Valdez v. Joyce

Background

Yefry Valdez filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his ongoing detention by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). He argued that ICE detained him without constitutionally adequate procedures and without a change in circumstances supporting a change in his custody status. He sought immediate release and also raised claims under the Immigration and Nationality Act and the Administrative Procedure Act.

Valdez entered the United States in April 2024 and was taken into custody by Customs and Border Protection. After processing, he was released on his own recognizance. During the following 14 months, he timely filed an asylum application, obtained employment authorization, worked as an auto mechanic in New York City, volunteered with his church, and attended his scheduled immigration court appearances. The opinion states that he had no criminal history in any country.

Valdez voluntarily attended an immigration hearing on April 9, 2025, and another hearing on June 2, 2025. At the June hearing, an ICE attorney orally moved to dismiss his removal proceedings based on changed circumstances, but the Immigration Judge did not immediately rule and scheduled another hearing. As Valdez left the courthouse, plainclothes ICE agents arrested and detained him. According to the opinion, the agents did not explain why he was being detained. ICE later transferred him from New York to a processing center in Texas, where he remained in custody when the petition was filed.

Exhaustion

The respondents argued that Valdez’s detention challenge was premature because he had not exhausted available administrative remedies. The court excused that requirement because Valdez raised a substantial constitutional question that the Immigration Judge or the Board of Immigration Appeals could not properly address. The court also noted that he might not be entitled to a bond hearing through the ordinary immigration process.

Due-process analysis

The court held that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects noncitizens from deprivation of liberty without constitutionally adequate procedures. It explained that the issue was not whether immigration detention is always permitted under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), but what procedures the government must follow when exercising that detention authority.

The court applied the balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, which considers: (1) the private interest affected; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation under the procedures used; and (3) the government’s interest and the burden of additional procedures.

First, the court found that Valdez had a significant liberty interest in remaining free from imprisonment. Second, it found a high risk of erroneous detention because ICE re-detained him without notice, an explanation, or an opportunity to be heard, and without identifying a relevant change in circumstances since his earlier release. The court rejected the respondents’ reliance on a flight-risk allegation because it conflicted with the earlier decision to release Valdez and was unsupported by evidence in the record. The court also rejected the argument that a change in the government’s administration or enforcement priorities was enough; it stated that the law requires a change in relevant facts, not merely a change in attitude.

Third, the court found that the government had not shown a significant interest in Valdez’s continued detention. The opinion states that the respondents did not argue that he posed a danger to the community and had not shown that he was a flight risk. His attendance at immigration hearings, including a nine-hour bus trip to an earlier hearing, supported the opposite conclusion. The court characterized the detention decision as arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretionary authority.

The court further held that ICE could not use an attempt to dismiss ongoing immigration proceedings as a basis for arresting and detaining a person who had previously been released, without providing constitutionally required procedures. It stated that continued-release decisions after immigration proceedings have begun are to be made by the Immigration Judge with judicial-process protections. The court concluded that Valdez was entitled to more process than he received, including prior notice, a showing of changed circumstances, and an opportunity to respond.

Other claims and disposition

Because the court found a due-process violation, it did not address Valdez’s claims under the Immigration and Nationality Act or the Administrative Procedure Act. The court also stated that any challenge to an agency-wide policy concerning dismissal of pending removal proceedings had to be brought in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, while the specific motion to dismiss in Valdez’s immigration case remained pending before the Immigration Judge.

Judge George B. Daniels granted Valdez’s First Amended Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus and ordered the respondents to immediately release him from custody. The Clerk of Court was directed to close the case.