Olangian v. United States

Background

A jury found Reza Olangian guilty in 2016 on four counts involving conspiracies and attempts to acquire and transfer anti-aircraft missiles and to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. The court sentenced him to 25 years in prison in 2018. The Court of Appeals later affirmed his conviction.

Olangian then filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which allows a federal prisoner to ask the sentencing court to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence on specified grounds, including a constitutional violation. In his supplemental motion, he focused on ineffective assistance of trial counsel. He alleged that attorney Lee Ginsberg was inadequately prepared; failed to seek a short trial postponement when Olangian was experiencing problems related to prednisone and colitis; failed to present evidence about Olangian’s opposition to the Iranian government and lack of intent to complete the weapons deals; failed to argue that the government had not proved Olangian had a $15 million Turkish bank account; failed to file a motion seeking to exclude evidence about alleged earlier weapons-for-drugs dealings; and failed to object when the government said Olangian lied during his testimony.

Legal standard

The court applied the two-part test from Strickland v. Washington. Olangian had to show both that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Prejudice required a reasonable probability that, without counsel’s alleged errors, the result would have been different. The court considered the alleged errors together, as Olangian requested, while giving substantial deference to counsel’s strategic decisions.

Court’s analysis

The court found that counsel’s preparation was reasonable. Ginsberg appropriately delegated work to Nadjia Limani, who spent almost 530 hours preparing for trial. The court also found that there was no required minimum number of attorney-client meetings or requirement that counsel conduct a practice cross-examination. It concluded that Ginsberg’s questioning gave Olangian enough opportunity to respond to the law-enforcement witnesses’ testimony.

The court found no ineffective assistance in counsel’s decision not to seek a continuance on the first day of trial. The case had been pending for four years, the court had already granted several postponements, and a last-minute health-related request might have been denied. The court also found that Olangian did not show prejudice from the decision, including because the prednisone dosage he described was within the normal initial dosage range by the time he testified if the prescription or his described tapering schedule was followed.

The court found that counsel reasonably chose not to present additional evidence about Olangian’s hostility toward the Iranian government because similar evidence had already been presented through testimony, an expert witness, and counsel’s opening and closing arguments. The court likewise found reasonable counsel’s decisions not to emphasize the lack of a Russian visa, not to use a text message to an alleged co-conspirator, and not to argue that the government had not proved the claimed Turkish bank account. Those choices could have highlighted incriminating evidence and distracted the jury from the defense theory that Olangian was trying to expose Iran’s conduct rather than complete the transactions.

The court also rejected the claim concerning the alleged earlier dealings in Tajikistan. Counsel’s decision to rely on the government’s oral assurance rather than seek a formal pretrial ruling was a reasonable strategic choice. In any event, the trial court struck the testimony, instructed the jury to disregard it, and the Court of Appeals had already found any error harmless in the context of the entire trial.

Finally, the court agreed that the government’s repeated use of “lie” or “lied” was excessive or inflammatory, but found that Olangian was not prejudiced. His defense depended on the jury believing that he had not truly intended to complete the weapons deals, so his credibility was already central to the trial. The court concluded that counsel’s failure to object did not amount to ineffective assistance.

Disposition

The court held that Olangian’s trial counsel was not ineffective and that the alleged errors did not create a reasonable probability of a different verdict. Olangian’s § 2255 motion was denied without a hearing. The court also ruled that no certificate of appealability would issue, denied permission to appeal without paying filing fees, directed the clerk to close the open motions, and directed the clerk to close case number 21 Civ. 08166.