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S.D.N.Y.Procedural orderFiled July 11, 2025

Hodge v. Rykers Islands

Judge
Laura Swain
Docket
1:24-cv-05737
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
5
Section 1983Civil RightsPro SeCivil Procedure
In one sentence

Hodge v. City of New York D.O.C. was dismissed as defective and untimely, Judge Swain ruled, with no further amendment allowed.

Who this affects

Shakeem Hodge’s claims against the New York City Department of Correction, Correction Officer Reed Shield #1373, and any intended claims against New York City were dismissed; any related state-law claims were not heard.

What happened

In Shakeem Hodge v. City of New York D.O.C. and Reed Shield #1373, Shakeem Hodge alleged that detainees and correction officers assaulted and seriously injured him on January 10, 2015, and sought money damages under a federal civil-rights law. He represented himself and was allowed to amend his complaint once.

The court dismissed the claims against the Department of Correction because it is a New York City agency that cannot be sued. It also dismissed any claims against the City because Hodge did not allege that a city policy, custom, or practice caused the alleged violation. The court further ruled that the claims were untimely because they were filed more than three years after the 2015 assault and the amended complaint gave no reason to extend that deadline.

Judge Swain dismissed the action for failure to state a legally sufficient claim, declined to consider any state-law claims, and denied further leave to amend. The court also denied permission to appeal without paying filing fees, finding that an appeal would not be taken in good faith.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Hodge v. Rykers Islands · No. 1:24-cv-05737
Judge
Laura Swain
Date
July 11, 2025

Background

Shakeem Hodge filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law allowing claims for violations of constitutional rights by state or local actors. He proceeded without a lawyer and was allowed to file without paying the usual filing fee. Hodge alleged that on January 10, 2015, multiple detainees and correction officers in his housing area on Rikers Island assaulted him and caused serious injuries. He sought money damages.

The original complaint named Rikers Island as the only defendant. The court previously gave Hodge an opportunity to amend because Rikers Island was not a suable entity, the complaint did not allege facts supporting municipal liability against New York City, and the claims appeared untimely. Hodge then named “City Of New York D.O.C.” and Correction Officer Reed Shield #1373 as defendants. He repeated the allegation that detainees and correction officers assaulted him and alleged that Officer Reed was present and participated.

Reasons for dismissal

The court dismissed the claims against D.O.C. because the Department of Correction is an agency of New York City and is not an entity that can be sued under the New York City Charter.

To the extent Hodge intended to sue New York City, the court held that the amended complaint still did not state a municipal-liability claim under § 1983. Such a claim requires facts showing that a city policy, custom, or practice caused the constitutional violation. The court found that the amended complaint contained no facts supporting that inference.

The court also dismissed the § 1983 claims as untimely and for failure to state a claim. It explained that New York’s three-year limitations period applies to these claims and that they generally accrue when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury. Hodge filed the original complaint on July 20, 2024, concerning an assault on January 10, 2015. Although the court had invited him to provide facts that might justify equitable tolling, the amended complaint provided none.

Other rulings

After dismissing the federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, meaning authority to hear related state-law claims, over any state-law claims Hodge may have been asserting.

The court denied further leave to amend because Hodge had already received an opportunity to correct the complaint and the defects could not be cured by another amendment.

Disposition

Judge Laura Taylor Swain dismissed the action for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The court directed the Clerk of Court to enter judgment dismissing the action. It also certified that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied Hodge permission to appeal without paying the filing fee.

The authoritative version

Read the full 5-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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