Fay v. City of Newburgh

Background

Naomi Fay sued the City of Newburgh and Joseph P. Donat. She alleged sexual harassment, a hostile work environment, wrongful termination, retaliation, and sex-based discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment. She also asserted claims under the New York State Human Rights Law. Fay originally pleaded a claim against the City under the municipal-liability doctrine, but withdrew that claim during briefing on the motion.

Fay worked for the City beginning in 2010 and became an Executive Assistant to the City Manager. Donat became Interim City Manager in December 2018. Fay and Donat exchanged work-related and personal text messages and emails between December 2018 and March 2019. In March and April 2019, Donat criticized aspects of Fay’s work and changed some of her duties. On April 6, 2019, Fay complained to the City that she felt unsafe and described her work environment as hostile and retaliatory. The City referred the complaint to outside counsel and conducted an independent investigation. The investigation found no substantive evidence that Donat had behaved inappropriately toward Fay. The City later directed Fay to return to work, but she did not return by the stated deadlines, and the City terminated her employment on June 14, 2019.

Summary-judgment standard

The court applied the summary-judgment standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows no genuine dispute about a fact that could affect the outcome and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. The court must view reasonable factual inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion, but speculation and conclusory statements are not enough to require a trial.

Title VII hostile-work-environment claim

Fay alleged that Donat’s conduct created a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The court treated Fay’s first two causes of action as the same Title VII hostile-work-environment claim against the City. It also held that an individual supervisor cannot be held personally liable under Title VII, so judgment as a matter of law was appropriate to the extent Fay asserted that claim against Donat.

The court assumed, without deciding, that Fay could prove a hostile work environment. It nevertheless held that the City established the employer defense recognized in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth. The court found that the City had a sex-harassment policy, provided a complaint process, promptly investigated Fay’s complaint, and allowed her to remain away from work during the investigation. The court also found that Fay waited until April 2019 to use the City’s complaint procedure even though the alleged harassment began in February, and that her informal responses to Donat were not enough to invoke the City’s corrective process. The court therefore granted summary judgment on the Title VII hostile-work-environment claims.

Title VII wrongful-termination claim

The court applied the burden-shifting framework used for employment-discrimination claims. Even assuming Fay established an initial showing of discrimination, the court found that the City had offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her: she failed to return to work after being directed to do so following the investigation. Fay argued that this reason was a pretext because the City had not taken additional steps to address her safety concerns. The court rejected that argument, finding that the City investigated her complaint, instructed Donat to limit his text messages to work-related communications, and advised Fay to report any later retaliation or unlawful conduct.

The court also declined to consider Fay’s alternative theory that she had been forced to resign or constructively discharged. That theory was not pleaded in the complaint, and the court held that Fay could not add it for the first time in opposition to summary judgment. The court granted summary judgment on the wrongful-termination claim.

Title VII retaliation claim

Fay alleged that Donat retaliated against her after she rejected his alleged advances and complained about her work environment. The court held that the alleged criticism of her work and changes to her duties occurred before Fay filed her internal complaint on April 6, 2019. Because conduct that predates protected activity cannot have been caused by that activity, the court found no causal connection for those alleged retaliatory acts. The court further held that the termination was supported by the City’s legitimate reason that Fay failed to return to work. The court granted the City summary judgment on the Title VII retaliation claim.

Fourteenth Amendment equal-protection claim

Fay brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Donat, alleging that he violated her Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection. The court explained that sex-based workplace discrimination can support such a claim and that the claim is evaluated under the same standards as Fay’s Title VII claims. Because the equal-protection claim relied on the same allegations as the Title VII harassment, wrongful-termination, and retaliation claims, the court granted the defendants summary judgment on the equal-protection claim as well.

New York State Human Rights Law claims

The court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over Fay’s state-law claims even after resolving her federal claims. Supplemental jurisdiction allows a federal court to hear related state-law claims arising from the same dispute. The court found that the state and federal claims used substantially the same standards and that deciding the state claims would not require significant additional judicial resources.

For the New York hostile-work-environment claim, the court applied the same employer defense it had applied to the Title VII claim and dismissed the claim. For the New York quid-pro-quo sexual-harassment claim, the court held that Fay had not shown that Donat linked a job benefit or adverse employment action to acceptance or rejection of his alleged advances. The court therefore granted the defendants summary judgment on that claim.

For the New York retaliation claim, the court held that Fay’s criticism-and-duty-change allegations preceded her internal complaint. The court also held that merely ignoring or declining alleged sexual advances, without more, did not constitute protected activity under the New York law. In addition, Fay had not shown that Donat knew she was opposing sex discrimination. The court therefore granted the defendants summary judgment on the New York retaliation claim, including the claim against Donat.

Disposition

Judge Nelson S. Roman granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment in its entirety. The court stated that all of Fay’s claims were dismissed with prejudice, directed the Clerk to enter judgment for the defendants, terminate the motion, and close the case.