Sanchez v. City of Atherton

Background

Daniel Sanchez alleged that, on May 30, 2020, officers from several mutual-aid law-enforcement agencies assisting Oakland police used excessive force while he peacefully observed demonstrations at Frank Ogawa Plaza. He alleged that officers fired at least seven 40MM Direct Impact Rounds toward him, and that one round struck his eye, causing permanent blindness in his left eye. He alleged that the rounds were used without exigent circumstances and without approval from the Oakland Police Department incident commander, contrary to the department’s Training Bulletin III-G.

Sanchez asserted five claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law allowing claims against people who violate constitutional rights while acting under state authority: excessive force under the Fourth Amendment; interference with free speech under the First Amendment; failure to intervene; supervisory liability; and failure to train and supervise. The court had previously dismissed his original complaint for insufficient factual allegations but allowed him to amend most claims. It had dismissed his official-capacity claims without leave to amend.

Claim-splitting ruling

The defendants argued that the amended complaint improperly split claims that Sanchez had already brought in an earlier Oakland action. Claim-splitting generally prevents a plaintiff from maintaining two lawsuits involving the same subject matter against the same defendant at the same time.

The court revisited whether the defendants were in “privity,” meaning they had a legally recognized relationship with parties to the earlier case that could make the earlier litigation applicable to them. Based on the mutual-aid relationship, the court found that APD, SMPD, SMSO, RCPD, and CCOS were in privity with defendants in the earlier Oakland action. It concluded that the claims against those five agency defendants were duplicative and dismissed those claims without leave to amend.

The court reached a different conclusion for MacDonald, Hickman, Clayton, Smith, Cochran, Marshall, and Williams in their individual capacities. They were not parties to the earlier action, and the court found that their individual-capacity claims were not barred by claim-splitting. The court therefore denied the motion to dismiss on that ground as to those individual defendants.

Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim

The court denied the motion to dismiss the excessive-force claim as to Hickman, MacDonald, and Williams. Sanchez alleged that each officer affirmatively participated in firing rounds without justification and that one of the rounds struck him. The court held that the amended allegations corrected the earlier problem concerning causation. It also held that Sanchez did not need to identify which of the three officers fired the specific round that caused his injury at the pleading stage because the rules allow alternative allegations.

The court granted the motion as to Clayton, Smith, Marshall, and Cochran. Sanchez alleged that they were nearby, communicated with the shooting officers, and authorized the deployment of the rounds, but the court found those allegations too conclusory to show that they played an integral role in the alleged constitutional violation. The order granted dismissal without leave to amend as to the other defendants.

First Amendment claim

The court granted the motion to dismiss Sanchez’s free-speech claim without leave to amend. Although the court accepted that observing police activity was protected conduct and that the alleged use of force could deter an ordinary person from continuing that conduct, it found insufficient facts showing that Sanchez’s observation was a substantial or motivating reason for the officers’ actions.

The court emphasized that Sanchez alleged he was standing at a distance from the demonstrators and officers and was not part of the demonstration. It also found that his allegations, made on information and belief, that the officers intended to suppress protected activity did not provide enough factual support for the required inference of intent. Because Sanchez had already amended this claim once and the court found further amendment futile, it dismissed the claim without leave to amend.

Failure-to-intervene claim

The court denied the motion to dismiss the failure-to-intervene claim. An officer may be liable for failing to stop another officer’s constitutional violation when the officer had a realistic opportunity to intervene. Sanchez alleged that the defendants could communicate with one another and had opportunities to de-escalate their interactions with peaceful demonstrators. Accepting those allegations as true at this stage, the court found them—although sparse—sufficient to allow the claim to proceed.

Supervisory-liability claim

The court granted the motion to dismiss the supervisory-liability claim without leave to amend. It dismissed the claim against the agency defendants under its claim-splitting analysis. As to Clayton, Smith, Cochran, and Marshall in their individual capacities, the court found that Sanchez did not provide enough facts showing that they had authority over Hickman, MacDonald, and Williams or establishing a causal connection between the supervisors’ conduct and the alleged constitutional injury. The court found further amendment futile.

Failure-to-train and supervise claim

The court granted the motion to dismiss the failure-to-train and supervise claim without leave to amend. It treated the claim as asserting individual supervisory liability against MacDonald, Hickman, Clayton, Smith, Cochran, Marshall, and Williams, and municipal liability against the city and county defendants based on an alleged policy or practice. The court dismissed the municipal claims under its claim-splitting ruling.

As to the individual defendants, the court found no sufficient nonconclusory facts showing personal involvement, a supervisory role, knowledge, or a causal connection to the alleged constitutional violation. It also found some allegations contradictory or difficult to follow, including allegations that MacDonald and Williams both fired the injury-causing rounds and failed to train or supervise without facts showing they were supervisors. The court dismissed the claim without leave to amend.

Disposition

Judge Jeffrey White granted in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss the first amended complaint. The order dismissed without leave to amend all claims against APD, SMSO, CCOS, SMPD, and RCPD; denied dismissal of the first claim as to MacDonald, Hickman, and Williams but granted dismissal as to all other defendants; granted dismissal without leave to amend of the second, fourth, and fifth claims; and denied dismissal of the third claim.