Arriaga v. Annucci

Background

Anthony Arriaga, representing himself and proceeding without paying the filing fee, sued Anthony Annucci, Michael Capra, Quandera T. Quick, Elaine Velez, and Benny Thorpe. The defendants were sued in their official and individual capacities. Arriaga alleged that the defendants violated his constitutional and state-law rights while he was incarcerated at Sing Sing Correctional Facility and, later, Sullivan Correctional Facility.

Arriaga alleged that he was removed from a Sing Sing law-library clerk assignment in 2019 under a policy treating the position as security-sensitive. He also alleged that prison staff failed to follow COVID-19 precautions, that he contracted COVID-19, and that he experienced poor conditions during quarantines. He claimed that Catholic services were suspended at Sing Sing for nearly a year. He further alleged that prison officials mishandled grievances, restricted his participation in inmate organizations, removed him from leadership positions, and transferred him from Sing Sing to Sullivan in retaliation for raising staff-misconduct issues.

Legal standards

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(1) concerns the court’s power to hear a case, while Rule 12(b)(6) tests whether the complaint alleges enough facts to support a legally recognized claim. At this stage, the court accepted well-pleaded factual allegations as true, drew reasonable inferences in Arriaga’s favor, and interpreted his filings liberally because he was representing himself.

Claims dismissed for jurisdictional or pleading reasons

The court dismissed claims for money damages against all defendants in their official capacities because the Eleventh Amendment generally protects states and state officials sued in that capacity from such federal-court claims. The court also dismissed Arriaga’s state-law claims for negligence, gross negligence, negligent and grossly negligent training, direction, retention, and supervision, slander per se, and fraud under Section 24 of the New York Correction Law.

The court dismissed Arriaga’s claims based on his removal from the law-library assignment. It held that he alleged injuries to other incarcerated people who had received his assistance, rather than a personal injury to himself. The dismissed claims included denial of access to the courts, equal protection, erroneous removal from the assignment, interference with the writ of habeas corpus, legal assistance, and failure to prevent or intervene.

The court dismissed the Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claim concerning COVID-19 conditions. It found that Arriaga generally failed to allege that the defendants knew about the conditions he described. As to the November 2021 quarantine, the court found that the alleged conditions were not sufficiently serious under the deliberate-indifference standard.

The court dismissed constitutional claims concerning the prison grievance process because incarcerated people do not have a constitutional right to a grievance procedure, a response to a grievance, or proper processing of a grievance. The court also dismissed the conspiracy claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 and the related claim under Section 1986 because the complaint did not plead particular facts showing an agreement among the defendants.

First Amendment religious-services claim

The court held that Arriaga plausibly alleged that the nearly year-long suspension of Catholic services substantially burdened his sincerely held religious beliefs. The court also found that the defendants had not identified a particular prison-safety or other legitimate prison-related reason that justified the suspension at the motion-to-dismiss stage.

The claim may proceed against Annucci because Arriaga alleged that Annucci directed the suspension of religious services. It may also proceed against Capra because Arriaga alleged that he sent Capra a Supreme Court decision concerning restrictions on congregate religious services, which plausibly put Capra on notice that services should be reinstated. The court dismissed this claim as to Quick, Velez, and Thorpe because Arriaga did not allege their personal involvement in denying religious services.

First Amendment retaliation claim

The court held that Arriaga plausibly alleged retaliation for protected speech. It concluded that raising staff-misconduct issues through grievances and the Incarcerated Liaison Committee was protected activity. It further concluded that preventing him from attending committee meetings, removing him from inmate-organization leadership positions, and transferring him from Sing Sing could deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising constitutional rights.

The alleged timing of the actions, Capra’s alleged statements about staff-misconduct agendas and removing Arriaga from Sing Sing, and Arriaga’s allegation that he had a perfect disciplinary record were sufficient at the pleading stage to support a possible causal connection. The court dismissed this claim as to Annucci and Quick because Arriaga did not adequately allege their personal involvement. The claim may proceed against Capra, Velez, and Thorpe.

The court also rejected qualified immunity for Capra, Velez, and Thorpe at this stage. Assuming the allegations were true, the court held that retaliating against Arriaga for exercising his First Amendment rights was clearly unlawful, and the defendants’ asserted belief that a transfer was lawful could not be resolved on the pleadings.

Relief and disposition

The court dismissed requests for injunctive and declaratory relief concerning Sing Sing because Arriaga had been transferred away from that facility and the alleged violations were past acts rather than ongoing violations of federal law. The court denied leave to amend, finding that the deficiencies in the dismissed claims were substantive and could not be cured by improved pleading.

The motion to dismiss was therefore granted in part and denied in part. The First Amendment free-exercise claim may proceed against Annucci and Capra, and the First Amendment retaliation claim may proceed against Capra, Velez, and Thorpe. The court dismissed the other claims identified in its conclusion, denied Arriaga’s request to proceed without paying the filing fee for an appeal, instructed the Clerk to terminate Quick as a defendant, and directed that the case continue toward an initial conference.