Crespo v. Franco

Background

Six plaintiffs—Edwin Crespo, Donte Smiley, Tony Serrano, Anthony Washington, Jose Santiago, and Sidney Wray—sued former New York City police officer Joseph Franco, the City of New York, and unidentified New York Police Department officers. They alleged that Franco caused their arrests between 2006 and 2015, fabricated evidence, and withheld exculpatory evidence, leading to criminal prosecutions and convictions. The plaintiffs alleged that their convictions were later vacated, although the City stated that Sidney Wray’s conviction had not yet been vacated because of an administrative error.

The complaint asserted due-process and malicious-prosecution claims against Franco and a municipal-liability claim against the City under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A municipal-liability claim under the rule known as Monell requires a plaintiff to connect the alleged constitutional injury to a city policy, practice, or custom, rather than relying only on the city’s employment of the individual officer. The City moved to dismiss the Monell claim under Rule 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint alleges enough facts to state a legally plausible claim.

Rulings on the Constitutional Claims

The Court concluded that the plaintiffs had not adequately pleaded an underlying constitutional violation, which was necessary for their Monell claim against the City.

For the due-process claim based on fabricated evidence, the plaintiffs did not identify the evidence allegedly fabricated in any plaintiff’s case, describe the circumstances of their arrests or charges, or explain why the evidence was likely to influence a jury. They also did not expressly allege that Franco forwarded fabricated evidence to prosecutors. The Court therefore concluded that the fabricated-evidence theory failed as pleaded.

The plaintiffs’ alternative due-process theory was based on withholding favorable evidence. The Court concluded that the plaintiffs did not identify the allegedly withheld evidence, explain why it was favorable, or provide facts showing that its suppression caused prejudice. The Court therefore concluded that this theory also failed.

The Court assumed, for purposes of its analysis, that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged a loss of liberty for their malicious-prosecution claims. It nevertheless concluded that the claims were not adequately pleaded. The plaintiffs did not allege facts showing that Franco played an active role in starting or continuing their prosecutions, such as communicating with prosecutors, preparing statements, or taking other concrete steps. They also provided insufficient facts to challenge any presumption of probable cause arising from indictments, including the crimes charged, the allegedly fabricated evidence, and the circumstances of their arrests. The Court accepted that the vacated convictions satisfied the favorable-termination element but concluded that the claims still failed because other required elements were not adequately alleged.

Municipal-Liability Claim

The Court gave two independent reasons for granting the City’s motion to dismiss the Monell claim. First, because the plaintiffs had not adequately pleaded an underlying constitutional violation, there was no constitutional injury on which municipal liability could rest.

Second, even assuming an underlying constitutional violation, the plaintiffs had not pleaded enough facts to support either of their municipal-liability theories. Under their policy-or-practice theory, they relied on reports, lawsuits, news coverage, and allegations involving other officers. But they did not provide enough information about their own arrests and convictions to show that those other incidents were factually similar or established a widespread City or NYPD policy. The Court also found that the 1994 Mollen Commission Report was too distant in time, and that incidents involving Franco after the plaintiffs’ arrests could not show a policy existing when the plaintiffs were injured.

Under their failure-to-discipline theory, the plaintiffs likewise did not identify the crimes charged, the evidence allegedly fabricated, or other details that would allow the Court to determine whether the cited incidents were sufficiently similar to put the City on notice of a recurring problem. The Court therefore granted the City’s motion to dismiss the Monell claim.

Other Dispositions

The plaintiffs stated in their opposition brief that they were withdrawing their conspiracy and failure-to-intervene claims. The Court granted that request.

The Court denied the plaintiffs’ request for leave to amend again. It relied on the plaintiffs’ prior opportunities to amend, the scheduling deadlines, the seven-month discovery period before the Second Amended Complaint, and the plaintiffs’ failure to show good cause for another amendment.

The Court granted the plaintiffs’ motion to join in Franco’s crossclaims against the City. Those crossclaims sought indemnification and recovery of defense costs under New York General Municipal Law § 50-k. The Court found that the crossclaims arose from the same events and involved common legal and factual questions. The opinion did not decide the merits of Franco’s crossclaims or the individual claims against Franco.