Dillon v. Nguyen

Background

Latonya Dillon brought a civil-rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer Nguyen, Officer Caballero, Officer Hiller, Officer Leichliter, Officer Rodriguez, Officer Rossi, Officer Vukasinovic, Sergeant Perez-Angeles, Sergeant Fowler, and Sergeant Rowbotham, all identified in the opinion as members of the Oakland Police Department. She asserted claims for fabrication of evidence and malicious prosecution.

According to the first amended complaint, Dillon went to her mother’s home after learning that her brother, Rahsaan Robinson, had arrived there with a gun. Dillon called 911, reported Robinson’s name and description, and said she was going to the scene to pick up her daughter. The officers arrived first, Robinson fled, and Dillon arrived afterward. While Dillon tried to move Robinson’s white Mercedes from the street, officers questioned and detained her. Officers searched the Mercedes and Dillon’s bag, found firearms and marijuana in the Mercedes and a handgun registered to Dillon in her bag, and arrested Dillon.

Dillon alleged that the defendants later participated in drafting or reviewing reports and declarations that incorrectly described her as the Mercedes’ driver, placed her at the scene and in the Mercedes when officers arrived, and mischaracterized witness statements. The Alameda County District Attorney’s Office later charged her with firearm and marijuana offenses. The assault-weapon charges were dismissed, the remaining charges were reduced to misdemeanors, and those charges were dismissed after Dillon completed a six-month diversion program.

Motion-to-Dismiss Standard

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which asks whether a complaint states a legally recognized claim supported by enough factual allegations to be plausible. In deciding that motion, the court accepted the complaint’s factual allegations as true and viewed them in the light most favorable to Dillon.

Fabrication-of-Evidence Claim

The court explained that a fabrication-of-evidence claim requires allegations that an official deliberately fabricated evidence and that the fabrication caused the plaintiff to lose her liberty. The defendants argued that choices made in drafting police reports did not amount to deliberate fabrication and that the allegations against each officer were too general.

The court rejected those arguments. It found that Dillon sufficiently alleged that the defendants mischaracterized material witness statements and facts. For example, she alleged that a witness associated Robinson, not Dillon, with the white Mercedes and that other witnesses described the suspect as a Black male in a white sweatshirt without identifying Dillon. She also alleged specific involvement by each defendant, including participation in the investigation, searches, arrest, report preparation or review, and review of surveillance or witness information.

The court also found that Dillon plausibly alleged causation. She alleged that the officers caused her prosecution by presenting information they knew was false or withholding relevant information, including information that she arrived after Robinson fled, lacked a key to the Mercedes, had called 911 to report the situation, and was not identified by witnesses as the suspect. She also alleged that surveillance footage did not show her near the Mercedes until after the officers arrived and Robinson fled.

Malicious-Prosecution Claim

The court stated that a malicious-prosecution claim requires a plaintiff to allege that the prior case was started by or at the defendant’s direction and ended in the plaintiff’s favor, lacked probable cause, and was initiated with malice. The plaintiff must also allege that the prosecution was intended to deny a specific constitutional right. The defendants did not dispute that Dillon plausibly alleged malice, so the court addressed favorable termination and probable cause.

For favorable termination, the defendants argued that Dillon could not sue because the charges were withdrawn or resolved through an agreement. The court relied on the Supreme Court’s rule that a plaintiff need only show that the criminal prosecution ended without a conviction, rather than an affirmative declaration of innocence. The court concluded that the dismissal of the assault-weapon charges and the dismissal of the remaining charges after diversion were sufficient at the motion-to-dismiss stage.

The defendants raised their probable-cause argument for the first time in their reply brief, and the court stated that the argument was therefore waived. The court nevertheless considered the argument and rejected it on the merits. Drawing inferences in Dillon’s favor, the court found that she plausibly alleged that the officers knew she was not the Mercedes’ driver or the possessor of the contraband and therefore lacked probable cause to initiate the prosecution.

Disposition

The court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the first amended complaint. The opinion therefore allowed Dillon’s fabrication-of-evidence and malicious-prosecution claims to proceed, without deciding the ultimate merits or liability on those claims.