M.G. v. Towns

Background

M.G., B.Z., J.L., and J.M. are parolees supervised by New York’s Department of Corrections and Community Supervision. Each is subject to parole conditions under the Sexual Assault Reform Act, or SARA. SARA requires covered parolees to refrain from knowingly entering certain areas within 1,000 feet of school grounds, or certain facilities primarily used to care for people under 18, when someone under 18 is present.

The plaintiffs brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Darryl C. Towns, the Chairperson of the New York State Board of Parole, and Daniel F. Martuscello III, the Acting Commissioner of the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, both in their official capacities. They sought an injunction and a declaration that SARA’s 1,000-foot restriction is unconstitutional. They did not seek money damages.

The plaintiffs alleged that SARA’s application to their movements and potential residences was unclear. M.G. and J.M. described changing their travel routes and avoiding particular places because they feared violating SARA. M.G. also limited time at his father’s church and feared exiting subway stations in unfamiliar neighborhoods. J.M. alleged that he avoided parts of Albany, traveled to a primary-care doctor outside Albany, and was unsure whether the entire Washington Park was restricted because part of it was near a school. The plaintiffs also described difficulties obtaining residence approval and periods in homeless shelters.

Claims and motions

Count One asserted that SARA’s restriction on entering school grounds was unconstitutionally vague as applied to the plaintiffs’ circumstances. Count Two asserted an as-applied vagueness challenge to SARA’s effect on their residences. Count Three asserted that SARA burdened a constitutional right to travel within New York. The complaint also included putative class allegations.

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The first rule concerns whether the court has jurisdiction, including whether the plaintiffs have standing. The second concerns whether the complaint states a legally sufficient claim.

Standing

The court denied the Rule 12(b)(1) motion. It held that the complaint adequately alleged an injury in fact and a sufficient personal stake in the dispute. The plaintiffs alleged fear of parole revocation and reincarceration, confusion about SARA’s requirements, changes to their movements, and housing-related expense and instability. The court concluded that these allegations adequately supported their asserted due-process interest in receiving notice of conduct restricted by law and avoiding vague, inconsistently enforced parole prohibitions.

Count One: movement-related vagueness

The court granted the motion to dismiss Count One in part and denied it in part. A law can be unconstitutionally vague if it does not give ordinary people a reasonable opportunity to understand what it prohibits or if it authorizes or encourages arbitrary enforcement. The court focused on the second theory for the surviving claims.

The court held that M.G. and J.M. plausibly alleged narrow courses of conduct that they wanted to undertake but avoided because of uncertainty about SARA’s enforcement. The allegations included uncertainty about how to measure the 1,000-foot restriction, whether an entire park or establishment is restricted when only part is within the boundary, contradictory descriptions of whether SARA restricts movement or only residence, and Department of Corrections and Community Supervision guidance directing parole officers to use “sound judgment” and “common sense.”

The court allowed M.G.’s claims concerning his presence at his father’s church, his commuting routes, and subway travel to proceed. It also allowed J.M.’s claims concerning his commuting routes, visits to health-care providers, and access to Washington Park in Albany to proceed. The court concluded that these activities were not so clearly within SARA’s core prohibition that there could be no substantial concern about arbitrary enforcement.

The court dismissed the part of Count One concerning M.G.’s, B.Z.’s, and J.L.’s attendance at mandatory check-ins and counseling sessions. SARA states that it does not restrict a lawful condition of supervision, and the plaintiffs did not allege that they had been warned that complying with those mandatory conditions would violate SARA.

The court also dismissed Count One as to B.Z. and J.L. because they did not identify specific locations or activities they wished to pursue but avoided because of fear of SARA enforcement. The court did not decide whether SARA’s text independently fails to provide adequate notice of prohibited conduct.

Count Two: residence-related vagueness

The court dismissed Count Two. It held that the plaintiffs’ difficulties obtaining approved residences did not plausibly show that SARA was unconstitutionally vague as applied to their proposed homes. According to the complaint, parole officers used mapping software, conducted visual inspections, held an approval conference, and notified parolees whether proposed addresses were approved.

The court stated that concerns about the transparency of the approval process could involve notice or an opportunity to be heard, but those concerns did not establish that the standards for enforcing SARA’s residence restriction were unconstitutionally vague.

Count Three: intrastate travel

The court dismissed Count Three. It explained that the Second Circuit recognizes a constitutional right to move between places within a state, but that right does not necessarily guarantee access to a particular location. The plaintiffs did not explain how SARA affected their access to food. The court also concluded that J.M.’s decision to travel farther for health care did not plausibly state a travel claim because he continued to travel to the provider he selected.

The court separately rejected the complaint’s reference to a right to remain in public areas or loiter for innocent purposes because it did not identify any lawful loitering activity that a plaintiff wished to undertake but avoided because of SARA.

Other theories and class allegations

The court dismissed any facial vagueness claim because the complaint did not provide allegations supporting a claim that SARA was unconstitutional in all or nearly all applications. The court also dismissed any additional theory that might be inferred from the complaint but was not stated in Counts One through Three.

Disposition

The court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of Article III standing. It granted the defendants’ other motion to dismiss except for the limited prospective, as-applied vagueness claims involving M.G.’s specified movements and presence at his father’s church, and J.M.’s specified travel, health-care visits, and presence in Washington Park. The Clerk was directed to terminate the motion.