Elliott v. City of New York

Background

Roland Elliott sued the City of New York, the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA), New York City Police Department (NYPD) Officer Lt. Eric S. Dym, and identified and unidentified officers. He alleged that Defendants discriminatorily enforced the City’s COVID-19 social-distancing policies against Black and Latinx communities. His claims included constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, related New York constitutional claims, and state common-law claims including false arrest and imprisonment, assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, abuse of process, and negligent hiring, training, and supervision. He also asserted discrimination claims against NYCHA under Title VI, the Fair Housing Act, the United States Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law.

Elliott alleged that officers interfered with a peaceful outdoor vigil at the Mott Haven Houses on April 7, 2020. He said officers cursed at and harassed him as he prepared to leave, then punched, kicked, tackled, and tased him. Officers handcuffed him, took him to a police station and a hospital, and later brought him to court for arraignment. He was released on April 8, 2020, and alleged that the criminal case against him was later dismissed. He further alleged that City and NYCHA policies or practices led to discriminatory policing and mistreatment of residents and others near the Mott Haven Houses.

The City and Dym, referred to in the opinion as the NYPD Defendants, moved to dismiss all claims against them except Elliott’s excessive-force claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), which concerns subject-matter jurisdiction, and Rule 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. NYCHA moved to dismiss the entire complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).

Rulings on the NYPD Defendants’ Motion

The court granted the motion as to Elliott’s requests for injunctive relief. To seek an injunction against a municipality, Elliott had to allege both a policy or equivalent practice and a realistic likelihood that he would personally suffer similar harm in the future. The court found that he alleged a policy or equivalent practice but did not allege that he was likely to be stopped, searched, or harassed again, particularly because the challenged conduct was tied to a past period ending in October 2022. His fear of future police misconduct and allegations that misconduct might continue elsewhere did not establish a sufficient personal risk.

The court granted the motion as to Elliott’s state common-law and state constitutional claims identified in the opinion as claims nine through fourteen and claim sixteen, because they were barred by the applicable one-year-and-ninety-day limitations period. The court rejected Elliott’s argument that a continuing violation extended the filing period. It held that his false arrest and imprisonment claims concerned restraint ending when he was released; his assault and battery claims accrued when the alleged acts occurred; and his intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and abuse-of-process claims arose from the April 7, 2020 incident. The court also found that Elliott had not alleged a timely discriminatory act supporting the continuing-violation theory for his state constitutional equal-protection and negligent-supervision claims. The court did not reach the NYPD Defendants’ qualified-immunity argument concerning false arrest.

The court denied the motion as to Dym’s personal involvement. Although the complaint did not describe Dym’s exact actions on April 7, 2020, the court found that its allegations plausibly connected him to initiating and continuing the stop, harassment, and use of force and gave him fair notice of the claims.

The court denied the motion as to Elliott’s race-based equal-protection claims against the NYPD Defendants, except to the extent he relied on a “class-of-one” theory. The court held that the complaint plausibly alleged that facially neutral social-distancing policies were intentionally enforced in a race-based manner against African-American and Latine communities. The allegations included comparisons to a gathering in Williamsburg and enforcement data and studies describing racial disparities. The court found the Williamsburg comparison sufficient, if barely, for a selective-enforcement theory, but found that the complaint did not meet the stricter requirements for a class-of-one theory. Statistics about predominantly white neighborhoods could not substitute for a sufficiently specific comparator for that theory.

The court granted the motion as to Elliott’s standalone Fourteenth Amendment due-process claim. Elliott did not respond to the argument seeking dismissal of that claim, and the court treated it as abandoned. The court also held that a separate substantive-due-process claim was unavailable because the alleged conduct was covered by more specific constitutional protections, including the Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment, and Equal Protection Clause.

The court denied the motion as to Elliott’s municipal-liability claims against the City. Municipal liability under Monell requires a plaintiff to plausibly allege that a municipal policy or practice caused a constitutional injury. The court found that Elliott’s allegations of racial disparities in COVID-19 policing, reports and data concerning arrests and summonses, alleged misconduct in the Mott Haven community, and alleged failures to train or supervise officers supported a plausible claim at the motion-to-dismiss stage. The court did not decide whether Elliott could ultimately prove those allegations.

Rulings on NYCHA’s Motion

The court granted NYCHA’s motion in full. It granted the motion as to Elliott’s federal equal-protection and municipal-liability claims because he did not adequately allege that NYCHA was involved in the NYPD officers’ conduct on April 7, 2020, or that the officers acted pursuant to a NYCHA policy, practice, or custom. The court held that the allegations of cooperation between NYCHA and the NYPD did not explain why NYCHA was responsible for the officers’ actions and amounted at most to an impermissible theory of vicarious liability.

The court also granted NYCHA’s motion as to Elliott’s Title VI and § 1981 claims. For purposes of the motion, it assumed without deciding that Elliott had statutory standing to bring those claims. It nevertheless found that he had not alleged facts showing that NYPD conduct should be attributed to NYCHA or that NYCHA intentionally discriminated against him.

The court granted the motion as to Elliott’s Fair Housing Act claim. Although Elliott argued that continuing discriminatory practices made the claim timely, the court found that he had not adequately alleged that NYCHA, rather than the NYPD, maintained a discriminatory practice extending into the limitations period.

The court granted the motion as to Elliott’s United States Housing Act claim because he did not allege that submission to the NYPD’s alleged practices was a condition of his NYCHA lease. It also declined to dismiss Elliott’s New York State Human Rights Law and New York City Human Rights Law claims based on the alleged failure to provide a notice of claim, because such notice was not required for civil-rights claims. However, the court granted NYCHA’s motion as to those claims because Elliott had not alleged facts showing discriminatory treatment attributable to NYCHA.

Disposition

The court stated that NYCHA’s motion was granted in full. The NYPD Defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted as to Elliott’s claims for injunctive relief, New York constitutional violations, due process, and the specified state-law claims, and denied as to all other claims. Elliott could proceed on claims one, two, and three against the NYPD Defendants. Judge Analisa Torres directed the Clerk of Court to terminate the two motions.