Wickland v. City of New York

Background

Allison C. Wickland alleged that she was forcibly removed from a City-run COVID isolation site in 2021 and taken involuntarily to Bellevue Hospital. She alleged that Bellevue doctors incorrectly diagnosed her with schizophrenia, confined her for 15 days, restrained her, and forcibly administered psychiatric medication. Her lawsuit asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983—a federal civil-rights statute—and New York law, including false arrest, false imprisonment, excessive force, due-process violations, assault and battery, emotional-distress claims, negligence, and medical malpractice.

The motions addressed in this opinion were filed by the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (NYCHHC), the Doctor Defendants, and Doctor Kestelman. The opinion considered the complaint’s factual allegations as true for purposes of the failure-to-state-a-claim analysis.

Rulings

Claims against Doctor Poulakos

The court dismissed all claims against Doctor Poulakos for lack of personal jurisdiction. Wickland’s process server delivered the summons and complaint to Allison Rothman at the address of Poulakos’s medical office. Poulakos submitted an affidavit stating that Rothman was not his employee or coworker, that he did not know her, and that he had exclusive occupancy of the office. The court held that Wickland did not show that Rothman was a person of suitable age and discretion at Poulakos’s actual place of business under the applicable service rules. The court therefore concluded that Poulakos had not been properly served and could not be subjected to the court’s jurisdiction.

Claims against the Doctor Defendants and NYCHHC

The court dismissed Count One against the Doctor Defendants and NYCHHC because the count concerned Wickland’s initial custody and transport to Bellevue, before she interacted with those defendants.

The court dismissed Count Two against NYCHHC because that count did not mention NYCHHC or allege facts supporting its liability for Wickland’s false-imprisonment and due-process claims.

The court dismissed Count Three against NYCHHC. Wickland claimed that NYCHHC had policies or customs involving inadequate discipline and unnecessary restraints and medication. The court held that she did not plead enough specific facts showing a policy, widespread practice, deliberate indifference, or a pattern of similar constitutional violations. This was a municipal-liability claim under Monell, which generally requires a plaintiff to connect the alleged constitutional violation to an official policy or custom rather than relying only on the acts of individual employees.

The court dismissed Counts Six and Seven against the Doctor Defendants and NYCHHC. Those counts asserted intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The court held that the alleged conduct was covered by traditional tort claims such as false arrest, medical malpractice, assault, and battery, and that the complaint otherwise offered only legal conclusions. The court also noted that public policy bars an intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim against a governmental entity.

The court dismissed the negligence claim in Count Eight against the Doctor Defendants and NYCHHC, and dismissed Count Ten against those defendants. The court held that the alleged failures to evaluate, diagnose, treat, restrain, medicate, and confine Wickland concerned medical judgment and therefore sounded in medical malpractice rather than ordinary negligence. The opinion specifically states that the medical-malpractice claim was not at issue in these motions and survives.

The court dismissed Count Nine against NYCHHC and the Doctor Defendants. The count alleged negligent staffing, hiring, training, retention, assignment, and supervision. Because Wickland alleged that the doctors acted within the scope of their employment, the court held that these claims could not proceed as separate negligent-hiring, training, or supervision claims. The court also held that Wickland did not plausibly plead facts supporting such claims against the individual doctors.

The court dismissed Count Eleven against the Doctor Defendants to the extent Wickland intended to assert that count against them. The court found that the complaint alleged no conduct by those doctors concerning the failure to record statements from Wickland’s sister. NYCHHC did not move to dismiss Count Eleven.

Disposition and amendment

The court stated that the two partial motions to dismiss were granted in their entirety. The listed dismissals were: all claims against Poulakos; Count One against the Doctor Defendants and NYCHHC; Count Two against NYCHHC; Count Three against NYCHHC; Counts Six and Seven against the Doctor Defendants and NYCHHC; the negligence claim in Count Eight against the Doctor Defendants and NYCHHC; Count Nine against the Doctor Defendants and NYCHHC; Count Ten against the Doctor Defendants and NYCHHC; and Count Eleven against the Doctor Defendants.

The court gave Wickland one opportunity to amend the complaint further, but only if she could do so in good faith and remedy the identified pleading deficiencies. Any further amended complaint must state specifically which defendants are the subject of each cause of action.