Madera v. United States

Background

Antonio Madera alleged that Craig W. Tietjen, William Arnold, and Metehan Egilmez, officers employed by the United States Park Police, approached him with an NYPD officer in Lower Manhattan on January 7, 2020. According to the complaint, the officers demanded to search him, struck him with what he believed were police batons when he walked away, forced him to the ground, and continued striking him. Madera alleged that he did not resist arrest or try to strike an officer.

Madera further alleged that the officers refused to provide medical treatment, interfered with his examination at a hospital, and had him taken to an NYPD precinct even though he showed symptoms consistent with a traumatic brain injury. He alleged that additional force was used at the precinct and that the individual defendants made false statements to the Brooklyn District Attorney for use in prosecuting him. The charges against him were later dropped.

Madera asserted a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the Park Police defendants acted under state law because they worked with NYPD officers and used authority provided by New York law. In the alternative, he asserted a constitutional claim under Bivens, a judge-made damages remedy against certain federal officers. He also asserted a claim under the New York City Human Rights Law, alleging that the defendants denied him access to a public sidewalk because he is Black.

Rule 12(b)(6) standard

The Park Police defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint plausibly states a legal claim. The court accepted Madera’s non-conclusory factual allegations as true for purposes of the motion, but it did not accept legal conclusions or labels as facts.

Section 1983 claim

The court granted dismissal of Madera’s section 1983 claim. Section 1983 generally provides a remedy for constitutional violations by a person acting under state authority. The court explained that federal officers ordinarily cannot be sued under section 1983 merely because they work with state officers or enforce state law.

New York Criminal Procedure Law section 2.15(9) gives certain federal law-enforcement officers, including Park Police officers, limited authority to enforce New York criminal law. The court held that the Park Police defendants’ alleged enforcement of New York law was undertaken as part of their federal duties, not as state actors. The court also held that Madera’s allegations that the officers conspired or cooperated with NYPD officers were conclusory and did not plausibly establish the required joint action or improper motive.

Bivens claim

The court also dismissed Madera’s Bivens claim. Under current Supreme Court precedent, a court must first determine whether a proposed Bivens claim arises in a “new context,” meaning one meaningfully different from the limited categories of Bivens claims previously recognized. If it does, the court must determine whether special factors counsel against creating a damages remedy.

The court held that Madera’s claim against Park Police officers arose in a new context. It further held that the Park Police Internal Affairs Unit’s procedures for investigating misconduct were an alternative remedial structure and therefore a special factor making a Bivens remedy unavailable. The court stated that the claim failed as a matter of law.

Timeliness

The Park Police defendants alternatively argued that Madera’s section 1983 and Bivens claims were filed outside the applicable three-year limitations period. Madera argued that a New York executive order issued during the COVID-19 pandemic tolled the limitations period. Because the court dismissed both claims on other grounds, it declined to decide whether they were timely or whether the executive order applied.

New York City Human Rights Law claim

The court dismissed Madera’s New York City Human Rights Law claim as to the Park Police defendants. Madera argued that a public sidewalk was a public accommodation and that the defendants interfered with his use of it because he is Black.

The court concluded that the conduct identified in the complaint—stopping, questioning, arresting, assaulting, battering, frisking, and using force against Madera—described actions taken during an arrest, not denial of a public accommodation under the city law. The court therefore held that Madera did not plausibly state this claim against the Park Police defendants.

Disposition

The court granted the motion to dismiss filed by Craig W. Tietjen, William Arnold, and Metehan Egilmez. The ruling dismissed the section 1983 claim, the Bivens claim, and the New York City Human Rights Law claim as to those defendants. The opinion states that only the Park Police defendants had filed the motion addressed by this order.