Strong v. The City of New York
- John Cronan
- 1:24-cv-02315
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 9
In Strong v. The City of New York, Judge Cronan granted in part and denied in part the City’s motion to dismiss Strong’s employment-related claims.
Emanuel Strong’s surviving employment-discrimination and retaliation claims against the City and his New York disability-discrimination claims against the City and individual defendants may proceed; the opinion dismisses the other identified claims and the ADA and Section 75-b claims against individual defendants.
What happened
In Strong v. The City of New York, pro se plaintiff Emanuel Strong alleged that City Department of Correction employees ignored his medical light-duty accommodations, required full-duty work and excessive overtime, and disciplined him after injuries and medical problems.
The court dismissed Strong’s constitutional and other federal and state-law claims, including his retaliation, false-imprisonment, disability-based claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and several New York-law claims. It allowed disability discrimination, retaliation, and hostile-work-environment claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act against the City, disability-discrimination claims under New York laws against all defendants, and a New York Civil Service Law Section 75-b retaliation claim against the City to proceed. Claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 75-b were dismissed against the individual defendants.
Judge Cronan adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The dismissed claims were dismissed without leave to amend; the Section 75 claim was dismissed without prejudice because the court declined to hear it, leaving any relief available in state court.
The detailed version
- Strong v. The City of New York · No. 1:24-cv-02315
- John Cronan
- Aug. 21, 2026
Background
Pro se plaintiff Emanuel Strong sued the City of New York and nine individual employees of the New York City Department of Correction. He alleged that, after inmates assaulted him and he suffered physical and psychological injuries, the defendants disregarded medical accommodations assigning him light-duty work, required him to work full-duty posts and excessive overtime, and disciplined and suspended him when he refused.
The defendants moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which asks whether the complaint states a legally sufficient claim. Strong did not oppose the motion. Magistrate Judge Gary Stein recommended granting the motion in part and denying it in part. No party objected by the deadline, and Judge Cronan nevertheless conducted a de novo review, meaning an independent review of the recommendation.
Claims Dismissed
The court dismissed Counts I through VIII, Counts XII through XVI, and Count XIX as to all defendants. These included Strong’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the federal civil-rights statute used here, for First Amendment retaliation, false imprisonment under the Fourth Amendment, disability discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment. The court held that:
- Strong’s notices about forced overtime and double tours could plausibly be speech on a matter of public concern, but the alleged adverse actions occurred before those notices, so the complaint did not plausibly show a causal connection. - His false-imprisonment claim did not plausibly allege that any defendant confined him or that a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave. The threat of termination from employment was not enough. - His disability-based § 1983 claims could not be brought under that statute because the Americans with Disabilities Act provides its own enforcement structure. - His failure-to-supervise, failure-to-intervene, and municipal-liability claims failed because he had not plausibly alleged an underlying constitutional violation. - His claims under New York General Municipal Law Section 207-c, New York Labor Law Sections 162, 168, and 193, and New York Civil Service Law Section 75 failed because of the reasons stated in the opinion, including lack of an alleged application for Section 207-c benefits, no private right of action under Section 162, Section 168’s limitation to certain state employees, Section 193’s exclusion of government agencies, and the court’s decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Section 75 claim. - His defamation claim failed because he did not allege that the potentially actionable statements were communicated to a third party.
The court dismissed these claims without leave to amend. It also dismissed the Civil Service Law Section 75 claim without prejudice because the dismissal rested on declining supplemental jurisdiction rather than a decision on the merits, leaving Strong free to seek relief on that claim in state court.
Claims Allowed to Proceed
The court denied the motion as to Strong’s claims against the City for disability discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Strong plausibly alleged that he had an anxiety disorder involving recurrent panic attacks and Crohn’s disease, that he received unpaid suspensions and other adverse actions, and that the defendants knew about his disabilities and light-duty accommodations. He also plausibly alleged that the City failed to honor accommodations granted by Department of Correction medical professionals.
The court also denied the motion as to Strong’s disability-discrimination claims under the New York State Human Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law. Those claims proceed against all defendants. The court explained that, unlike the Americans with Disabilities Act, those New York laws allow disability-discrimination claims against individual defendants.
The court denied the motion as to Strong’s retaliation claim against the City under New York Civil Service Law Section 75-b. His complaints about assignments that disregarded his light-duty status and his references to the Americans with Disabilities Act were plausibly protected activity, and the suspensions, undesirable assignments, and forced double tours allegedly followed closely enough to support causation at the pleading stage. The same claim was dismissed against the individual defendants because Section 75-b does not allow individual liability.
Disposition
Judge Cronan adopted Judge Stein’s Report and Recommendation in its entirety. The defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted as to Counts I through VIII, Counts XII through XVI, and Count XIX, which were dismissed as to all defendants. The motion was granted in part as to the Americans with Disabilities Act claims in Counts IX and X and the Section 75-b claim in Count XVII, because those claims were dismissed against the individual defendants only. The motion was denied as to the surviving claims against the City and the disability-discrimination claims under the New York State and New York City Human Rights Laws. The Clerk was directed to close the motion docket entry.
Read the full 9-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.