Hampton v. Lee

Background

Horace Hampton was convicted by a jury in New York County Supreme Court in 2007 of second-degree murder, attempted second-degree murder, second-degree criminal possession of a weapon, and first-degree reckless endangerment. He was adjudicated a second felony offender and received an indeterminate sentence of 35 years to life. The charges arose from the January 19, 2006 shooting of O’Shay Mitchell, who died, and Lloyd Ashe, who survived.

At trial, Melissa Figueroa identified Hampton as the shooter. Matthew Martin testified that he saw Hampton near Mitchell before the shooting and saw Hampton running away afterward. Dwayne Rose’s trial testimony differed from an earlier statement that implicated Hampton, and the trial court allowed the prosecution to use the earlier statement to impeach Rose’s credibility. Hampton presented no evidence and argued that the prosecution had not proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury convicted him.

After direct appeals and several state post-conviction proceedings, Hampton filed an amended federal petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He asserted five claims: actual innocence based on new evidence; use of false testimony in violation of Napue v. Illinois; ineffective assistance of trial counsel; prosecutorial misconduct; and cumulative trial errors.

Legal standard

Because the state courts had adjudicated Hampton’s claims, the court applied the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s deferential standard. Under that standard, federal relief was unavailable unless the state court’s decision contradicted or unreasonably applied clearly established Supreme Court law, or rested on an unreasonable determination of the facts. State factual findings, especially credibility findings, were presumed correct unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.

Actual-innocence claim

The court noted that the Supreme Court has never recognized a freestanding federal claim of actual innocence. Assuming such a claim existed, the court said the required showing would be extraordinarily high. Hampton relied mainly on Martin’s recantation and testimony from Dr. Margeret Kovera, an eyewitness-identification expert.

The court upheld the state court’s finding that Martin’s recantation was wholly unreliable. Martin’s account of when and how he prepared the recantation conflicted with testimony from private investigator Lothel Crawford and with Martin’s own 2019 statements to prosecutors. The court also found Martin’s claim that Assistant District Attorney Tom Schellhammer coerced him implausible in light of the timing of Martin’s grand-jury testimony and the circumstances Martin described. Kovera could not say that Figueroa’s identification was inaccurate or that any identified factors made it unreliable when made. The court therefore denied relief on the actual-innocence claim.

False-testimony claim

Hampton argued that Schellhammer knowingly presented Martin’s false trial testimony. Under Napue, a conviction violates due process when the prosecution knowingly presents false testimony or allows it to remain uncorrected, and the testimony could reasonably have affected the verdict.

The court held that Hampton had not shown that Martin’s trial testimony was false or that Schellhammer knew it was false. The state court reasonably credited the evidence that Martin’s trial testimony was consistent with his grand-jury testimony and with information Schellhammer had obtained from the crime scene and other witnesses. The court therefore denied relief on the false-testimony claim.

Ineffective-assistance claim

Hampton argued that his trial lawyer was ineffective for failing to consult or call an eyewitness-identification expert and for failing to reopen the identification-suppression hearing after Figueroa testified about the lineup.

Applying Strickland v. Washington, the court required Hampton to show both objectively unreasonable representation and resulting prejudice. It found no constitutional deficiency in counsel’s decision not to use an identification expert. Counsel cross-examined Figueroa and Martin about problems affecting their testimony, and the trial judge instructed the jury about evaluating eyewitness reliability. Kovera’s later testimony also did not establish that Figueroa’s identification was unreliable.

The court likewise found that counsel’s decision not to reopen the suppression hearing was a reasonable strategy. Counsel used Figueroa’s statement that she remembered the lineup participants as standing while Hampton was seated to attack the reliability of her memory during cross-examination and summation. The court held that Hampton had not shown deficient performance or prejudice and denied relief on the ineffective-assistance claim.

Prosecutorial-misconduct claim

Hampton challenged the prosecutor’s use of Rose’s prior statement, the introduction of background evidence and a photograph concerning Mitchell, and remarks during opening and closing statements.

The court held that the claims concerning Rose and the prosecutor’s remarks during opening and closing were procedurally barred because the First Department had rejected them under New York’s contemporaneous-objection rule. Hampton had not shown the required cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice to overcome that bar.

The court also reviewed the misconduct claims on their merits. It held that the state court reasonably found a legitimate basis for calling Rose and correctly instructed the jury that Rose’s prior statement could be used only to evaluate his credibility, not as proof of the charged crimes. Although the First Department found that the background evidence and photograph concerning Mitchell should not have been admitted, it reasonably found the error harmless. The First Department also reasonably determined that any improper prosecutorial remarks did not deprive Hampton of a fair trial. The federal court further found no substantial prejudice because the evidence included Figueroa’s direct identification, Martin’s testimony, brief and isolated improper comments, and curative jury instructions. It denied relief on this claim.

Cumulative-error claim

Hampton argued that the combined effect of the alleged errors deprived him of a fair trial. The court assumed, without deciding, that this claim had been properly presented to the state courts. It rejected the claim because Hampton had not shown that the individual matters he identified were errors or that their combined effect made the trial fundamentally unfair.

Disposition

Judge Koeltl denied the petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The court declined to issue a certificate of appealability because Hampton had not made a substantial showing that a constitutional right was denied. It also certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied fee-free status for an appeal. The clerk was directed to enter judgment dismissing the petition and close the case.