Sterling v. ACS

Background

Rose Sterling, who is representing herself, sued the New York City Administration for Children’s Services, the New York City Human Resources Administration, “Medicaid” (which the court construed as the State of New York), and the City of New York. She invoked federal-question jurisdiction and sought damages and injunctive relief. Her complaint referred to constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, federal criminal statutes, 34 U.S.C. § 12601, federal regulations, and state law. She also appeared to assert employment-discrimination claims involving an unidentified community college and an attempt to obtain employment with the City.

The court reviewed the complaint under the screening rules applicable to a person allowed to proceed without prepaying filing fees. Those rules require dismissal of claims that are frivolous, fail to state a legally sufficient claim, seek money from an immune defendant, or fall outside the court’s jurisdiction. The court also considered the earlier round of Sterling’s related litigation, without relying on the earlier proceeding’s caption in this summary.

Rulings

The court dismissed any claims seeking federal criminal prosecution of the defendants or other people because a private person cannot require prosecutors or the court to bring a criminal case. The court dismissed without prejudice any claims Sterling sought to bring for her deceased son’s estate because she did not allege that she had been appointed the estate’s personal representative or provide facts showing that she was the only beneficiary and that the estate had no creditors or other affected interests.

The court dismissed Sterling’s claims against the State of New York under the Eleventh Amendment, which generally protects states and their agencies from suits in federal court unless immunity has been waived or removed by Congress. The court also dismissed claims under 34 U.S.C. § 12601 because that statute authorizes only the United States Attorney General to bring a civil action and does not give private individuals a right to sue.

The court applied issue preclusion, also called collateral estoppel, to claims Sterling brought on her own behalf that were identical to claims decided in the earlier round of the case. Issue preclusion prevents a party from relitigating an issue that was actually decided in a prior final proceeding after a full and fair opportunity to litigate it. The court dismissed those repeated claims for failure to state a claim.

The court separately dismissed Sterling’s Section 1983 claims against the Administration for Children’s Services and the Human Resources Administration because those city agencies are not entities that can be sued under New York City law. As to the remaining Section 1983 claims against the City of New York, the court held that Sterling did not allege facts showing that a city policy, custom, or practice caused a constitutional violation. Those claims were dismissed for failure to state a claim, but Sterling was given leave to replead them by naming the City rather than a city agency and supplying facts about a viable claim that was not already barred by the earlier rulings.

The court also concluded that claims concerning the alleged loss of Sterling’s parental rights and the child-abuse proceedings appeared untimely. Section 1983 claims arising in New York generally have a three-year limitations period. The court noted allegations and attached documents indicating that the relevant child-protection events occurred years before Sterling filed this action, and found that she had not alleged facts supporting equitable tolling. Those claims were dismissed for failure to state a claim, but Sterling received 30 days to allege facts showing that they were timely or that the limitations period should be extended.

The court dismissed Sterling’s employment-discrimination claims under Section 1983 because she did not identify an individual state actor and did not allege facts showing that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was the reason for an adverse employment action. The court gave her 30 days to amend by identifying an appropriate state actor, employer, or prospective employer and alleging facts sufficient to support a claim under Section 1983 or Title VII, the federal employment-discrimination statute.

Disposition

Judge Swain dismissed the action but granted Sterling 30 days to file an amended complaint addressing the claims for which the court allowed repleading. If Sterling did not amend within that period, the clerk would be directed to enter judgment dismissing the action, including the remaining state-law claims that the court declined to hear through supplemental jurisdiction. The court held the matter open until a civil judgment was entered and certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith, so fee-free status was denied for purposes of an appeal.