Johnson v. Johnson

Background

Jinja “Kyng Pariah” Johnson filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 while incarcerated and representing herself. She alleged that defendants violated her constitutional rights during detention at the Rose M. Singer Center, Kirby Psychiatric Center, and Rockland Psychiatric Center. Her original complaint was filed on April 12, 2022, and she later filed amended complaints without direction from the court.

In an order dated November 20, 2023, the court dismissed the original and first amended complaints for failure to state a claim because Johnson did not allege facts showing each defendant’s personal involvement. The court gave her 60 days to replead facts supporting a valid constitutional claim and instructed her to show that the court had authority to hear her claims.

Johnson then filed a second amended complaint concerning events at the Rose M. Singer Center and Mid-Hudson Psychiatric Center from February 4, 2022, through March 15, 2023. She later filed a third amended complaint alleging that she had been wrongfully convicted. The court treated the second and third amended complaints together as the operative pleading.

Reasons for dismissal

The court held that the amended pleadings did not cure the earlier defects. Even considering the special consideration given to complaints filed without a lawyer, Johnson did not allege facts showing how each named defendant was directly and personally involved in violating her federal rights. The court therefore dismissed the action for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), a provision requiring dismissal during screening when a qualifying complaint does not state a claim.

The court separately dismissed the claims against Judge Cory Weston. It held that judges are absolutely protected from damages claims for actions taken within their judicial responsibilities. Johnson did not allege facts showing that Weston acted outside those responsibilities or without jurisdiction. The court dismissed those claims because they sought money from a defendant immune from that relief and therefore also treated them as frivolous under the applicable screening statute.

The court also dismissed the claims against David Krauss. Section 1983 generally requires conduct taken under state authority, and private parties ordinarily are not liable under that statute. The court stated that representing a defendant in state criminal proceedings does not ordinarily make a private lawyer a state actor. Because Johnson did not allege that Krauss worked for a state or other government body, she did not state a § 1983 claim against him.

Conviction-related claims and state-law claims

The court dismissed without prejudice Johnson’s new claims challenging her conviction because those claims were beyond the scope of the original lawsuit and the amendment permission the court had granted. The court explained that constitutional challenges to a state-court conviction generally must be brought in a petition challenging custody under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, after available state-court remedies have been exhausted.

Johnson had also referred to a state-law defamation claim and possibly other state-law claims. Because she did not state a federal claim, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, meaning its authority to hear related state-law claims, over those claims. The court also declined to allow another amendment because Johnson had already received an opportunity to correct the pleading defects and the court determined that further amendment could not cure them.

Disposition

The court dismissed the action as frivolous, for failure to state a claim, and for seeking monetary relief from a defendant immune from that relief. The clerk was directed to enter judgment dismissing the action. The court certified that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied Johnson permission to proceed without paying fees for purposes of an appeal. Judge Laura Taylor Swain signed the order as Chief United States District Judge.