Clemmons v. Flora Food US Inc.
- P. Castel
- 1:22-cv-00355
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 4
In Clemmons v. Upfield US Inc., Judge Castel received Plaintiff’s request for a conference about $1,625 in expert fees.
Duval Clemmons, Upfield US Inc., and Plaintiff’s expert, Andrea Matthews, Ph.D.; the document seeks payment of $1,625 in expert fees from Upfield.
What happened
In Clemmons v. Upfield US Inc., Plaintiff Duval Clemmons’s lawyer asked the court for a pre-motion conference about requiring Upfield US Inc. to pay $1,625 in fees for Plaintiff’s expert, Andrea Matthews, Ph.D. The letter says Upfield had taken Matthews’s deposition and that the Clerk later entered judgment after the court granted summary judgment to Upfield.
The letter argues that the request was timely, that Plaintiff did not need to be the winning party to recover the expert’s fees, and that Matthews’s $500 hourly rate and preparation time were reasonable and compensable. It also argues that requiring payment would not cause an exceptional unfairness recognized under the applicable rule.
The document does not state that the court granted or denied the request. Judge Castel is identified as the district judge, and the letter asks to pursue a motion for expert fees under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(E).
The detailed version
- Clemmons v. Flora Food US Inc. · No. 1:22-cv-00355
- P. Castel
- Apr. 30, 2025
Document and request
This document is Plaintiff Duval Clemmons’s counsel’s letter requesting a pre-motion conference. The anticipated motion would ask the court, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(E), to order Upfield US Inc. to pay $1,625 in fees for Plaintiff’s expert, Andrea Matthews, Ph.D. The letter states that counsel spoke with defense counsel on April 28, 2025, as required before seeking discovery-related relief, but that Upfield’s counsel did not agree to the requested relief.
Background
The letter states that Plaintiff retained Matthews to provide expert testimony and that Upfield deposed her on February 14, 2024. It also states that on March 31, 2025, the Clerk entered judgment after the court granted summary judgment to Upfield. The document does not describe the underlying claims or the court’s summary-judgment reasoning.
Arguments about the expert fees
The letter relies on Rule 26(b)(4)(E), which generally requires the party seeking discovery from an expert to pay a reasonable fee for the expert’s time responding to that discovery, unless exceptional unfairness would result. It argues that the fee request was not too late, even though it was made after the deposition and after summary judgment.
The letter also argues that Plaintiff’s status as the party that did not obtain summary judgment does not prevent recovery under Rule 26(b)(4)(E). It contends that Matthews’s hourly rate was reasonable because her rate increased from $450 to $500 in early 2024, she had expertise in survey and research methodology and marketing research, and her education included a Ph.D. in business marketing and a master’s degree in survey research and methodology. The letter further argues that her work was complex and that 1.5 hours of preparation across February 12, 13, and 14 were compensable, in addition to the 1.75-hour deposition identified on the invoice.
Finally, the letter argues that requiring payment would not cause the exceptional unfairness described in the rule because compensating an expert for deposition time is generally mandatory and the rule is intended to prevent one party from providing expensive discovery for another party’s benefit without reimbursement.
Disposition
The supplied text is a party’s request for a pre-motion conference, not a court order deciding the request. It does not state that Judge Castel granted or denied a motion, ordered Upfield to pay the fees, or otherwise disposed of the request.
Read the full 4-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.