F.R. v. Santa Clara Unified School District

Background

F. R., a minor, sued through her guardian ad litem, Mila Romero. She alleged that, while attending kindergarten at Don Callejon School, teacher Nicole Bilte pushed her, cut her hair, and scratched her; teacher Melissa Le scratched her; and teacher or coach Daniel Flores sexually battered her. The amended complaint asserted six claims:

Flores, Bilte, and Le had filed answers denying wrongdoing. The District and Alberts moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. The District challenged only claims based on its responsibility for Flores’s alleged sexual battery. Alberts sought dismissal of all claims against him.

The District’s Motion

The battery, intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress, and negligence claims against the District were based on the District’s alleged responsibility for torts committed by its employees. The District did not challenge vicarious-liability theories involving Bilte, Le, or Alberts. F. R. conceded that California law does not make an employer responsible for a teacher’s sexual abuse of a student and did not oppose dismissal of Claims 3, 4, and 5 against the District to the extent they relied on Flores’s alleged sexual battery.

The court therefore granted the motion without leave to amend as to Claims 3, 4, and 5 against the District to that extent.

Alberts’s Negligence Claim

Claim 5 alleged that Alberts negligently supervised Bilte, Le, and Flores. The court applied California law, which requires school authorities to supervise students and use reasonable measures to protect them from foreseeable injury.

As to Bilte, the court held that the allegations were sufficient at the pleading stage. F. R.’s parents allegedly repeatedly told Alberts about Bilte’s conduct, but Alberts allegedly delayed taking action and ultimately did not keep Bilte away from F. R. The court concluded that these allegations supported a claim for ineffective supervision, even though Alberts eventually transferred F. R. to another class and instructed Bilte not to contact her. The motion was therefore denied to the extent Claim 5 was based on negligent supervision of Bilte.

As to Le, the amended complaint alleged only that Le scratched F. R. on one occasion and included no other allegations about Le. F. R. conceded that those allegations were insufficient to state a negligent-supervision claim against Alberts. The court granted the motion without leave to amend to the extent Claim 5 was based on Alberts’s supervision of Le.

As to Flores, the court held that the allegations were sufficient. The complaint alleged that Alberts knew about a series of troubling incidents involving F. R., including physical assaults by Bilte and Le, Flores’s involvement in confronting F. R., and Flores’s question about whether F. R. wore shorts under her dress. The court concluded that Alberts could reasonably have foreseen further physical assaults even if he could not have predicted the specific alleged sexual battery or that Flores would commit it. The court denied the motion to the extent Claim 5 was based on negligent supervision of Flores.

Alberts’s Supervisory-Liability Claim

Claim 6 alleged that Alberts was liable under § 1983 because he failed to stop conduct by Bilte, Le, and Flores that allegedly violated F. R.’s constitutional rights. A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 for personal involvement or for a sufficient connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.

The court found that the amended complaint did not show on its face that Alberts had responded adequately to the parents’ reports. It alleged that Alberts knew about repeated incidents but did not appear to take action beyond transferring F. R. after weeks of complaints. The court held that F. R. had stated a § 1983 supervisory-liability claim and denied Alberts’s motion as to Claim 6.

Disposition

The court granted in part without leave to amend and denied in part the motion brought by the District and Alberts. It granted the motion without leave to amend as to Claims 3, 4, and 5 against the District insofar as they relied on the District’s responsibility for Flores’s alleged sexual battery, and as to Claim 5 against Alberts insofar as it alleged negligent supervision of Le. The court otherwise denied the motion. The District and Alberts were ordered to answer the amended complaint consistently with the ruling.