Kueh v. New York and Presbyterian Hospital

Background

Edward Kueh worked for New York and Presbyterian Hospital (NYP) in various capacities beginning around 1990. From March 2008 to November 2021, he was a Pharmacy Purchasing Manager. According to the complaint, his duties included ordering drugs requested by pharmacies for hospital campuses affiliated with NYP, and he alleged that all of his duties could be performed remotely.

In 2021, NYP adopted a policy requiring employees to receive a COVID-19 vaccination, while allowing employees to request medical or religious exemptions. Kueh requested a religious exemption, which NYP granted. After the New York State Department of Health adopted a mandate requiring medically eligible personnel at healthcare institutions to be vaccinated and not allowing religious exemptions, NYP revoked Kueh’s exemption. Kueh was suspended without pay and told that failing to receive a vaccine dose would be treated as a resignation.

After another federal court temporarily blocked the state mandate’s elimination of religious exemptions, NYP reinstated Kueh and allowed him to mask and undergo testing instead of receiving a vaccine. The injunction was later vacated, and the mandate was reinstated. Kueh then asked to work remotely as a religious accommodation. NYP denied that request, stating that his position required on-site work, and later ended his employment because he did not comply with the vaccination policy.

Kueh asserted claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the New York City Human Rights Law. NYP moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal when a complaint does not adequately state a legally plausible claim.

Claims for Discriminatory Termination

The first cause of action alleged that NYP terminated Kueh because of his religion in violation of Title VII. Judge Broderick held that Kueh alleged an adverse employment action but did not allege direct evidence of discrimination or facts supporting a plausible inference of discriminatory intent. Kueh alleged that some former colleagues or coworkers worked remotely a few days each week, but he did not provide enough information to show that they held the same or substantially similar position, performed similar duties, and worked at the same location. The court also noted that partial remote work did not establish that NYP treated comparable employees differently from Kueh’s request for fully remote work. The court therefore granted NYP’s motion to dismiss the first cause of action.

The complaint’s third cause of action was labeled a New York City Human Rights Law wrongful-termination claim. The court treated it, to the extent it alleged religious discrimination, as a claim requiring discriminatory motive. Judge Broderick found no allegations supporting an inference that NYP terminated Kueh because of his religion. The court therefore rejected that theory, while treating the allegations in the third cause of action as also presenting a failure-to-accommodate claim discussed below.

Failure to Accommodate

The second cause of action alleged that NYP failed to accommodate Kueh’s religious beliefs under Title VII. The court found that Kueh plausibly alleged the elements of such a claim: he held a religious belief conflicting with vaccination, informed NYP of that conflict, and was disciplined and ultimately terminated for failing to comply with the vaccination requirement.

The court rejected NYP’s argument that vaccination was a state-law requirement rather than an employment requirement. Relying on decisions addressing the same state healthcare vaccination mandate, the court held that a workplace vaccination requirement triggered or modified by the mandate could qualify as an employment requirement under Title VII.

The court found that allowing Kueh to work in person while unvaccinated would create an undue hardship because doing so would violate the state mandate. But the mandate did not prevent an employer from offering an accommodation that removed an employee from the mandate’s coverage, such as a remote-work arrangement. Kueh alleged that his duties could be performed entirely remotely. NYP argued that he normally worked on site, that remote work would prevent him from performing essential functions, and that NYP was not required to create a permanently remote position.

At the motion-to-dismiss stage, however, the court had to accept the complaint’s well-pleaded factual allegations as true. NYP did not identify allegations establishing which functions were essential, why those functions had to be performed on site, or why remote work would impose a substantial burden on NYP’s business. The court concluded that these issues required fact-intensive examination and that Kueh plausibly alleged a Title VII failure-to-accommodate claim. The court denied NYP’s motion to dismiss the second cause of action.

The court treated the accommodation theory in the third cause of action as a failure-to-accommodate claim under the New York City Human Rights Law. Because that law provides broader protection than Title VII, the court concluded that the claim also survived. The court denied NYP’s motion to dismiss the third cause of action.

Interactive-Process Claim

The fourth cause of action alleged that NYP failed to engage in a meaningful discussion about Kueh’s accommodation request. Judge Broderick held that the New York City Human Rights Law does not create an independent claim based solely on an employer’s failure to engage in an interactive process. The court also found that the complaint described substantial communication between Kueh and NYP, including the exemption request, the initial exemption, reinstatement with masking and testing, and NYP’s substantive response to the later remote-work request. The court granted NYP’s motion to dismiss the fourth cause of action.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part NYP’s motion to dismiss. It granted the motion as to the first and fourth causes of action and denied it as to the second and third causes of action. NYP was directed to file an answer within fourteen days.