Moore v. City of New York

Background

Ali Moore, proceeding without a lawyer, sued numerous defendants, including Morningside Heights Housing Corporation and FirstService Residential New York, Inc. The opinion calls Morningside and FirstService the “Property Defendants.” Moore alleged that, on October 1, 2021, Morningside employees refused to accept his complaint about two Morningside peace officers, threatened him, and contacted the New York City Police Department by reporting that he was causing a disturbance. Police officers then arrested Moore and transported him to a hospital for an involuntary psychological evaluation.

Moore also alleged that, on October 5, 2021, an unknown person from Morningside called 911. With Moore’s mother’s consent, police officers entered his apartment, refused to leave, and required him to accompany them for another psychological evaluation. The Property Defendants moved to dismiss the operative complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal when a complaint does not allege enough facts to state a legally plausible claim.

Federal Claims

The complaint was construed as asserting racial-discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Fair Housing Act, as well as retaliation claims under those laws. The court held that the complaint did not allege facts providing even minimal support for an inference that the Property Defendants acted because of Moore’s race. The allegations about refusing his complaint, threatening him, calling police, and permitting police access to his residence were not linked to race. The court also held that Moore did not identify protected activity because the complaint did not explain that his intended complaint concerned a violation of Section 1981, Title VI, or the Fair Housing Act. Those federal discrimination and retaliation claims were dismissed.

The court dismissed Moore’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the complaint did not allege that the Property Defendants were state actors or that their conduct was fairly attributable to the state. The fact that Morningside employees called the police was not enough, by itself, to turn their conduct into state action.

The court also dismissed the claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 because the complaint did not provide a factual basis for an agreement among the Property Defendants or between them and other defendants to deprive Moore of his rights. The related Section 1986 claim was dismissed because such a claim must be based on a valid Section 1985 claim.

State-Law Claims and Opportunity to Replead

The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, meaning authority to decide related state-law claims, over Moore’s New York constitutional and common-law claims against the Property Defendants. The court noted that all federal claims against those defendants had been dismissed.

Because Moore was proceeding without a lawyer, the court allowed him to seek permission to replead certain federal claims. By April 25, 2025, he could file a letter of no more than three pages describing additional facts supporting an inference of discriminatory intent or explaining that his intended complaint about the Morningside peace officers concerned a violation of Section 1981, Title VI, or the Fair Housing Act. The court did not require him to seek permission to amend, and the opportunity did not affect his surviving claims against the other defendants.

Disposition

Judge Lorna G. Schofield granted the Property Defendants’ motion and dismissed Morningside and FirstService. The order did not state that the dismissal was with or without prejudice. The surviving claims against defendants other than the Property Defendants were to proceed.