Sepulveda v. Alomari

Background

Richard Sepulveda sued Mojeeb Ahmed Alomari and Adel M. Aldafari, individually and doing business as Mi Ranchito Market, and Mi Ranchito Market #2. He asserted claims under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), California’s Disabled Persons Act, California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, and the California Health and Safety Code. He sought an injunction and a declaration under the ADA, as well as statutory damages under the two California civil-rights statutes.

Sepulveda stated that he is limited in his use of his legs, uses a walker, and sometimes sits in the walker and wheels himself as in a wheelchair. He visited Mi Ranchito Market on July 9, 2022, and January 25, 2023. He identified blocked service areas, aisles that were too narrow for comfortable movement or for his walker to fit, narrow alcoves that were difficult to enter, and an entrance path with a slope that made it harder to push his walker inside. He said these conditions deterred him from returning.

After the lawsuit was filed, the parties conducted a joint site visit. Engineer Roberto Cortez identified conditions that did not comply with certain federal and state accessibility requirements, including floor mats, narrow shelves and alcoves, objects blocking the meat display case and cashier station, and the need for a service counter on one side of the meat display.

Standing and Defendants’ Motion

Standing is the requirement that a plaintiff show an injury, a connection between the injury and the defendant’s conduct, and a likelihood that the requested court order would remedy the injury. Because private plaintiffs under Title III of the ADA generally may seek injunctive relief, Sepulveda had to show a sufficient likelihood of future injury. The court explained that this can be shown when a person is currently deterred from visiting a public accommodation because of a barrier, or was previously deterred and intends to return where the person is likely to encounter the barrier again.

The defendants argued that Sepulveda lacked a genuine intention to return because he had moved from Oakland to Manteca, more than 60 miles away, and had not provided specific plans or reasons requiring him to return. Sepulveda responded that he continued to receive frequent medical care at Veterans Administration health facilities in Oakland, including the Oakland Veteran’s Hospital, and that he had longstanding ties to Oakland. He also stated that he planned to return to the market when it became accessible.

The court found that this evidence created a genuine dispute of material fact about whether Sepulveda intended to revisit Mi Ranchito Market. It rejected the defendants’ reliance on a four-factor test concerning distance from home, past visits, definiteness of plans, and frequency of travel near the business, explaining that the Ninth Circuit had not adopted that test as controlling. The court also held that Sepulveda’s history as a frequent ADA litigant did not belong in the standing analysis and that deciding he was not credible would be improper at the summary judgment stage.

The court therefore denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

Sepulveda’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

Sepulveda asked the court to establish that the barriers existed on the dates of his visits, that he encountered them, and that they continued to exist. The court determined that Sepulveda qualified as a person with a disability under the ADA because his walking was substantially limited and he used a walker. It also found no dispute that Mi Ranchito Market was a place of public accommodation.

The court explained that Title III prohibits disability discrimination in the full and equal enjoyment of a public accommodation. For an existing facility, discrimination may include failing to remove architectural barriers when removal is “readily achievable,” meaning easily accomplishable without much difficulty or expense. The court rejected the defendants’ argument that the alleged barriers could not affect Sepulveda because he used a walker rather than a wheelchair. A barrier need not completely prevent entry or use; it is enough if it interferes with a person’s full and equal enjoyment of the facility.

The court found that Sepulveda established that the barriers interfered with his full and equal enjoyment of the market because of his disability. It also found no evidence establishing that the barriers no longer existed. The court therefore granted plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on the findings that the barriers existed on the visit dates, that Sepulveda encountered them on those dates, and that the barriers continued to exist.

Limits of the Ruling and Disposition

The court declined to grant summary judgment establishing Sepulveda’s causes of action or awarding injunctive relief and damages. Under the applicable burden-shifting framework, Sepulveda first had to plausibly show that removing an architectural barrier was readily achievable. The court found that he had not made that showing, so summary judgment on those claims was inappropriate.

Judge Thomas S. Hixson therefore denied defendants’ motion and granted plaintiff’s motion only for the three specified findings about the barriers. The court did not enter summary judgment establishing Sepulveda’s claims for an injunction or damages. It also scheduled a case management conference for June 12, 2025.