Blanche v. Blanche
- Katherine Menendez
- 0:26-cv-02853
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 19
Counsel of record per CourtListener. Firm names are approximate.
In Julio Victor R.R. v. Blanche, Judge Menendez granted in part a detained immigrant's petition, ruling his detention without an individualized bond hearing violates due process.
Noncitizens detained by federal immigration authorities under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) — the provision covering people present in the United States without having been admitted or paroled — who have been denied individualized bond hearings. This ruling directly affects Mr. R.R. and may be relevant to others in the District of Minnesota held under the same authority without a hearing.
What happened
In Julio Victor R.R. v. Blanche, federal immigration authorities detained Julio Victor R.R., a Guatemalan citizen who had lived in the United States since 2018, beginning April 13, 2026. He was taken into Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) custody after a bench warrant on minor traffic citations led to his arrest, and an immigration judge later refused to hold a bond hearing, concluding that the judge lacked authority to do so. Mr. R.R. then filed a petition in federal court asking for either his immediate release or a new hearing at which an immigration judge would actually consider the merits of his detention.
The court analyzed whether holding Mr. R.R. without any individualized review of whether he is a flight risk or a danger to the community violates the constitutional guarantee of due process — the legal requirement that the government follow fair procedures before taking away a person's liberty. The government argued that a federal statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), authorized mandatory detention and that three prior court decisions foreclosed Mr. R.R.'s claim. The court rejected those arguments, distinguishing the prior cases as involving either a different statute applicable to immigrants with criminal convictions, a different type of legal challenge, or a petitioner with no established ties to the United States.
Applying a balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, Judge Menendez found that Mr. R.R.'s strong interest in physical liberty, the high risk that keeping him locked up without review is an error, and the relatively modest burden on the government all weigh in his favor. The court granted in part and denied in part his petition: it ruled that his detention without a bond hearing violates due process and ordered the government to provide him an individualized bond hearing within two weeks, with advance notice to his counsel. If no such hearing occurs, or if the immigration judge refuses to reach the merits, the government must release Mr. R.R. immediately.
The detailed version
- Blanche v. Blanche · No. 0:26-cv-02853
- Katherine Menendez
- Aug. 26, 2026
Background
Julio Victor R.R. (referred to in the opinion as Mr. R.R.) is a citizen of Guatemala who has lived in the United States with his family since 2018. He, his wife, and their eight children live in Huron, South Dakota; three of his children are United States citizens. Mr. R.R. entered the United States without inspection at an unknown location.
On April 13, 2026, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) learned Mr. R.R. was held at Beadle County Jail on a bench warrant related to 2023 traffic citations. A deportation officer interviewed him by phone, determined he lacked lawful immigration status, and lodged an immigration detainer (Form I-247A) with the jail. The pending misdemeanor charges were dismissed on April 14, but he was held under the detainer until ICE arrested him on April 15, 2026. He was then served with a Notice to Appear (NTA) initiating removal proceedings — the formal process by which the government seeks to deport a noncitizen. An administrative arrest warrant (Form I-200) was also issued, though the parties dispute whether it was served on Mr. R.R. at the time of his transfer to ICE custody.
Approximately one month later, an immigration judge (IJ) held a custody redetermination hearing but concluded that, under a Board of Immigration Appeals decision (Matter of Yajure-Hurtado), the IJ lacked authority to release Mr. R.R. or set a bond, regardless of his individual circumstances. Mr. R.R. has been held at Freeborn County Jail throughout these proceedings.
Mr. R.R. filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus — a legal challenge to the lawfulness of his confinement — on June 4, 2026, raising four claims. He sought either immediate release or a new bond hearing at which an IJ would actually assess his individual circumstances.
Legal Framework
A federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to any person who demonstrates that he is held in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The right to challenge immigration-related detention through habeas extends to noncitizens. The petitioner bears the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence (more likely than not) that his detention is unlawful.
The Government's Statutory Authority
Respondents invoked 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) to justify detaining Mr. R.R. without a bond hearing. Under that provision, a noncitizen who is an "applicant for admission" and is "not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted" may be detained during removal proceedings. The Eighth Circuit recently held in Avila v. Bondi, 170 F.4th 1128 (8th Cir. 2026), that § 1225(b)(2) applies to noncitizens present in the United States without having been admitted or paroled. The court accepted that Avila establishes the government's statutory authority to detain Mr. R.R., but noted that Avila did not address any constitutional limits on that authority.
