Brown v. Annucci

Background

This order concerns Brown’s case and seventeen related cases brought by pro se Muslim prisoners who were housed in Housing Block A or Housing Block 7 at Sing Sing Correctional Facility. The plaintiffs alleged that they were denied the opportunity to attend Jumah, a weekly Muslim prayer service, on April 14, 2023, when the facility operated on a holiday schedule connected to a memorial service. They alleged that prisoners in other housing blocks were allowed to attend Jumah.

The plaintiffs asserted claims under the Constitution, through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). Some Housing Block 7 plaintiffs also alleged that they missed Jumah on March 17 and December 29, 2023. The court said the March and December incidents were not exhausted through the prison grievance process before the actions were filed; it also noted that the plaintiffs conceded they were not pursuing claims based on those dates. The court therefore addressed the claims based on the April 14, 2023 incident.

Motion to Dismiss Standard

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint alleges enough facts to state a legally plausible claim. Because the plaintiffs were representing themselves, the court read their filings with special consideration, including factual allegations in their motion papers. The court nevertheless explained that it could not supply factual allegations that the plaintiffs had not made.

Free-Exercise Claims

The defendants argued that the plaintiffs had not adequately alleged deliberate indifference or the defendants’ personal involvement and that qualified immunity protected the defendants. Qualified immunity generally protects government officials from civil damages when their conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right or when a reasonable official could have believed the conduct was lawful.

The court granted qualified immunity on the free-exercise claims. It explained that, at the time of the alleged deprivation, the Second Circuit had an unresolved question about whether a plaintiff had to show that government conduct substantially burdened religious beliefs to establish a free-exercise violation. Courts had also routinely held that missing one or a few religious services was not a substantial burden. The Second Circuit later ruled in Kravitz that a prisoner did not need to show a substantial burden for a § 1983 free-exercise claim, but that decision came seven months after the April 14, 2023 incident. The court concluded that the later decision could not have given the defendants fair notice that missing one service could violate the Constitution. The free-exercise claims were therefore dismissed.

RLUIPA Claims

RLUIPA prohibits the government from imposing a substantial burden on religious exercise by a person confined in an institution unless the government proves that the burden advances a compelling governmental interest and uses the least restrictive means of doing so. The court held that the plaintiffs had not plausibly alleged a substantial burden because their allegations concerned the denial of one religious service. It therefore dismissed the RLUIPA claims and did not decide the parties’ arguments about whether damages were available against the defendants.

The plaintiffs also sought injunctive relief under RLUIPA in their opposition papers. The court held that such relief could not continue because the underlying RLUIPA claims had been dismissed.

Equal-Protection Claims

The plaintiffs alleged that they were treated differently from other religious groups and from Muslim prisoners housed in other blocks. The court held that they had not alleged facts showing that the defendants denied Jumah because of the plaintiffs’ religion. Their assertion that other religious groups were treated differently did not identify similarly situated prisoners who were allowed to attend services on April 14, 2023.

The court also held that the fact that Muslim prisoners in Housing Blocks B and 5 allegedly attended Jumah did not support an equal-protection claim based only on housing-block differences. Housing blocks are not a protected or suspect class, and the plaintiffs had not plausibly alleged intentional religious discrimination. The court dismissed the equal-protection claims.

Declaratory Relief

The plaintiffs sought declarations concerning alleged constitutional and RLUIPA violations by Anthony Annucci in his official capacity. The court explained that declaratory relief is a remedy, not an independent claim, and cannot survive when the underlying claim has been dismissed. It dismissed the requested declarations concerning the RLUIPA and equal-protection claims.

The court separately held that qualified immunity did not itself bar declaratory relief concerning the free-exercise claims. However, the plaintiffs sought declarations about past conduct, and the court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred that retrospective relief against a state official. The requests for declaratory relief were dismissed.

Leave to Amend and Disposition

The plaintiffs had already amended their pleadings at least once, and most had amended two or three times. They had also received notice of the defendants’ proposed grounds for dismissal and an opportunity to amend. The court found that the plaintiffs had not asked to amend or identified additional facts that would cure the deficiencies. It therefore declined to grant leave to amend on its own initiative.

Judge Cathy Seibel granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The Clerk was directed to docket the order in Brown’s case and the seventeen related cases, terminate the pending motion, close all eighteen cases, and send the order to the plaintiffs. The opinion does not state that the dismissals were with or without prejudice.