Banks v. San Mateo County District Attorney's Office

Background

Carrie Banks alleged that Fernando Altuna Mendoza raped her while she was unconscious in her home on or about July 17, 2021. After his arrest and prosecution, the San Mateo County District Attorney's Office allegedly offered him a plea agreement without consulting Banks. She also alleged that the Probation Department failed to notify her of his arrest on a probation violation and failed to consult her before making a sentencing recommendation.

Banks sued San Mateo County, the San Mateo County District Attorney's Office, the San Mateo County Probation Department, and individuals in those offices. Her original complaint included four claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law allowing claims against state or local governments and officials for certain constitutional violations, along with five California state-law claims. In an earlier order, the court dismissed the individual federal claims based on absolute immunity, dismissed other federal claims, and allowed Banks to amend only her municipal-liability claim against San Mateo County. That type of municipal-liability claim is commonly called a Monell claim.

Motion to Dismiss

The County defendants moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which requires dismissal when a complaint does not allege enough facts to support a legally plausible claim. Banks based her amended municipal-liability claim on three theories: an unconstitutional County policy or custom, failure to train employees about victims' rights, and ratification of the alleged conduct by policymakers.

Court's Analysis

The court held that the amended complaint did not plausibly allege a Countywide policy or custom of violating Marsy's Law, California's Victims' Bill of Rights Act, when victims were female or the crimes involved gender-based violence. Apart from Banks's own case, the complaint identified five cases involving alleged Marsy's Law violations over a 15-year period. The court found those incidents too few and too far apart to establish a longstanding and sufficiently consistent County practice. It also noted that the complaint alleged no other Probation Department violations involving Marsy's Law and did not address compliance with Marsy's Law for male victims.

The court likewise rejected the failure-to-train theory. It explained that this theory ordinarily requires a pattern of similar constitutional violations and deliberate indifference, meaning a conscious disregard of a known or obvious risk. The court found that the allegations did not meet that demanding standard. The court also rejected ratification because the allegations showed, at most, that District Attorney Wagstaffe concluded the prosecutor's actions complied with applicable policies and procedures. The complaint contained no ratification allegations concerning a County Probation Department policymaker.

Because the policy, custom, training, and ratification allegations were insufficient, the court dismissed the municipal-liability claim. It did not reach the defendants' alternative argument that Banks had failed to allege a constitutional violation, and it did not decide whether Wagstaffe acted as a state or County official.

Disposition

The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, meaning authority to hear related state-law claims, because the only remaining federal claim was dismissed. It dismissed the municipal-liability claim with prejudice after Banks had already received an opportunity to amend. It dismissed the remaining state-law claims without prejudice to refiling them in state court. Judge Susan Illston granted the defendants' motion to dismiss.