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S.D.N.Y.Procedural orderFiled July 14, 2025

McConaughey v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey

Judge
Ronnie Abrams
Docket
1:21-cv-06137
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
6
EvidenceCivil ProcedureEmployment
In one sentence

In McConaughey v. Port Authority, Judge Abrams ruled on trial evidence and opening statements, allowing some materials, limiting others, and excluding others.

Who this affects

Michael McConaughey, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, their trial lawyers, and the witnesses and evidence addressed in the order.

What happened

In McConaughey v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, the court resolved the parties’ objections to proposed evidence before trial of the plaintiff’s hostile-work-environment case.

The court allowed the plaintiff’s lawyer to discuss certain expected evidence in the opening statement but barred displaying one exhibit. It allowed some memo entries and written complaints if specific conditions were met, while allowing other documents only to refresh memory or show that the defendant had notice of complaints. The court also restricted evidence about the plaintiff’s promotion, physical medical treatment, and a disciplinary document.

Judge Abrams allowed Terrance McKee to testify only to contradict the plaintiff’s testimony about incidents involving Joseph Brenneck. She barred Aaron Woody’s affidavit, excluded the undisclosed disciplinary document, and limited what the defendant could discuss in its opening statement. The order also left the plaintiff to state whether he objected to admitting portions of medical records concerning his mental state.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
McConaughey v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey · No. 1:21-cv-06137
Judge
Ronnie Abrams
Date
July 14, 2025

Background

Trial was scheduled to begin on July 14, 2025. After receiving the parties’ objections to proposed evidence and hearing argument at a final pretrial conference, the court ruled on the objections and related opening-statement issues.

Rulings on the plaintiff’s evidence and opening statement

- PX 31 and alleged discriminatory statements: Plaintiff’s counsel could tell the jury that they expected the jury to see PX 31 and could discuss its contents, but could not use PX 31 as an exhibit during the opening statement. Counsel could also discuss the substance of allegedly discriminatory and harassing statements by Port Authority employees that the plaintiff expected to present. - Memo book entries (PX 56, 60, 68, 71, 82, and 108): These exhibits could be admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1), which concerns certain contemporaneous statements, if the plaintiff provided an adequate foundation. - “Flysheet” compilations (PX 59, 75, 106, and 110): These exhibits could not be admitted into evidence but could be used to refresh the plaintiff’s recollection. - “Handwrittens” (PX 17, 18, 21, 23, 34, 39, 72, 81, 101, and 107): These exhibits could be admitted subject to a limiting instruction. The jury could consider the complaints only to decide whether they gave, or should have given, the defendant notice that the plaintiff alleged a hostile work environment. The jury could not treat the allegations as proven facts or consider the alleged legal violations for another purpose. The plaintiff had to remove attached federal, state, and local laws and regulations, and had to provide the court additional information about PX 36. - EEO complaints and EEOC charges: PX 35, 41, 52, 91, and 95 could be admitted, subject to the same limiting instruction. PX 50, 54, and 55 could not be admitted because the plaintiff offered them only to show notice and the identities of the people named in them were not relevant for that purpose. The plaintiff could testify that he filed three additional complaints with the EEO Office and could give their dates. - Promotion evidence: Because the case presented a narrow hostile-work-environment theory, neither the fact of the plaintiff’s promotion nor exhibits concerning it could be admitted. The jury might nevertheless infer the promotion from a change in rank. If the plaintiff testified about his qualifications or achievements, the defendant could offer evidence of the promotion.

Witness and affidavit rulings

- Terrance McKee: The defendant could call McKee even though it had not included him in its required disclosures, but only to impeach the plaintiff by contradicting his testimony about alleged incidents involving Joseph Brenneck. The defendant could not question McKee about any other issue. The court also stated that the disclosure failure was harmless because the plaintiff knew McKee’s identity and the scope of his knowledge before trial. - Aaron Woody’s affidavit: The plaintiff’s objection was sustained, so the affidavit could not be used under the cited evidence rules.

Medical and disciplinary evidence

- Medical records (DX 28–32): Portions concerning only the plaintiff’s physical health and treatment would not be admitted. Portions concerning his then-existing mental state and expectations about the transition process and its after-effects were relevant because he sought emotional-distress damages. The plaintiff had to tell the court whether he objected to admitting those portions. - Charges and specifications against Justin Abramopaulos (DX 21): The plaintiff’s objection was sustained. Because the defendant had not produced the document during discovery, it could not be used at trial. The defendant could still present testimony from a knowledgeable witness about discipline against Abramopaulos. If Abramopaulos was unavailable to testify, the defendant could offer the portion of his deposition discussing that discipline.

Defendant’s opening statement

Because DX 21 could not be used, the defendant could not refer to or describe that document in its opening statement. It could discuss Abramopaulos’s discipline to the extent it appeared in his deposition testimony. If the defendant had a good-faith basis to expect another witness to testify about that discipline and wanted to describe that expected testimony in opening, it had to notify the court. The defendant also could not mention that its efforts to address the alleged hostile work environment were “stymied by the police union” unless it had a good-faith basis to expect testimony supporting that statement and notified the court.

Disposition

This was a pretrial evidentiary and opening-statement order. The court granted, denied, or limited the parties’ objections as specified above; it did not decide the underlying hostile-work-environment claims.

The authoritative version

Read the full 6-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

Open opinion PDF →
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