Due Process Analysis
The Due Process Clause Applies
The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause prohibits depriving any "person" of liberty without due process of law. The Supreme Court has held this protection extends to all persons in the United States, including noncitizens present unlawfully. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). The court found that Mr. R.R.'s approximately eight years of residence in the United States, during which he developed community ties, entitles him to some procedural protection before the government may deprive him of his liberty. Freedom from physical detention is, as the court described, "the most elemental of liberty interests."
Respondents' Cited Precedents Do Not Foreclose the Claim
Respondents argued that three cases barred Mr. R.R.'s due process claim:
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003) and Banyee v. Garland, 115 F.4th 928 (8th Cir. 2024): These cases upheld mandatory detention under a different statutory provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), which applies to noncitizens with specific criminal convictions — so-called "criminal aliens." The court identified two critical distinctions. First, under § 1226(c), the underlying criminal convictions (adjudicated with full procedural protections of the criminal justice system) serve as a congressionally recognized substitute for the individualized flight-risk and dangerousness assessment that would otherwise be required. Section 1225(b)(2), by contrast, requires only a finding that a noncitizen is an applicant for admission not clearly entitled to be admitted — with no accompanying congressional findings that such persons are likely to be flight risks or dangers to the community. Second, both Demore and Banyee focused on whether the duration of detention during removal proceedings violated due process, not whether the detention was constitutionally infirm from its very inception.
Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020)
The court found this case inapplicable for two reasons: the petitioner there was challenging the government's asylum determination, not the lawfulness of his detention; and Thuraissigiam's holding, by its own terms, is limited to noncitizens "seeking initial entry" at the border. Mr. R.R. is not challenging his removability — he is challenging the legality of continued detention without a bond hearing. Moreover, his years of residence in the United States distinguish him from a noncitizen with no established connections to the country.
The Mathews Balancing Test
The court applied the three-factor balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), which weighs: (1) the private interest affected by government action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest through current procedures, and the value of additional procedures; and (3) the government's interest, including administrative burdens.
Factor 1 — Private Interest
The court found Mr. R.R.'s continued physical detention implicates a serious and fundamental liberty interest. This factor weighs in his favor.
Factor 2 — Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
The government's legitimate interests in detaining noncitizens during removal proceedings are ensuring appearance at future proceedings and preventing danger to the community. The court found it is impossible to determine whether Mr. R.R.'s detention serves either of those purposes without an individualized assessment. The IJ's refusal to even consider his individual circumstances — based solely on a categorical rule — creates a high risk of erroneously depriving him of liberty. Respondents argued, relying on Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003), that the only relevant due process question is whether Mr. R.R. is correctly classified as an inadmissible applicant for admission. The court rejected this argument: Doe addressed reputational harm under a sex offender registration statute, not physical confinement, and the Constitution requires more than what statute alone provides. This factor weighs in Mr. R.R.'s favor.
Factor 3 — Government's Interest
The court acknowledged the government's interests in uniformly administering immigration laws and preserving the § 1225(b)(2) detention framework efficiently. However, the court noted that prior to the Eighth Circuit's Avila decision, the government routinely provided bond hearings to detainees like Mr. R.R. for decades, and courts in other circuits still require such hearings. There is no suggestion in the record that bond hearings would be unmanageable. These considerations do not outweigh Mr. R.R.'s substantial liberty interest.
Holding and Order
The court granted in part and denied in part the habeas petition. The court declined to reach Mr. R.R.'s remaining three claims (concerning timing and service of the I-200 warrant and the Notice to Appear), having granted relief on the due process claim.
The court ordered:
- Mr. R.R.'s detention under § 1225(b)(2) without an individualized bond hearing violates his due process rights.
- Respondents must provide a bond hearing within two weeks of the order, at which an immigration judge makes an individualized assessment of his risk of flight and danger to the community. Mr. R.R. and his counsel must receive advance notice sufficient to attend and prepare.
- If no bond hearing occurs within two weeks, or if the immigration judge declines to reach the merits or finds a lack of authority to do so, Respondents must immediately release Mr. R.R. from custody in Minnesota or South Dakota with his personal effects.
- Respondents must file a status report with the court within 48 hours of the conclusion of the bond hearing or of any decision to release Mr. R.R.
Additional Note
The court noted in a footnote that the Supreme Court has granted review in Genalo v. Black, No. 25-886, which will address whether detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) can become unconstitutionally prolonged such that due process requires a bond hearing — a question that could affect the continued validity of Banyee. The court did not speculate on the outcome of that case.
Read the full 19-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.