Alcy v. Northwell Health, Inc.

Background

Marie Alcy sued Northwell Health, Inc. and Mary Anne Portoro under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the New York State Human Rights Law. Alcy alleged race and national-origin discrimination, a hostile work environment, and retaliation. She worked as an Emergency Department Specialty Tech at Northwell’s Phelps Hospital from December 2018 until Northwell terminated her on March 25, 2022.

Alcy is Black and of Haitian origin. She claimed that Portoro made repeated race-related remarks, including statements that Alcy was “Black,” “lazy,” and that “Black people don’t like to work.” Alcy also said that Portoro and other Charge Nurses assigned her more work than other Specialty Techs. In December 2021, another Northwell employee, Scott Rose, told Alcy, “Move over you Haitian girl. Your pussy stink.” Alcy complained to supervisors about Rose’s comment and complained several times about Portoro’s conduct.

Northwell’s stated reason for terminating Alcy was that she slept while on duty on two occasions: once in a breakroom and once while conducting a required constant observation of a patient. Alcy denied sleeping during the constant observation. The court noted conflicting testimony about what happened, including testimony from Alcy, Portoro, and other Northwell employees. The video recording of the constant-observation incident was no longer available because a security-department computer hard drive crashed.

Summary-judgment standard

The court applied the summary-judgment standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Summary judgment is appropriate only when the evidence shows no genuine dispute about a fact that could affect the outcome and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. At this stage, the court generally may not weigh evidence or decide which witnesses are credible. Instead, it must determine whether a jury could resolve disputed facts for the nonmoving party.

Discrimination claims concerning termination

For the termination-discrimination claims, the court applied the burden-shifting framework used for Title VII and New York State Human Rights Law claims. Defendants did not dispute that Alcy was in a protected class, was qualified, or suffered an adverse employment action when she was terminated. Defendants argued that Alcy lacked evidence supporting an inference that the termination was discriminatory.

The court rejected that argument at the summary-judgment stage. Alcy testified that Portoro made racially offensive comments and that Portoro reported that Alcy slept during the constant observation. Northwell relied at least partly on that report in terminating Alcy. The court therefore found that Portoro’s alleged animus could be connected to the termination even though the parties disputed whether Portoro was Alcy’s direct supervisor or had formal authority over the termination.

Northwell offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the termination: Alcy allegedly slept twice while on duty, conduct Northwell said placed patients, other patients, and hospital employees at serious risk. But the court found material factual disputes about whether Alcy actually slept during the constant observation, whether Portoro made discriminatory comments, and whether Portoro fabricated or knowingly made a false report. The court also noted that the missing video and inconsistent testimony from Davis prevented resolving those issues on summary judgment.

The court therefore denied summary judgment on Alcy’s discrimination claims concerning her termination.

Workload-based discrimination claim

Alcy also claimed that Portoro and other Charge Nurses assigned her a disproportionate workload compared with Specialty Techs Timms and Lenora Peruccio. The court held that this evidence did not establish an inference of race discrimination because Timms was also Black and therefore belonged to Alcy’s protected racial group. Although Peruccio was outside that protected racial group, the existence of Timms as another comparator undermined Alcy’s comparison to Peruccio.

The court also stated that Alcy did not argue that the workload was assigned because of national origin and had not presented evidence supporting such an inference. The court therefore granted summary judgment on the Title VII discrimination claim based on the allegedly disproportionate workload.

Retaliation

Alcy claimed that Northwell terminated her in retaliation for complaining about Portoro’s allegedly discriminatory remarks. The court found that Alcy’s complaints qualified as protected activity because her testimony showed that she complained to Davis, her supervisor, about Portoro calling her “Black,” “lazy,” and saying that Black people did not like to work. The court found that Alcy had a good-faith belief that Portoro’s conduct violated employment-discrimination law; she did not have to prove at this stage that the underlying discrimination complaint was ultimately correct.

The court also found sufficient evidence that Northwell knew about the complaints because Alcy reported them to Davis, who was responsible for addressing complaints from employees under her supervision. Alcy’s termination was undisputedly an adverse action. For causation, Alcy testified that her last complaint about Portoro occurred approximately three weeks before her termination, which was close enough in time to support the required inference at the summary-judgment stage.

For the same reasons discussed in the termination-discrimination analysis, the court found a factual dispute about whether Portoro’s report was knowingly false and whether the stated reason for termination was a cover for retaliation. The court denied summary judgment on the retaliation claim. It rejected, however, Alcy’s separate theory that the allegedly disproportionate workload was retaliatory because the record did not establish a sufficient connection between her complaints and the workload assignments.

Hostile-work-environment claims

As to Portoro, the court found that disputes about whether Portoro made repeated race-related comments, how often Alcy complained, and whether the comments supported the termination and retaliation theories prevented summary judgment. The court denied summary judgment on the Title VII hostile-work-environment claim to the extent it was based on Portoro’s comments.

The court rejected the hostile-work-environment theories based on the disproportionate workload for the same reasons it rejected the workload-based discrimination claim. A hostile-work-environment claim based on the workload could not proceed when Alcy had not shown the required inference of race discrimination.

As to Rose, the court held that his single comment about Alcy’s Haitian origin, although offensive and troubling, was not extraordinarily severe enough by itself to create a hostile work environment. Alcy also did not provide admissible evidence that Northwell failed to take reasonable corrective action after she complained to Davis. The court therefore granted summary judgment on the Title VII hostile-work-environment claim based on Rose’s comment.

Portoro’s individual liability under New York law

The New York State Human Rights Law can impose individual liability on a person who qualifies as an employer or who aids and abets discriminatory conduct. The court found that factual disputes about whether Portoro made discriminatory comments and whether she made a false report that contributed to Alcy’s termination directly concerned whether Portoro was personally involved in discrimination. The court therefore denied summary judgment on Alcy’s New York State Human Rights Law claim against Portoro individually.

Disposition

Judge Karas granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment in part and denied it in part. The court granted summary judgment on the workload-based discrimination theory and on the Title VII hostile-work-environment theories based on the workload and Rose’s comment. It denied summary judgment on the termination-discrimination claims, the retaliation claim concerning termination, the Title VII hostile-work-environment claim based on Portoro’s comments, and the New York State Human Rights Law individual-liability claim against Portoro. The opinion scheduled a telephonic status conference for April 10, 2025.