Doe v. Santa Clara County Department of Health and Human Services

Background

Jane and Jill Doe were minors when the events occurred. The Santa Clara Department of Family and Children’s Services removed them from their parents’ care because of alleged substance-abuse and domestic-violence issues. The agency placed them with Brian Hernandez and Marissa Clark instead of their biological grandmother. The plaintiffs alleged that Hernandez and Clark physically and sexually abused them, and that the County and Sharon Jenkins failed to investigate the home adequately or respond to warning signs.

The plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint asserted six categories of claims: a civil-rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Jenkins for interference with familial association and privacy; a claim against the County under Monell v. Department of Social Services, which concerns municipal responsibility for constitutional violations caused by an official policy or custom; state civil-rights claims; a § 1983 claim for judicial deception; a claim concerning injuries to children in government care; and negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Judicial Notice

The County renewed its request for judicial notice of juvenile-court records. The court stated that the records were proper subjects of judicial notice, but because it did not rely on them in deciding the motion, it denied the request as moot.

Federal Civil-Rights Claims

The court dismissed the § 1983 claim concerning familial association and privacy with leave to amend. The plaintiffs alleged that they were wrongfully placed with Hernandez and Clark instead of biological family members, but they did not plausibly allege an established close familial relationship with their grandmother or other unnamed relatives that government action had disrupted.

The court also dismissed, with leave to amend, the claim that Jenkins violated the plaintiffs’ liberty interests in social-worker supervision and protection from harm in government care. The complaint did not allege that Jenkins was the social worker assigned to the plaintiffs’ case and did not provide enough specific facts about the alleged lies, warning signs, dangerous conduct, or home-study problems to make the claim plausible.

The court declined at this stage to dismiss the § 1983 claims based on absolute or qualified immunity. It stated that Jenkins might have absolute immunity for quasi-prosecutorial or quasi-judicial functions in juvenile-dependency proceedings, and might have qualified immunity if the alleged conduct did not violate a clearly established right. But the court found dismissal on either immunity ground premature and allowed Jenkins to raise those defenses again if the plaintiffs amended the claims.

Monell Claim

The court dismissed the County’s Monell claim. The plaintiffs identified alleged policies involving removal of children, foster-home approval and investigations, adoption home studies, and inadequate training or supervision. The court found that the complaint supplied facts specific to the plaintiffs rather than facts showing an unconstitutional County custom or policy. It also found that the failure-to-train theory consisted only of a conclusory allegation and did not explain what training was inadequate or how it caused the alleged constitutional injuries. The court granted leave to amend this claim.

Judicial-Deception Claim

The court dismissed the judicial-deception claim with leave to amend. A judicial-deception claim requires a deliberate or recklessly false statement or omission that was important to a judicial decision. The court found that the plaintiffs did not adequately identify a misrepresentation or omission. Their allegation that the defendants failed to disclose that another county had removed foster children from Hernandez and Clark was speculative because the plaintiffs said they did not know why those children had been removed.

State-Law Claims

The court dismissed the state civil-rights, negligence, and intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims with prejudice as to the County and Jenkins. The plaintiffs did not respond to the defendants’ arguments concerning those claims and did not amend the complaint to address deficiencies identified in the court’s earlier ruling. The court stated that the plaintiffs had therefore forfeited the claims and that state-law immunity independently required dismissal.

Defendant Clark and Disposition

The court ordered the plaintiffs to show cause why their claims against Clark should not be dismissed for failure to serve or prosecute. Earlier requests for entry of default against Clark had been declined because of insufficient proof of service, and the plaintiffs had taken no action since the court’s most recent denial on October 18, 2023. The response was due February 16, 2024; the court stated that failure to respond timely would result in dismissal of Clark without prejudice.

The court granted the County and Jenkins’ motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs could amend only the § 1983, judicial-deception, and Monell claims, and any amendment was limited to the deficiencies identified in the order. The amended complaint was due February 29, 2024.