Franchitti v. Cognizant Technology Solutions Corporation

Background

Jean-Claude Franchitti brings retaliation claims against Cognizant Technology Solutions Corp. and Cognizant Technology Solutions U.S. Corporation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the New York State Human Rights Law. He alleges that Cognizant terminated his employment because he opposed alleged efforts to eliminate experienced non-Indian employees, questioned visa applications submitted on behalf of Indian workers, and complained about discrimination.

The parties asked the court to exclude expert testimony before trial. Cognizant proposed Rona E. Wexler and Richard V. Turner to testify about Franchitti’s efforts to find employment after his 2016 termination. Franchitti proposed Roberto J. Cavazos to rebut their opinions.

Legal standard

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 permits qualified experts to testify when their specialized knowledge will help the jury, their testimony rests on sufficient facts, their methods are reliable, and they reliably applied those methods to the case. The court also considered Rule 403, which allows exclusion of evidence when its usefulness is substantially outweighed by the risk of needlessly presenting cumulative evidence. Challenges to otherwise admissible evidence generally go to its weight and are addressed through cross-examination and contrary evidence rather than exclusion.

Franchitti’s motion concerning Wexler and Turner

Franchitti argued that their jointly authored report failed to identify which opinions belonged to which expert. The court concluded that permitting both experts to testify would create needlessly cumulative evidence. Cognizant had indicated that, if it could call only one expert, it would call Turner and did not explain why both should testify. The court therefore excluded Wexler from testifying and permitted only Turner to testify from the joint report.

Because the record showed that Wexler and Turner might not share every opinion, the court ordered Cognizant, no later than two weeks after the opinion, to provide Franchitti with a copy of the report striking any portions Turner does not adopt as his own.

The court also barred Turner from testifying that Franchitti failed to conduct a “diligent” job search. Whether Franchitti’s efforts were reasonable was an ultimate question for the jury. Turner may, however, testify about what a reasonable job search typically involves and compare Franchitti’s efforts with that standard, to the extent the testimony is relevant and beyond ordinary juror knowledge. The court found that objections to the sources underlying the job-search opinions should be addressed through cross-examination and contrary evidence.

The court allowed Turner to testify about the estimated time Franchitti would have needed to find comparable employment. It found Turner qualified based on his professional experience and found the opinion sufficiently supported by general studies and analysis of Franchitti’s age, skills, labor market, available jobs, and unemployment rates.

Cognizant’s motion concerning Cavazos

The court granted Cognizant’s motion to exclude Cavazos. Although Cavazos had a professional and educational background in economics, the court found that he had no experience as a recruiter or career counselor, had not taken or taught career-counseling or job-search courses, and had never advised someone about strategies for finding a new job. His experience helping university students find employment did not qualify him to rebut opinions about Franchitti’s job search in the information-technology and consulting fields.

The court also concluded that Cavazos’s proposed testimony about facts or methodological errors that Turner allegedly overlooked would not help the jury because those issues could be raised through cross-examination, contrary evidence, and argument.

Disposition

Franchitti’s motion to preclude Wexler’s and Turner’s testimony was GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Cognizant’s motion to preclude Cavazos’s testimony was GRANTED. The result was that Turner, and only Turner, could testify as an expert at trial, subject to the limits described in the opinion. The court directed the clerk to terminate the two listed motions.