McMillen Sulaymu-Bey v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey

Background

Aleshia McMillen Sulaymu-Bey proceeded without a lawyer and without paying the filing fee. In her amended complaint, she alleged that, late on January 6, 2020, she was trying to catch the last bus from the Port Authority bus terminal in Manhattan to New Jersey. She alleged that a New Jersey Transit employee, sued as “John Doe NJT employee,” used a racial slur after she asked for directions. She also alleged that a Port Authority “starter worker” did not promptly provide directions. She asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, and alleged that she was the victim of a hate crime. She named the Port Authority, John Doe NJT employee, Mojdeh Moayyed, and “Dadrian Hall/Tara” as defendants and sought $300,000 in damages.

The court reviewed the amended complaint under the screening requirement for cases brought without paying the filing fee. That requirement calls for dismissal of claims that are frivolous, seek relief from an immune defendant, or fail to state a claim for relief. The court also considered whether it had jurisdiction over the claims.

Federal claims

The court concluded that the amended complaint did not state a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The complaint did not allege that Sulaymu-Bey was disabled or that the alleged racial slur was related to a disability. The court also noted that money damages are unavailable to a private individual under Title III of that statute.

As to the § 1983 claim against John Doe NJT employee, the court held that verbal harassment alone—even the alleged use of a racial slur—does not amount to a constitutional violation without an additional appreciable injury. Because the alleged interaction involved only verbal harassment, the court found the allegations insufficient.

The court also rejected the § 1981 claim against John Doe NJT employee because Sulaymu-Bey did not allege that she lost a legally protected right. The court dismissed the Title VI claim against that individual because Title VI applies to entities receiving federal funding, not individual defendants.

For the claims against the Port Authority under §§ 1981 and 1983, the court applied standards used for municipal liability. It held that Sulaymu-Bey had not alleged a Port Authority policy, custom, or practice that caused a violation of her rights. The court also stated that the alleged conduct by the New Jersey Transit employee was not attributable to the Port Authority, and that the allegations about the Port Authority worker did not show a constitutional violation or a policy, custom, or practice causing one.

The court dismissed the Title VI claim against the Port Authority because Sulaymu-Bey did not allege that the Port Authority intentionally discriminated against her based on race, color, or national origin, or that it maintained a discriminatory policy, custom, or practice.

The court dismissed the claims against Mojdeh Moayyed and “Dadrian Hall/Tara” because the amended complaint did not allege any facts about what those defendants did or failed to do.

Hate-crime and state-law allegations

The court dismissed the allegation that Sulaymu-Bey was the victim of a hate crime. It explained that a private person cannot initiate or control a criminal prosecution in federal court; decisions about whether to prosecute belong to prosecutors.

Sulaymu-Bey also asserted a state-law breach-of-contract claim. After dismissing the federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction—the court’s authority to hear related state-law claims—in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The order does not state that the state-law claim was dismissed with or without prejudice.

Disposition

The court dismissed the federal claims for failure to state a claim, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims, and declined to give Sulaymu-Bey another opportunity to amend because she had already amended once and the court found no indication that further amendment could cure the defects. The clerk was directed to enter judgment. The court also certified that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied fee-free status for purposes of an appeal.