Gomes v. Santa Clara County

Background

Tim and Catherine Gomes sued Santa Clara County and county social workers Roshanda Burns, Linda Hsaio, Michael Shaheed, Sarah Arana, and Bob Beck. Their 15 claims concerned the removal of their older child, I.G., the emergency removal of their younger child, H.G., alleged sexual misconduct by Shaheed, a claim against the County under Section 1983, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Arana. The parents alleged violations of their Fourteenth Amendment right to family association and their right to be free from deception and false evidence in court proceedings, along with state-law claims.

I.G. had previously been placed under juvenile-court supervision and later removed from the Gomeses’ custody after allegations involving unsafe home conditions, supervision, domestic violence, and Catherine’s mental-health issues. The juvenile court and California Court of Appeal upheld the findings supporting I.G.’s dependency and later parental-rights proceedings. In June 2017, the juvenile court issued a protective-custody order after DFCS sought a warrant for I.G.’s removal.

H.G. was born on November 24, 2017. Hospital staff later reported concerns about the parents’ care of H.G., including not responding to the infant’s needs, leaving her unswaddled until her body temperature dropped, unsafe handling, and leaving waste on the floor. County workers began seeking a warrant, but when they learned that H.G. and the parents would be released from the hospital momentarily, they decided that emergency circumstances justified removing H.G. without a warrant.

Rooker-Feldman ruling concerning I.G.

The defendants argued that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred the federal claims involving both children. That doctrine prevents a federal district court from acting as an appeals court reviewing a final state-court judgment.

The court agreed that the doctrine barred the Section 1983 claims concerning I.G. The parents argued that Burns had used false information in a warrant application. The court found that the juvenile dependency court had already considered and rejected the parents’ arguments that Burns’s report was fraudulent. Allowing the federal claims to proceed would require the district court to revisit that state-court determination. The court therefore granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Counts One and Two.

The court reached a different conclusion for H.G. It held that the state juvenile court’s later decision to continue H.G.’s detention did not resolve whether exigent circumstances existed at the time of the initial warrantless removal. The court therefore held that Rooker-Feldman did not bar the H.G. claims.

H.G. removal and qualified immunity

The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment on their Fourteenth Amendment claims concerning H.G. Parents and children have a constitutional right to live together without government interference, but officials may remove a child without a warrant when they have reasonable cause to believe the child faces imminent danger of serious bodily injury and the removal is reasonably necessary to prevent that injury.

The court held that the record established sufficient exigent circumstances to justify H.G.’s warrantless removal. Beck and DiPaulo knew about the parents’ history involving I.G., had received repeated concerns from Kaiser staff about the parents’ ability to care for H.G., and were already seeking a warrant when they learned that the family would soon leave the hospital. The court stated that the risk to H.G. increased when she was about to leave the hospital because hospital staff could no longer intervene.

The court also held that the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, which protects officials from liability when their conduct did not violate clearly established law or when a reasonable official could have believed the conduct was lawful. The court found that the law clearly prohibited removing a child without evidence of imminent serious bodily injury, but a reasonable official would not have understood that a warrant was required under these circumstances. The court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Counts Five, Six, and Seven. The opinion separately states that Count Six, the parents’ Fourth Amendment claim concerning H.G.’s removal, was dismissed because the parents’ claim was properly analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Fourth Amendment.

Claims against Santa Clara County

The parents asserted municipal-liability claims against Santa Clara County under Section 1983. Under that theory, a county can be liable for a constitutional violation caused by an official policy, a widespread practice, a decision by a final policymaker, or deliberately inadequate training.

The court held that it could not assess the County claim concerning I.G. because doing so would require disrupting the juvenile court’s finding that Burns’s statements were true. It therefore granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Count Three.

Regarding H.G., the parents alleged that the County had a custom of removing children without exigent circumstances and that its policies and training were inadequate. The court found that the DFCS policies required a warrantless removal only when there was immediate danger of serious physical harm and otherwise directed workers to seek a warrant when danger was imminent. The court also found that the parents had provided no evidence of a widespread practice or sufficient facts showing a practice of wrongful removals, false warrant applications, or inadequate training. The court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Counts Eight and Fourteen.

Remaining claims and disposition

The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims, including Counts Four, Nine, Ten through Twelve, and Fifteen. Supplemental jurisdiction allows a federal court to decide related state-law claims, but the court may decline that jurisdiction after disposing of all federal claims. The court stated that it had not considered the merits of the state-law claims and that the parties had not identified a significant inconvenience from refiling them in state court.

In its conclusion, the court stated that the defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted in part as to the federal claims in Counts One through Three, Five through Eight, and Thirteen through Fourteen. The plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment was denied. The court declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims, directed the Clerk to close the file, and stated that judgment in favor of the defendants would follow.