D.R. v. Contra Costa County CA

Background

The case proceeded on a Third Amended Complaint concerning D.R.’s detention by the County’s Children & Family Services agency, D.R.’s death while in the custody of foster parent Marcie Franich, and actions taken by County employees afterward. D.R. was deceased and appeared through her successor in interest, John Freeman. Cristina Ramirez also was a plaintiff. The remaining defendants addressed by the motion were Contra Costa County and Tasha Mizel; the complaint also named foster parent Marcie Franich and County employees identified as Doe defendants. Claims against Franich and all of Freeman’s claims against the County defendants had previously been dismissed.

The County defendants moved for summary judgment under Rule 56. Summary judgment is a decision entered without a trial when the evidence shows no genuine dispute about a fact important to the result and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law.

First Cause of Action: State-Law Wrongful-Death and Survivor Claims

Ramirez’s First Cause of Action asserted state-law claims based on alleged failures by County coroner employees to investigate and document D.R.’s death, alleged failures by Mizel and other social workers to supervise Franich and assist relatives seeking placement, and alleged liability by the County for its employees’ conduct and for negligence by Franich.

The court held that the claims were barred by California’s Government Claims Act. That law requires a plaintiff to present a damages claim to a public entity before filing suit against the entity or its employee. Ramirez presented her claim to the County on March 11, 2020, after the lawsuit had been filed on October 30, 2019. The court rejected Ramirez’s argument that the County should be prevented from relying on this requirement because its employees had delayed or withheld information about D.R.’s death. The court found that Ramirez knew the relevant circumstances before filing suit and had not shown that a County employee prevented or deterred her from presenting a timely claim.

The court therefore held that the County defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the First Cause of Action. The Doe defendants also were entitled to summary judgment because the same dispositive issue applied to them and Ramirez had a full opportunity to address it.

Second Cause of Action: Cremation and Related State-Law Claims

The Second Cause of Action alleged that Mizel arranged for D.R.’s remains to be released for cremation without Ramirez’s consent and that other County employees directed or participated in that conduct. Plaintiffs argued that the Government Claims Act did not apply because Mizel acted outside the scope of her employment.

The court rejected that argument. The complaint alleged that Mizel and the Doe defendants acted as County employees within the scope of their duties, and Ramirez’s claim to the County also asserted that the County was responsible for Mizel’s conduct. The court further found that plaintiffs presented no evidence creating a genuine dispute about consent. Mizel stated that she contacted Ramirez personally and that Ramirez agreed to cremation. The court found that a declaration from Ramirez’s mother stating what Ramirez might have done if she had known more about the death was speculation and did not create a triable factual dispute.

The court held that the County defendants and the relevant Doe defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the Second Cause of Action.

Third Cause of Action: Federal Civil-Rights Claims

The Third Cause of Action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It alleged that County social workers violated constitutional rights by taking D.R. from the hospital without a warrant, by authorizing cremation without Ramirez’s consent, and by failing to notify or assist relatives seeking placement of D.R. in a relative’s home.

Claim Against Mizel Concerning Relative Placement

The court considered Mizel’s argument that the claim concerning placement with relatives was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. That doctrine generally prevents a federal district court from acting as an appeal court reviewing a state-court judgment. The court held that the doctrine barred the claim only to the extent it challenged the state court’s requirement that relative placement occur after a court hearing. It did not bar a claim based on an alleged failure by Mizel to notify relatives or assist them in applying for placement, because success on that theory would not require finding that the state court had wrongly decided an issue.

The court nevertheless held that Mizel was entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiffs argued that the alleged placement rights arose from federal statutes, state statutes, and a state court rule. The court found that plaintiffs had not identified precedent clearly establishing that the cited federal statutes could support a § 1983 claim or that the cited state laws and court rule created a federally protected procedural-rights claim. The court therefore granted summary judgment to Mizel on the Third Cause of Action based on qualified immunity.

Claims Against Doe Defendants

The court granted summary judgment to the Doe defendants on the cremation-related § 1983 claim for the same reason stated for the Second Cause of Action: the evidence was undisputed that Ramirez consented to the cremation.

The court also granted summary judgment to the Doe defendants on the relative-placement claim based on qualified immunity, for the same reasons applicable to Mizel.

Seizure Claim

The remaining claim alleged that Doe defendants seized D.R. from the hospital without a warrant and without an emergency requiring immediate action. Plaintiffs sought permission to add Mizel, Kathy Schulze, Rosario Vidales, and the County as defendants. Plaintiffs did not seek to identify and name Imani Williams-Ephriam, whom the evidence identified as the social worker who took D.R. from the hospital.

The court found that plaintiffs did not claim or provide evidence that Mizel, Schulze, Vidales, or the County participated in the seizure. The proposed theory that these individuals failed to intervene could not support liability because plaintiffs did not show that they were present during the seizure or involved in the decision to detain D.R. The court also found the proposed amendment untimely because the deadline to amend had passed and plaintiffs did not explain why they had failed to seek amendment earlier.

The court therefore dismissed the seizure portion of the Third Cause of Action without further leave to amend. The court specifically did not decide the County defendants’ argument that the seizure itself failed to violate the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment, because neither County defendant was named as a defendant to that claim and therefore neither had standing to seek a ruling on its viability.

Disposition

The court’s order granted the County defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to all claims except the unconstitutional-seizure portion of the Third Cause of Action. That portion was dismissed without further leave to amend. The order was signed by Maxine M. Chesney, United States District Judge.