Jones v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation

Background

Amanda Jones was traveling on an AMTRAK Highway 17 Express bus with a motorized scooter while recovering from knee surgery. The coach operator, Sergio Gonzalez, attempted to secure the scooter using the bus’s securement equipment. Jones suggested a different method, but Gonzalez used his own method. During the trip, the scooter tipped over with Jones on it, causing her to fall to the floor.

Jones’s Third Amended Complaint asserted five remaining claims: two claims under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, one claim under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, one claim under California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, and negligence. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, which asks whether the evidence shows any genuine dispute over an important fact requiring a trial.

Injunctive and Declaratory Relief

The defendants argued that Jones lacked standing to seek an injunction because she had not shown a real and immediate threat of suffering the same injury again. The court agreed. Jones had moved to Los Angeles and offered no evidence showing when, where, or on which defendant’s transportation services she had traveled after the incident, or that she intended to do so again. The court also found that her unsupported allegation about a later bus incident could not be considered at summary judgment because she provided no evidence establishing its date, location, route, operator, or other details.

The court concluded that even two supported past incidents would not establish a sufficient likelihood of future violations. It therefore found that Jones was not entitled to injunctive relief and denied declaratory relief because the evidence concerned a single past event and did not show an ongoing relationship or significant likelihood that the event would recur.

Disability-Related Claims

The court held that Jones had not shown a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, or the Unruh Act. The evidence showed one incident in which a driver attempted to secure one scooter but did not secure it well enough to prevent it from tipping. The court found that the record instead showed regular efforts to accommodate passengers with disabilities and train drivers, including training on securing mobility devices.

Jones argued that the defendants failed to train Gonzalez to proficiency under 49 C.F.R. § 37.173. The court rejected that theory because the evidence showed Gonzalez had received training on securing regular scooters and other mobility devices. The court also relied on the scooter’s owner’s manual, which warned that the scooter should not be used as a seat in a moving vehicle and should be stowed unoccupied. The court stated that training to proficiency did not require training employees to perform a dangerous practice contrary to the manufacturer’s instructions.

Jones also argued that the securement system violated the regulation limiting movement of an occupied mobility aid to two inches. The court held that this rule did not apply because the manufacturer’s instructions required the scooter to be unoccupied while being transported. Jones further argued that the securement area was too short. The court found her photographs and expert opinion lacked evidentiary value, while the defendants’ expert measured the area as 60 inches long and 38 inches wide. The court therefore rejected all three statutory-breach theories.

The court also found no evidence of intentional discrimination. Compensatory damages under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act required proof of deliberate indifference, meaning knowledge that harm to a protected right was substantially likely combined with a failure to act. The court found no evidence that the defendants knew of such a risk or that Gonzalez acted with discriminatory intent. Because Jones did not show a disability-law violation or intentional discrimination, the court granted summary judgment to the defendants on Counts I through IV, including the Unruh Act claim.

Negligence Claim

Jones alleged that the defendants negligently secured her scooter, operated the bus too quickly, failed to slow before a curve, failed to train or supervise Gonzalez, provided inadequate equipment, and violated safety and disability-access requirements. The court first noted that there was no evidence Jones had traveled by train, so the negligence claim failed to the extent it referred to trains, tracks, or train systems.

The court also found that Jones’s statement that the bus felt like it was moving rapidly was insufficient to create a genuine factual dispute because she could not see the speedometer, while another passenger and Gonzalez stated that the bus was not speeding. The court found no sufficient evidence that the defendants violated their legal duties in helping Jones board or securing her scooter. It also held that federal regulations allowed, but did not require, the operator to recommend that a scooter user transfer to a regular bus seat. The court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to establish negligence.

Disposition

The court ordered that the defendants’ motion for summary judgment was GRANTED and Jones’s motion for partial summary judgment was DENIED. The order does not use the terms “with prejudice” or “without prejudice.”