Sutton v. Adams

Background

Troy Sutton, proceeding without a lawyer, sued the City of New York and Mayor Eric Adams. Sutton was a former Civil Service Senior Custodian who had worked for the City’s Department of Citywide Administrative Services for approximately 14 years. The City required its employees to receive at least one dose of an approved COVID-19 vaccine as a condition of continued employment. Sutton requested a religious exemption, but the City denied his request. The City later notified him that he was terminated for failing to receive the required vaccine.

Sutton challenged the City’s October 20, 2021 vaccination mandate and Mayor Adams’s March 24, 2022 emergency order under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. He argued that the City treated public employees differently from private-sector workers and from professional athletes, performing artists, and people working alongside them. He also alleged that the City discriminated and retaliated against him because of prior complaints, a disability, and his age. Sutton was 50 when he was terminated. Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which asks whether the complaint contains enough factual allegations to state a legally plausible claim.

Equal-Protection Claims

The court applied the rational-basis standard because Sutton did not identify a protected classification and the vaccination mandate did not implicate a fundamental right. The court stated that “City workers” and socioeconomic status were not protected classes under the Equal Protection Clause. It also relied on precedent recognizing that the Constitution does not establish a fundamental right that makes public-health vaccination requirements unconstitutional.

Under rational-basis review, a policy is valid if it is reasonably related to a legitimate government interest. The court held that the City had a rational basis for requiring City employees to be vaccinated: protecting the public from COVID-19, particularly in City buildings. The court also found a rational basis for treating City employees differently from professional athletes and performing artists. People could choose whether to attend a sporting event or performance, while people might have less choice about entering City buildings. The emergency order also cited the performers’ and athletes’ contributions to the City’s economic recovery and the competitive disadvantage faced by the City’s sports teams when visiting teams could use unvaccinated players.

The court also considered two equal-protection theories that can apply even when a plaintiff does not allege discrimination against a protected class: selective enforcement and “class of one.” Both theories require a plaintiff to identify a comparable person or group that received more favorable treatment. The court held that private-sector workers were not sufficiently comparable to Sutton, and that professional athletes, performing artists, and their coworkers were also not sufficiently comparable to him. Sutton likewise did not allege that the defendants selectively treated him differently from other City employees. The court further held that Sutton’s allegations about improper motives were speculative and did not overcome the City’s rational basis. The court therefore dismissed Sutton’s equal-protection claims.

Age and Other Employment Claims

Defendants argued that Sutton improperly added his Age Discrimination in Employment Act claim to the amended complaint without consent or permission. Because Sutton was representing himself, the court treated the amendment as a request for permission to amend and granted that request.

The court nevertheless dismissed the age-discrimination claim and any Title VII claims Sutton intended to assert. A person bringing an Age Discrimination in Employment Act or Title VII claim generally must first file the relevant discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or the applicable state agency within the required period. The court understood Sutton to concede that he had not filed such charges within 300 days of the challenged conduct. It found that he had not alleged facts that would plausibly excuse this requirement.

The court also held that Sutton’s allegations were insufficient even assuming the claims were timely. For an age-discrimination claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, age must be the “but-for” cause of the adverse employment decision. Sutton alleged that age and an unspecified disability played a significant part in his termination, but he did not allege that age was the necessary cause of the termination. The court also found that he did not plausibly allege that age or retaliation caused his termination, particularly because his complaint specifically attributed the termination to his failure to comply with the vaccination mandate. The court dismissed Sutton’s remaining claims.

Disposition

Judge Oetken granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court dismissed Sutton’s claims and directed the Clerk of Court to terminate the motion at ECF No. 22 and close the case. The opinion does not state that the dismissal was with or without prejudice.