Bunten v. Donat

Background

Patricia Bunten, Reginald Brown, Tamie Hollins, Lisa Ross, Maurice Williams, and Maritza Wilson sued Joseph Donat, George Garrison, William Horton, and the City of Newburgh. They alleged employment discrimination based on race, gender, and national origin under the Fourteenth Amendment, using 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law that permits claims against people acting under state authority for violating constitutional rights. During briefing, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims against George Garrison with prejudice.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, asking the court to enter judgment without a trial because they argued that the evidence did not show a genuine dispute of material fact. The court reviewed each plaintiff’s allegations separately.

Claims of Patricia Bunten

Bunten, a Hispanic woman, claimed that the City denied her request to work from home during the COVID-19 pandemic because of her national origin, even though some non-Hispanic employees were allowed to work remotely. The court found that the City had provided a nondiscriminatory reason: the Code Compliance Department was designated essential, and officials believed its front-facing, paper-based work required employees to be present.

The court held that Bunten did not provide enough evidence to show that this explanation was a pretext, meaning a false reason masking discrimination. The fact that the department was largely non-White, while another department was described as predominantly White and allowed remote work, was not enough. The court dismissed Bunten’s discrimination claim.

Claims of Reginald Brown

Brown, who identified as Black and Hispanic, claimed that the City discriminated against him by selecting Jason Beeman, a White man, for the Code Compliance Supervisor position. The court found that Brown did not meet the position’s minimum qualifications when he applied in July 2020 because he had an associate’s degree and three years of code-enforcement experience, rather than the required degree or experience.

The court also found that Brown had become qualified by the time Beeman was appointed, but that Beeman likewise met the qualifications. The evidence did not show that Brown was substantially better qualified or that race motivated the decision. The court rejected Brown’s claim.

Claims of Tamie Hollins

Hollins, an African American woman, alleged discriminatory treatment involving uncompensated out-of-title work, extreme temperatures and mold in her workplace, vehicle assignments, and personal protective equipment. The court found that she did not identify similarly situated non-Black employees who received better treatment for comparable work or conditions.

The court also noted evidence that employees of different racial and ethnic backgrounds experienced building and vehicle problems. It concluded that Hollins’s allegations were conclusory and speculative and did not support a reasonable inference that race or gender caused the alleged treatment. The court rejected her claim.

Claims of Lisa Ross

Ross, an African American woman, claimed that the City discriminated against her by selecting Beeman for the Code Compliance Supervisor position. The court found that Ross’s experience as a property manager and in City administrative work did not meet the stated qualification requiring experience in the design, construction, or supervision of building construction.

The court further held that, even if Ross had been qualified, the record did not connect her race, gender, or national origin to the decision. The court rejected her claim.

Claims of Maurice Williams

Williams claimed that the City discriminated against him by failing to select him for an Assistant Maintenance Mechanic position and by not placing him at a higher salary step after he became a Sanitation Enforcement Officer. The court acknowledged a factual dispute about whether his application for the mechanic position reached the relevant City official, but found no evidence connecting the decision to race or showing that Williams was similarly situated to the people hired.

As to pay, the court found that Donat authorized Williams’s placement at Grade 9, Step 3, and that the plaintiffs did not dispute that Garrison lacked authority to set salaries under the collective bargaining agreement. The court held that Williams offered no evidence showing that the stated reason for not granting the higher salary was a pretext for discrimination. The court rejected his claims.

Claim of Maritza Wilson

Wilson, a Hispanic woman, claimed that the City discriminated against her based on gender when it denied her the Recreation Director position and appointed a man instead. The position required a bachelor’s or associate’s degree, which Wilson did not have. But the record showed that she had performed the Director’s duties for years and that she had allegedly been promised that the qualifications would be changed to account for her experience.

The court held that this evidence was enough to establish an initial showing of discrimination. The defendants offered Wilson’s lack of a college degree as a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not appointing her. But the court found a material factual dispute about whether Donat said that the City Council wanted “a younger male for the job.” Considering that alleged statement, Wilson’s experience, and the promises concerning the qualifications, a reasonable factfinder could infer that gender influenced the decision.

The court also rejected Donat’s qualified-immunity argument at this stage. Qualified immunity can protect a government official from damages when the official’s conduct did not violate a clearly established right or was objectively reasonable. The court concluded that freedom from gender discrimination was clearly established and that, if Donat refused to appoint Wilson because she was a woman, the violation would have been clear. Wilson’s claim against Donat therefore survived.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. It directed the Clerk to enter judgment for the defendants on the First through Fifth Causes of Action and stated that Bunten, Brown, Hollins, Ross, and Williams were no longer parties to the action. Wilson’s Sixth Cause of Action, alleging gender discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment and § 1983, was the sole remaining claim. The court also directed the parties to appear for a telephonic pretrial conference on May 31, 2024.