Sage v. County of Monterey

Background

Shasha Sage, proceeding without a lawyer, alleged that she was a registered member of One Starfish’s Safe Parking program in Marina, California. She alleged that she had been allowed to park her recreational vehicle in a designated space permanently, including overnight, for about two and a half years. On November 12, 2021, the Monterey County Sheriff’s Department evicted her from the lot without a prior eviction notice and denied her access to her recreational vehicle. Sage alleged that she was injured during the eviction and arrest, that her recreational vehicle and trailer were towed, and that personal property and more than $20,000 in cash were missing.

Sage’s First Amended Complaint asserted twelve causes of action, including unreasonable seizure, excessive force, due process violations, state-created danger, a claim under California Civil Code section 52.1, a claim under California Civil Code section 2080, conversion, false arrest, battery, wrongful eviction, and injunctive relief. The County Defendants sought dismissal of all claims except wrongful eviction. One Starfish sought dismissal of the wrongful-eviction claim.

Rulings on the County Defendants’ Motion

The court dismissed Counts IV, V, and IX—state-created danger, the California Bane Act claim, and false arrest—because the court had already granted summary judgment for the County Defendants on the same claims in the earlier round of this case. The court applied claim preclusion, a rule that generally prevents a party from bringing the same claim again after a final merits judgment. These claims were dismissed without leave to amend.

The court dismissed Sage’s false-arrest theory under the California Constitution in Count I without leave to amend. Sage agreed in her opposition that the allegations supporting that theory were barred.

The court dismissed without leave to amend the unreasonable-seizure-of-property theory in Count I, and Counts II and III—excessive force and due process—as asserted against the County of Monterey. The court held that Sage had not alleged specific facts showing that a County policy, practice, or custom caused the alleged constitutional violations, as required for municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court allowed the unreasonable-seizure-of-property theory in Count I and Counts II and III to proceed against Scott Davis, Angel Estrada, Matthew Mendoza, and Matthew Perez.

The court dismissed Count VII, the California Civil Code section 2080 claim, against those four individual officers without leave to amend. Sage had not alleged that the individual officers obtained possession of her property, and the complaint did not identify who took possession of it.

For Count VIII, conversion, the court denied the motion to dismiss as to the County of Monterey. The court held that, liberally construed, Sage’s allegations adequately pleaded possible County liability based on employee actions or failure to perform a statutory duty. The court dismissed Count VIII against the individual officers without leave to amend because Sage had not specifically alleged that they took possession of her property or converted it.

The court denied the motion to dismiss Count X, battery, as asserted against the County of Monterey. Sage alleged that the individual defendants were County employees or agents acting within the scope of their employment, which was sufficient at the pleading stage to support possible County liability under California Government Code section 815.2.

The court dismissed Count XII, labeled injunctive relief, without leave to amend. Sage agreed that injunctive relief is a remedy rather than an independent cause of action, although the court stated that it could still issue an injunction as a remedy if appropriate.

Rulings on One Starfish’s Motion

The court dismissed Count XI, wrongful eviction, as asserted against One Starfish, Inc., without leave to amend. Sage offered several theories, including California common law, California Civil Code section 1946, and California Code of Civil Procedure section 1159.

For the common-law theory, the court held that Sage’s allegations did not show a sufficient connection between her work maintaining the parking lot and any promise by One Starfish that she would receive a permanent property interest in the parking space. The court reached similar conclusions concerning the section 1946 and section 1159 theories, finding that the complaint did not allege specific facts showing a bargained-for exchange or an agreement giving Sage a leasehold interest in the space.

Final Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part the County Defendants’ motion to dismiss and granted One Starfish’s motion to dismiss. The order states that Counts IV, V, IX, and XII were dismissed without leave to amend against all relevant defendants; Counts II and III and the property-seizure theory in Count I were dismissed without leave to amend against the County; Counts VII and VIII were dismissed without leave to amend against the individual officers; and Count XI was dismissed without leave to amend against One Starfish. The court denied dismissal of Count VIII and Count X against the County. Sage may proceed on Count XI against the County and on specified constitutional claims against the individual officers. The final numbered order appears to contain a typographical error by referring to “Counts VII and VII”; the body of the opinion and the surrounding rulings indicate that the intended references were Counts VII and VIII.