Stines v. Sanchez
- Ho
- 1:21-cv-07884
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 11
In Stines v. Sanchez, Judge Ho granted summary judgment in part on three tort claims, denied it on emotional-distress claims, and reserved judgment on swim clubs.
Kimberly Stines obtained summary judgment in part on her assault, battery, and false-imprisonment claims against Alvaro Sanchez as representative of Joseph Bernal’s estate. Her intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim was dismissed. The court did not yet decide her motion against Bernal’s swim-club defendants.
What happened
In Stines v. Sanchez, Kimberly Stines sued Alvaro Sanchez, as representative of Joseph Bernal’s estate, and several swim-club entities. She alleged that Bernal, her childhood swim coach, abused her when she was a minor. Her claims against Sanchez were for assault, battery, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress; she claimed the swim-club defendants were negligent.
The court granted Stines’s summary-judgment motion in part against Sanchez, ruling that the undisputed evidence established assault, battery, and false imprisonment. It denied summary judgment on the emotional-distress claim because that claim duplicated the assault and battery claims, and the court dismissed it for failing as a matter of law. The court reserved judgment on Stines’s motion against the swim-club defendants.
Judge Dale E. Ho said the swim-club defendants appeared to be in default after failing to respond, but he did not enter default judgment in this opinion. He allowed Stines to file a motion for default judgment by June 3, 2025, and said a separate damages inquiry would follow resolution of that motion.
The detailed version
- Stines v. Sanchez · No. 1:21-cv-07884
- Ho
- May 19, 2025
Background
Kimberly Stines sued Joseph Bernal and institutions allegedly connected with him after New York enacted the Child Victims Act. She alleged that Bernal emotionally and sexually groomed and abused her from age twelve until after she turned eighteen. Her claims against Bernal were for assault, battery, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. She asserted negligence claims against the institutional defendants.
Bernal died while the case was pending, and the court substituted Alvaro Sanchez as the personal representative of Bernal’s estate. Claims against the Amateur Athletic Union of the United States and Fordham University were resolved through settlement and dismissed. The remaining defendants for purposes of this motion were Sanchez and the swim-club defendants: Bernal’s Gator Swim Club, Inc.; Bernal’s Gator Swim Club of New England, Inc.; and Baystate Gator Swim Club, LLC.
Stines moved for summary judgment, which asks the court to rule without a trial when there is no genuine dispute about a material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. The motion was unopposed. The court nevertheless explained that it had to review Stines’s evidence and determine independently whether she met the summary-judgment standard.
Claims Against Alvaro Sanchez
The court reaffirmed that Sanchez was properly substituted for Bernal as the person authorized to represent Bernal’s estate. It also stated that New York law allowed Stines’s claims to continue against the estate’s personal representative.
Assault. Under New York law, civil assault involves intentionally placing another person in fear of imminent harmful or offensive contact. The court found that the undisputed evidence showed that, when Stines was thirteen, Bernal took her to his office, sat in front of her with his legs around her, and kissed her on the mouth. Stines testified that she was shocked because she did not expect the kiss. The court held that this evidence established assault and granted Stines’s motion for summary judgment on that claim.
Battery. New York civil battery requires intentional, wrongful physical contact without consent. The court held that the same incident established that Bernal kissed and touched Stines without her consent. It therefore granted summary judgment on the battery claim.
False imprisonment. A false-imprisonment claim requires intentional confinement, awareness of the confinement, lack of consent, and confinement that was not legally justified. The court found that Bernal intended to confine Stines in his office, that she was aware of the confinement, and that the confinement was not privileged because it was for the purpose of committing assault and battery. The court rejected the argument that Stines’s age automatically established lack of consent for this civil claim. It nevertheless concluded that the evidence allowed no reasonable inference that she consented to remaining confined after Bernal assaulted and battered her. The court therefore granted summary judgment on the false-imprisonment claim.
Intentional infliction of emotional distress. This claim requires extreme and outrageous conduct, the required intent or disregard of a substantial risk of severe emotional distress, causation, and severe emotional distress. The court held that Stines’s claim was entirely duplicative of her assault and battery claims. It denied summary judgment on the claim and also dismissed it because it failed as a matter of law. The opinion did not state that this dismissal was with or without prejudice.
Claims Against the Swim Club Defendants
The swim-club defendants did not respond to Stines’s summary-judgment motion. Their counsel had withdrawn, and no new counsel had appeared. The court stated that they appeared to be in default, meaning they had failed to plead or otherwise defend the case. The court did not decide Stines’s motion against them. Instead, it reserved judgment and directed Stines to file any motion for default judgment under the applicable federal, local, and court rules by June 3, 2025.
Disposition
The court granted in part Stines’s motion for summary judgment with respect to Sanchez, based on the assault, battery, and false-imprisonment claims. It denied the motion as to the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim and dismissed that claim. The court reserved judgment on the motion concerning the swim-club defendants. It stated that a referral for an inquiry into damages would issue separately after resolution of any default-judgment motion.
Read the full 11-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.