Doe v. County of Santa Clara

Background

Jane and Jill Doe were minors when the events occurred. The Santa Clara Department of Family and Children’s Services removed them from their parents’ care because of alleged substance-abuse and domestic-violence issues. Jane was placed with Brian Hernandez and Marissa Clark before Jill was born, and Jill was later placed with them at birth. The plaintiffs alleged that County personnel failed to investigate the home adequately, misrepresented its safety to the juvenile court, and failed to consider placement with biological relatives. Hernandez and Clark later adopted the children. The plaintiffs alleged that they suffered severe abuse after the adoption.

The plaintiffs filed this action against the County, Jenkins, County departments, unidentified social workers, Hernandez, and Clark. After earlier dismissals and amendments, the second amended complaint asserted three types of claims: (1) a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging interference with familial association and privacy; (2) claims against the County under Monell, which allows liability for a municipality’s policy, practice, or custom that causes a constitutional violation; and (3) a separate judicial-deception claim. The County and Jenkins moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim.

Judicial Notice

The court granted the defendants’ request to take judicial notice of juvenile-court records from two Santa Clara County proceedings. The court considered those records in deciding the motion because court filings are generally proper subjects of judicial notice.

Section 1983 Claims

The court dismissed the Section 1983 claim against the County with prejudice because the plaintiffs had not obtained permission to add that claim after the court’s prior order required express leave to add claims or parties. The plaintiffs also did not respond to the defendants’ arguments concerning the County’s liability.

The court dismissed the Section 1983 claims against Jenkins with prejudice. As to Jane, the court held that the allegations did not plausibly show a long-standing custodial relationship with her grandmother. The court noted that Jane was an infant when removed and, according to the complaint, lived in a guesthouse on her great-grandparents’ property rather than with her grandmother. As to Jill, the court relied on the complaint’s allegation that Jill did not know she had a biological family until she was 13. The court therefore concluded that Jill could not claim an established family relationship that government action had disrupted.

The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ theory that Jenkins used judicial deception. A judicial-deception claim requires a deliberate or recklessly made material misrepresentation or omission. The court found the allegations about other foster children being removed from the home speculative, including because Jane was about 18 months old when that removal occurred and the plaintiffs admitted they did not know the reason for it. The court also found that the home study did not support the claim because it was not shown to the juvenile court.

Monell Claims

The court dismissed the Monell claim without prejudice and granted leave to amend. The complaint identified alleged policies concerning emergency removals, approval of foster homes, approval of homes despite evidence of abuse, and inadequate training or supervision. The court found that some allegations were conclusory, that the complaint did not plausibly allege a policy or widespread practice extending beyond the plaintiffs’ treatment, and that it did not identify a constitutional right infringed by the alleged policies. The court also held that the alleged failure to train employees to evaluate biological relatives could not support a Monell claim because those relatives did not have a constitutional right to custody.

Separate Judicial-Deception Claim

The court dismissed the separate judicial-deception claim with prejudice and without leave to amend. It found that the plaintiffs had not identified a constitutional right violated by the alleged deception and had not pleaded fraud with particularity after three attempts.

Disposition

Judge Jeffrey White granted the motion to dismiss the second amended complaint. The Section 1983 claims against Jenkins and the County and the separate judicial-deception claim were dismissed with prejudice. The Monell claim was dismissed without prejudice. The plaintiffs may file a third amended complaint addressing only the Monell claim within 21 days, provided counsel believes there is a good-faith basis under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 to do so.