El Chaar v. New York University

Background

Dr. Edgard El Chaar, a professor of periodontology, worked for New York University College of Dentistry for nearly twenty-six years. He alleged that the school subjected him to a hostile work environment, denied him promotions, retaliated against him for complaining about discrimination, and constructively discharged him because of his race and national origin. His claims arose under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law.

El Chaar complained to the school’s Office of Equal Opportunity in 2017. That office found that some alleged comments—including that he was called “anti-Semitic” and a “foreigner”—were supported by at least one witness and expressed concern about a collective hostile work environment, although it concluded that no individual respondent’s conduct alone violated school policy. The school then required faculty to attend nondiscrimination and anti-harassment training.

When the chair of El Chaar’s department resigned, the dean appointed an interim chair from outside the department instead of El Chaar. Later, El Chaar applied to become the permanent chair. He was one of four finalists, but the school selected Leena Palomo. The dean considered faculty survey responses, the candidates’ qualifications, leadership and interpersonal skills, and other factors. El Chaar resigned after being told he would not receive the position.

Legal standard

The school moved for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows no genuine dispute about a fact that could affect the result and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court must view disputed facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, but that party must present concrete evidence from which a reasonable jury could rule in its favor.

For the Section 1981 discrimination and retaliation claims, the court applied the burden-shifting framework commonly used in employment cases. Under that framework, the employee must first present evidence supporting an initial claim. The employer must then provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory or nonretaliatory reason for its action. The employee must ultimately present evidence that the employer’s stated reason was a pretext, meaning a cover for unlawful discrimination or retaliation.

Hostile-work-environment claim

The court held that the older alleged comments could not independently support a timely Section 1981 claim because El Chaar filed the lawsuit more than four years after those events. The court considered whether later events could make the earlier conduct part of a continuing hostile environment. It rejected that argument because the school’s response training had been adopted after consultation with the investigator, El Chaar offered no evidence that the training was inadequate, and the later alleged comments were either unsupported by admissible evidence or not shown to be part of the same course of conduct.

The court also held that the faculty survey involved a discrete employment decision—the failure to promote El Chaar—and therefore could not be used to extend the hostile-work-environment claim. El Chaar did not show that the survey responses were motivated by race or national-origin discrimination. The court granted the school’s motion for summary judgment on the Section 1981 hostile-work-environment claim.

Failure to appoint El Chaar as interim chair

The court found that El Chaar presented an initial retaliation claim because he had made a discrimination complaint, the dean knew about it, El Chaar was not appointed to the interim position, and El Chaar testified that the dean referred to a need for a “cooling period” after his complaint.

The school, however, gave a legitimate reason for appointing an outside interim chair: the department was experiencing conflicts and operational problems, and the school routinely used experienced administrators from outside the department to address such issues. The court concluded that El Chaar did not provide enough evidence for a reasonable jury to find that retaliation was the but-for cause of the decision. The court regarded the dean’s “cooling period” comment as insufficient by itself, particularly given the department’s undisputed problems and the school’s prior practice. Summary judgment was therefore granted on this retaliation claim.

Failure to appoint El Chaar as permanent chair

The court assumed that El Chaar could establish the initial elements of a race- or national-origin discrimination claim because he was qualified and was denied the position. It nevertheless held that he did not show that the survey responses themselves reflected discriminatory or retaliatory intent, or that the dean negligently relied on biased information. El Chaar also did not provide evidence that the alleged campaign against him was related to his race or national origin.

The school offered legitimate reasons for using the survey and selecting Palomo. The survey helped assess faculty support and leadership qualities, and the dean had concerns about El Chaar’s statement that he would fire four or five department members. Palomo’s tenure, professional memberships, academic record, reputation, and leadership qualities also supported the selection. The executive committee ranked Palomo first and El Chaar second, and El Chaar conceded the accuracy of several reasons cited for that ranking.

The court held that El Chaar did not show these reasons were a pretext for discrimination. It also held that his retaliation claim concerning the permanent-chair decision failed because more than three years had passed since his complaint and, in any event, he did not show that the school’s stated reasons were pretextual. Summary judgment was granted on the discrimination and retaliation claims concerning the permanent chair position.

Constructive discharge

A constructive discharge occurs when an employer intentionally creates working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would feel forced to resign. The court held that El Chaar did not provide evidence that the school intended to create such conditions. The dean had asked him to remain as program director, a position with significant managerial responsibilities. The court also found that the school’s investigation, training, and decision not to place faculty members with a history of conflict with El Chaar on the search committee weighed against his claim. His dissatisfaction with not receiving the chair position and his statements that he would resign were not enough. The court granted summary judgment on the constructive-discharge claim.

State-law claims and disposition

After granting summary judgment on all of El Chaar’s federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his claims under the New York State Human Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law. Those claims were dismissed without prejudice to renewal in state court.

Final order

Judge Analisa Torres granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to El Chaar’s federal claims and dismissed his state claims without prejudice to renewal in state court. The court directed the clerk to enter judgment for the defendant, terminate the motion, and close the case.