Sutton v. California Department of Parks and Recreation

Background

Plaintiffs Imani Bey Sutton, L.B., and Cosby alleged that they visited Seacliff State Beach on March 27, 2021. After Bey placed trash on or next to an overflowing receptacle, an unknown woman confronted the plaintiffs, threw trash at them and Bey’s vehicle, yelled at them, and threatened to call law enforcement. The plaintiffs went to a park kiosk to report the incident to Donna Walizer.

According to the Second Amended Complaint, Walizer instead reported the plaintiffs to dispatch as disturbing the peace. Walizer allegedly told dispatch that Bey had said park rangers would be shot, although she also reported that Bey was worried because she was Black and believed the rangers might shoot her. Walizer allegedly confirmed that the plaintiffs had no weapons and were Black. Park rangers then arrived with guns drawn and pointed, ordered the plaintiffs out of their vehicle, and detained them for about 20 to 25 minutes.

The Second Amended Complaint asserted seven causes of action. The motions addressed the claims against the California Department of Parks and Recreation, Andrew Dobbs, Peter Estes, Trevor Morgan, Scott Sipes, Phil Bergman, and David Williams, collectively called Parks, and the Sixth Cause of Action against Friends of Santa Cruz State Parks and Donna Walizer, collectively called Friends.

Court’s analysis

The court considered the motions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which requires dismissal when a complaint does not allege enough facts to state a legally plausible claim. The court treated the complaint’s well-supported factual allegations as true for purposes of the motions.

Counts I and II: Monell claims

Counts I and II alleged that Parks was responsible under section 1983 for constitutional injuries based on an official policy, a custom or practice, failure to train, and decisions by final policymakers. The plaintiffs relied primarily on an operating agreement between Parks and Friends and alleged that Parks failed to train Friends volunteers about law enforcement and racial bias.

The court held that delegating management of state parks was not itself a constitutional injury. It also held that alleging a lack of training, without more, did not establish a constitutional injury. The plaintiffs did not allege facts showing that Parks had actual or constructive notice that failing to train Friends volunteers about racial bias would cause constitutional violations. The court further noted that a state is not a person against whom a section 1983 claim for money damages may be brought. Because this was the plaintiffs’ third attempt to plead these claims and the deficiencies had not been cured, the court dismissed Counts I and II against Parks without leave to amend.

Count III: negligent hiring, retention, training, and supervision

Only L.B. asserted Count III against Parks. The court held that the plaintiffs had not adequately alleged that Parks had a legal duty to train Friends or ensure that Friends’ staff were trained. They also had not alleged that Parks had reason beforehand to know that employing Walizer created an unreasonable risk of harm. Finally, the complaint did not provide enough facts about harm suffered by L.B., who was alleged to have been in a car seat and whose interactions with Walizer or the rangers were not described. The court dismissed Count III against Parks with leave to amend.

Count VI: California Tom Bane Civil Rights Act

The Bane Act allows a person to seek damages when threats, intimidation, or coercion interfere with rights secured by federal or California law. As to Parks, the court found that the complaint did not clearly allege that L.B. herself was detained. Although a passenger can be seized during a traffic stop, the allegations suggested that L.B. could not leave because she was five years old, not because a reasonable person in her circumstances would have believed she was not free to leave. The court dismissed Count VI against Parks with leave to amend.

As to Friends, however, the court held that the plaintiffs adequately stated a Bane Act claim. Viewing the allegations in the plaintiffs’ favor, Walizer reported to law enforcement that the plaintiffs posed an imminent threat and thereby caused rangers to arrive with guns drawn. The court concluded that threatening to summon law enforcement can sometimes be coercive under the Bane Act, even when the person making the threat is not a law enforcement officer. The court denied Friends’ motion to dismiss Count VI.

Count VII: California Unruh Civil Rights Act

The Unruh Civil Rights Act requires equal access to the accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, and services of business establishments. The court held that the individual rangers were performing a law enforcement function, not operating a commercial enterprise. It therefore dismissed Count VII against the individual Ranger defendants without leave to amend.

The court reached a different conclusion as to the California Department of Parks and Recreation. The plaintiffs alleged that the Department collects revenue and fees from park users. The court held that this allegation could support treating the Department’s activities as sufficiently similar to regular business transactions with the public to withstand a motion to dismiss. The court also rejected Parks’ immunity argument and denied Parks’ motion to dismiss Count VII against the Department.

Punitive damages and remaining claims

The court dismissed the request for punitive damages against the individual rangers because the court had dismissed the remaining Bane Act and Unruh Act claims against them. That dismissal was with leave to amend because the court had allowed amendment of the Bane Act claim against the rangers.

Counts IV and V were asserted only against defendants who did not move to dismiss them, so those counts could proceed. The court ordered the plaintiffs to file a third amended complaint addressing the identified deficiencies within 30 days of the order.

Disposition

Judge Beth Labson Freeman ordered the following:

- Counts I and II were dismissed against Parks without leave to amend. - Count III was dismissed against Parks with leave to amend. - Count VI was dismissed against Parks with leave to amend, while Friends’ motion to dismiss Count VI was denied. - Count VII was dismissed against the individual Ranger defendants without leave to amend, while Parks’ motion to dismiss Count VII against the Department was denied. - The request for punitive damages against the individual Ranger defendants was dismissed with leave to amend. - Plaintiffs were required to file a third amended complaint within 30 days.

The order therefore granted in part and denied in part Parks’ motion to dismiss and denied Friends’ motion to dismiss.