Brittany Montana v. City of Mount Vernon, et al.
- Kenneth Karas
- 7:21-cv-00260
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 14
In Montana v. City of Mount Vernon, Judge Karas denied Montana’s summary-judgment motion because she lacked statistical evidence linking testing practices to women’s hiring disparity.
Brittany Montana did not obtain summary judgment on her sex-discrimination claims. The City of Mount Vernon and the City of Mount Vernon Fire Department did not receive summary judgment because the court declined to decide the defendants’ request without a separate, fully briefed motion.
What happened
Brittany Montana v. City of Mount Vernon, et al. concerns Montana’s claims that the City of Mount Vernon and its Fire Department used hiring tests that unfairly disadvantaged women, violating federal and New York anti-discrimination laws.
Montana passed the written exam and ranked 119th on the physical agility test, making her the highest-scoring female applicant but not high enough to receive an interview. She argued that the testing system’s effects, together with the fact that the Fire Department had not hired a female firefighter in 25 years, proved discrimination.
Judge Kenneth M. Karas denied Montana’s motion for summary judgment and also denied the defendants’ request for judgment without a separate motion. The court ruled that Montana had not provided statistical evidence showing that the testing practices caused a significant disparity in hiring women.
The detailed version
- Brittany Montana v. City of Mount Vernon, et al. · No. 7:21-cv-00260
- Kenneth Karas
- Sept. 26, 2025
Background
Brittany Montana sued the City of Mount Vernon and the City of Mount Vernon Fire Department under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the New York State Human Rights Law. She alleged that the defendants’ hiring practices, particularly the physical testing system used for firefighter applicants, had a discriminatory effect on women. Montana moved for summary judgment, asking the court to rule in her favor without a trial.
Applicants had to pass a written exam and then a physical agility test. Applicants with the fastest agility-test times received the highest rankings on an eligibility list, and the Civil Service Commission interviewed applicants in ranking order. Montana passed the written exam, took the agility test, and ranked 119th. She was the highest-scoring female applicant but was not interviewed because she was not ranked high enough. The eligibility list was used from 2015 through 2019, and no female firefighters were hired from it. The opinion also states that the Fire Department had not hired a female firefighter in 25 years.
Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows no genuine dispute about a fact that could affect the outcome and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and may not resolve genuine factual disputes at this stage.
Montana pursued a disparate-impact theory. That theory challenges an employment policy that appears neutral but allegedly produces a disproportionate adverse effect on a protected group. To establish an initial case under Title VII, a plaintiff generally must identify a specific employment practice, show a disparity, and establish a causal connection between the practice and the disparity. The court stated that statistical evidence is generally central to this showing. The court applied the same analysis to Montana’s New York State Human Rights Law claim.
Court’s Analysis
The court held that Montana had not submitted any statistical analysis. Although the court stated that it was troubled by the absence of women hired by the Fire Department, it concluded that this fact alone showed only an overall gender imbalance. It did not establish that the challenged testing practices caused the imbalance.
Montana relied on the “inexorable zero” theory, under which an unusually complete absence of members of a protected group may sometimes support a discrimination claim without the usual level of statistical detail. The court explained that this theory had been applied in an earlier case involving a history of discriminatory practices that made later, facially neutral promotion practices likely to continue that discrimination. The court found Montana’s case more like a later Second Circuit case requiring evidence connecting the challenged employment practice to the disparity. Montana did not argue that a past discriminatory practice made the defendants’ testing system certain to disadvantage women.
The court therefore concluded that Montana had not supplied evidence showing that the testing and ranking system caused a substantial or statistically significant disparity in hiring. The court could not grant judgment in her favor on that record.
The defendants did not file their own summary-judgment motion, but they appeared to ask the court to grant them judgment without a separate motion. The court declined to do so. It explained that such a ruling is discretionary and that the issues raised by the defendants would benefit from full briefing. The court denied the defendants’ request under Rule 56(f).
Disposition
The court denied Montana’s Motion for Summary Judgment and denied the defendants’ request for summary judgment under Rule 56(f). The Clerk was directed to terminate Montana’s pending motion, and the court scheduled a status conference for October 23, 2025.
Read the full 14-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.