Yang v. Mullin

Background

Jor Y. is a 50-year-old native of Laos and member of the Hmong ethnic minority who entered the United States as a refugee in 1991 and was later granted lawful permanent resident status retroactive to that year. Following a 1998 conviction for conspiracy to commit kidnapping, an immigration judge ordered his removal in 1999. Because the government was unable to execute that removal order to Laos, Jor Y. was released under an order of supervision pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.5 and 241.13. For approximately twenty-six years, the court found no evidence of any noncompliance with his supervision conditions.

This is the second time Jor Y. successfully challenged an ICE revocation of his release order. In February 2026, this same court granted an earlier habeas petition, finding ICE had failed to comply with the applicable regulations when it first attempted to revoke his order of supervision. See Jor Y. v. Noem, et al., No. 26-CV-1210 (JMB/DJF). That order required ICE to release Jor Y. on his prior supervision conditions, which it did on February 12, 2026.

The August 2026 Detention

On June 5, 2026, Laotian government officials issued what government records described as a "travel document" for Jor Y.'s repatriation. The court noted that the government did not provide an actual copy of the document, so the court could not independently verify its nature, terms, or expiration date. Government records stated the document expired September 3, 2026.

On August 20, 2026 — approximately two-and-one-half months after the travel document issued — Jor Y. reported to an ICE office for a routine supervision appointment. Within a span of thirteen minutes, ICE generated a Notice of Revocation of Release (Form 71-091) and an Administrative Warrant of Deportation (Form I-205), then served both documents on Jor Y. Three minutes later, at 11:43 a.m., ICE took him into custody.

The Form 71-091 Notice told Jor Y. that his order of release was revoked under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i) because changed circumstances showed a significant likelihood of removal, specifically the June 5, 2026 issuance of a Laotian travel document valid through September 3, 2026. The notice stated his removal would take place no later than September 3, 2026, and that a flight had already been scheduled. After serving the notice, an ICE agent attempted an interview with Jor Y. regarding the revocation; Jor Y. declined to make a statement.

Four days later, on August 24, 2026, according to a declaration by ICE Deportation Officer William J. Robinson, ICE actually scheduled Jor Y.'s repatriation flight — a date that conflicted with the Form 71-091 Notice's representation that a flight had already been scheduled as of August 20. The court noted this discrepancy and further observed that Robinson's declaration did not attest to personal knowledge of the underlying facts, but instead relied on records and information from unidentified other agents.

Legal Framework

A federal court may issue a writ of habeas corpus — a court order requiring the government to justify a person's detention — when a person is held in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The right to seek such review extends to immigration-related detention. The petitioner bears the burden of proving illegal detention by a preponderance of the evidence (more likely than not).

The parties agreed that 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i) governs this case. That regulation applies to non-citizens who were previously released under an order of supervision after the removal period expired, because ICE had determined at the time of release that there was no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Under that regulation, ICE may revoke such a release upon a determination — based on changed circumstances — that there is now a significant likelihood the non-citizen may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future. § 241.13(i)(2).

Critically, the regulations impose specific procedural requirements on ICE before and after revoking a release:

Pre-Revocation Requirements ICE must evaluate the factors listed in § 241.13(f) before determining that changed circumstances justify revocation. Those factors include the history of the non-citizen's compliance with the removal order, ICE's history of efforts to remove non-citizens to the relevant countries, the likely results of those efforts, and the views of the Department of State regarding removal prospects.

Notification Requirements ICE must notify the non-citizen of the reasons for the revocation at the time of revocation. Courts in this district have held that these reasons must be non-conclusory — that is, they must provide enough specific information for the detainee to meaningfully contest the revocation.

Post-Detention Procedural Requirements After taking the non-citizen into custody, ICE must promptly conduct an informal interview to allow the person to respond to the revocation reasons and contest facts or the underlying determination. ICE must then conduct a formal "revocation custody review," which includes evaluating any contested facts and determining whether those facts warrant continued detention.

The Court's Analysis

The court found that ICE failed to satisfy its burden to justify Jor Y.'s detention on two main grounds.

First, there is no evidence in the record that ICE considered the factors listed in § 241.13(f) before deciding to revoke Jor Y.'s release. The Form 71-091 Notice contained no reference to or analysis of those factors, and no other evidence was presented showing that the required analysis occurred.

Second, ICE did not adequately inform Jor Y. of the basis for its revocation determination, as required by § 241.13(i)(3). The notice told Jor Y. only that a travel document existed and when it expired. It provided no reasoning supporting the conclusion that removal would actually occur in the reasonably foreseeable future. The court emphasized that post-hoc explanations offered in the government's legal response brief cannot substitute for the required contemporaneous notification. The court also noted that the Form 71-091 Notice may have contained a false statement — it claimed a flight had already been scheduled as of August 20, but Robinson's own declaration stated the flight was not scheduled until August 24.

The court also found no evidence that ICE conducted the required revocation custody review after the informal interview. Because these regulatory violations independently justified relief, the court did not reach Jor Y.'s Fourth Amendment argument.

The court cited the February 2026 order in the prior case as well as other district court decisions — Sarail A. v. Bondi, Roble v. Bondi, Escalante v. Noem, and Nguyen v. Hyde — in support of its legal conclusions about what § 241.13 requires.

Disposition

The court granted the petition and ordered: