Johnson v. Pham

Background

On September 5, 2019, Metro Transit police responded to a report of a shooting at the Hamline Avenue light-rail station. Officers learned that the shooter might have left in an older, silver Dodge Durango. About 50 minutes after the report, Sergeant Chad Worden saw an older, silver Durango near the station traveling south, followed it, and stopped it after other officers arrived.

The officers pointed their firearms at the vehicle, ordered Theresa L. Johnson, the driver, and Tammy A. Mhanna, the passenger, out, and handcuffed both women. Officers inspected the Durango and found nothing connecting the women or the vehicle to the shooting. Sergeant Worden then removed Mhanna’s handcuffs and told her she was free to leave. Johnson remained handcuffed in a squad car for roughly six more minutes while Officer Liam Pham retrieved and checked her driver’s license. Johnson was eventually released and later discovered that a $100 bill was missing from her wallet.

The plaintiffs originally asserted civil-rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Minnesota claims for assault, battery, false arrest or imprisonment, negligence, and conversion. In opposing summary judgment, they pursued Fourth Amendment claims concerning the stop, the handcuffing, and the missing money, along with the conversion claim. They did not defend their official-capacity claims against the officers or their claim against the Metropolitan Council, and they abandoned the assault, battery, false-arrest-or-imprisonment, and negligence claims.

Summary-judgment framework

Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows no genuine dispute about a fact that could affect the result and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. For the individual officers’ § 1983 claims, qualified immunity protects an officer unless the facts show a constitutional violation and the violated right was clearly established at the time.

Reasonable suspicion for the stop

The court held that the officers had reasonable suspicion—a particular, objective basis to suspect criminal activity—to stop the Durango. The vehicle matched the description of a possible getaway vehicle, it was seen very close to the shooting location, it was traveling in the reported direction, and the sighting occurred about 50 minutes after the shooting. Considering the circumstances together, the court concluded that the initial stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

Initial use of force and handcuffing

The court held that the circumstances justified drawing weapons and initially handcuffing both women. The investigation involved a shooting with a firearm, and the officers reasonably could have believed that the shooter or a firearm might be inside the Durango. Handcuffing was initially permissible to protect officer safety and maintain the situation while officers inspected the vehicle.

The court reached a different conclusion about Johnson’s continued handcuffing. Once officers had inspected the Durango and found no weapon or evidence connecting the women to the shooting, and after Worden released Mhanna, the record showed no objective safety concern justifying keeping Johnson restrained. Johnson and Mhanna had cooperated, four officers controlled the scene, and the stop occurred in daylight. The court concluded that leaving Johnson handcuffed for roughly six additional minutes violated a clearly established Fourth Amendment right. It denied summary judgment on this claim only as to Officer Pham.

Missing $100 bill

The court granted summary judgment against Johnson’s § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim based on the alleged theft of the $100 bill. Under controlling Eighth Circuit precedent, an adequate state-law remedy for a property loss barred this type of Fourth Amendment property claim. The court therefore did not allow the federal constitutional claim concerning the money to proceed.

The court denied summary judgment on Johnson’s Minnesota conversion claim against Pham. Johnson testified that the money was in her wallet before the stop, that Pham was the only person who handled her purse during the stop, and that the money was missing immediately afterward. Although the video evidence weakened her theory and did not show Pham taking the money, the court found the evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to consider the claim.

The court granted summary judgment on the conversion claim against the Metropolitan Council because the record did not provide evidence supporting employer liability for Pham’s alleged intentional misconduct.

Order

The court ordered that the defendants’ summary-judgment motion was granted in part and denied in part: