Parris v. New York City Housing Authority

Background

Nathaniel Parris sued his former employer, the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA), and his former supervisor, Darrell Laval. Four causes of action remained after an earlier order dismissed one cause of action and narrowed two others. Counts One and Two asserted that NYCHA retaliated against Parris in violation of the federal False Claims Act and the New York False Claims Act after he reported what he viewed as mismanagement at NYCHA properties and misuse of NYCHA funds to the NYCHA Inspector General. Count Three alleged negligent hiring, retention, and supervision, and Count Five alleged defamation against Laval.

Parris submitted reports concerning, among other matters, work and funding issues at Manhattanville Houses and Castle Hill. He also relied on events involving funding, staffing, heating, repairs, and employee performance at Moore, Marble Hill, Castle Hill, and Drew Hamilton. Parris argued that Laval and NYCHA materially diminished his job responsibilities by delaying or withholding funding and staffing and by failing to support his work.

After discovery ended, Defendants moved for summary judgment on all remaining counts. Summary judgment is entered when the evidence shows that no genuine dispute of an important fact requires a trial and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law.

False Claims Act retaliation claims

The court applied the same substantive analysis to the federal and New York False Claims Act claims. To prove retaliation, Parris had to show protected activity, the employer’s awareness of that activity, and an adverse employment action taken because of it. The court did not decide whether Parris’s reports qualified as protected activity because it concluded that he had not provided enough evidence of an adverse employment action.

Parris’s opposition focused on the theory that his material job responsibilities had been significantly reduced. The court treated his other theories—constructive discharge and counseling memoranda—as abandoned because he did not pursue them in his opposition. Parris admitted that his position, title, salary, and job duties did not change after his reports to the Inspector General and before his retirement in September 2017.

The court examined the events at each development. At Moore, the court found no evidence that Laval directed anyone to delay or deny funding for the roof-tank repairs. Although the later funding request took about four months to receive approval, the record showed that Laval followed up on the request and approved an exemption certificate when one was needed. At Marble Hill, the evidence showed staffing and heating problems but did not show that Laval prevented staff from being hired or obstructed repairs.

At Castle Hill, the court concluded that a critical email from Laval, the rejection of a painting request because required price quotes were missing, and issues involving bathtub reglazing did not materially change Parris’s job responsibilities. At Drew Hamilton, the court found no evidence that Laval prevented Parris from addressing a tenant’s forgery report, withheld resources, or blocked discipline of employees. The court also noted that Laval promptly requested that an employee be demoted after Parris asked for that action, and that Parris himself issued memoranda concerning another employee’s performance.

The court held that the evidence showed, at most, workplace inconveniences, funding and staffing shortfalls, and criticism—not a material adverse change in the terms or conditions of Parris’s employment. It therefore dismissed Counts One and Two with prejudice. The court did not reach whether the alleged actions were caused by Parris’s reports.

State-law claims and disposition

After dismissing the federal False Claims Act claim and its New York counterpart, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Count Three, concerning negligent hiring, retention, and supervision, and Count Five, concerning defamation and defamation per se. Supplemental jurisdiction is the federal court’s authority to hear related state-law claims alongside federal claims. The court dismissed Counts Three and Five without prejudice to Parris refiling them in state court. The opinion states that the limitations period for those claims had been paused while this federal case was pending.

The court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, dismissed Counts One and Two with prejudice, dismissed Counts Three and Five without prejudice to refiling in state court, directed the Clerk to enter judgment, and closed the case.