Morales v. Everett

Background

Benito Morales, a former New York City police officer, applied for a concealed-carry license in Westchester County. David Everett, a state court judge who also served as a statutory firearm-licensing officer, reviewed the application and denied it based on Morales’s disciplinary history with the New York City Police Department. Morales sued Everett, alleging that the denial violated his constitutional rights.

Everett moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), which concerns subject-matter jurisdiction, and Rule 12(b)(6), which concerns whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. Everett argued that the claims were barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, that the requested injunctive relief was unavailable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that Morales lacked standing, that absolute judicial immunity applied, and that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred the action.

Individual-Capacity Claims

The court held that Morales’s claims against Everett in his individual capacity were barred by absolute judicial immunity. Although Morales argued that Everett acted administratively rather than judicially when deciding the license application, the court relied on Second Circuit precedent holding that a judge acting as a firearm-licensing officer performs a quasi-judicial function. The court therefore concluded that Everett was immune from Morales’s damages claims based on that decision.

Official-Capacity Claims

The court held that Morales’s requests for declaratory relief against Everett in his official capacity were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Morales characterized the requested relief as prospective, but the court found that the requested declarations—that Everett’s conduct and New York’s licensing scheme violated the Constitution—were retrospective. The court also stated that Everett was not the proper defendant for a claim challenging the constitutionality of a state statute.

The court separately held that Morales’s requests for injunctive relief were barred by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That statute generally prevents injunctive relief against a judicial officer acting in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. The court found that no declaratory decree had been violated and that declaratory relief was available through a proceeding under Article 78 of New York’s Civil Practice Law and Rules. Morales had not pursued that procedure, which the court identified as the appropriate method for reviewing the firearm-license denial.

Disposition

Judge Nelson S. Roman granted Everett’s motion to dismiss. The court dismissed Morales’s complaint with prejudice and directed the Clerk of Court to terminate the motion and the action.