K.A. v. City Of New York

Background

The plaintiffs—K.A., S.A., L.R., L.J., and Jane Does 1–25—alleged that Sidney Wilson, a physician assistant working at the Rose M. Singer Center on Rikers Island, sexually abused them during medical examinations between October 2013 and February 2015. They sued the City of New York, Corizon Health, Inc., Corizon, Inc., and Wilson under federal and state law. The Corizon entities were no longer defendants because of bankruptcy; Wilson and the City were the remaining defendants.

The City moved under Rule 12(b)(6), which asks whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. The plaintiffs also sought permission to file a third amended complaint. Their proposed amendment added no new factual allegations and primarily sought to add the City to state and local law claims.

Federal claims against the City

The federal claims relied on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a law that allows claims against state actors who violate federal rights. The plaintiffs sought to hold the City liable under the rule from Monell v. Department of Social Services, which requires a plaintiff to connect the alleged constitutional violation to an official municipal policy, custom, or deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise.

The plaintiffs offered four theories of municipal liability:

1. Widespread custom: The plaintiffs argued that the City had a widespread practice of tolerating sexual abuse and not reporting it. The court held that allegations about Wilson’s repeated abuse of four plaintiffs involved only one alleged wrongdoer and did not adequately show a widespread practice, City notice, or participation by supervisors. The court also found that the other cases, news reports, and government reports cited by the plaintiffs were not sufficiently connected in timing or subject matter to the alleged abuse.

2. Failure to train: The plaintiffs argued that City personnel were not adequately trained to prevent, identify, report, or investigate sexual abuse. The court found no specific training deficiency supporting the claim that staff were not told sexual abuse was prohibited. It also found that general references to standards under the Prison Rape Elimination Act and K.A.’s reports did not identify a specific training problem that caused the alleged injuries.

3. Failure to supervise: The plaintiffs alleged failures involving staff evaluations, enforcement of a chaperone policy, contraband smuggling, monitoring, cameras, interviews, and supervisory rounds. The court held that they did not plausibly allege that City policymakers knew of similar violations, failed to investigate or discipline staff, or knew that additional supervision was obviously necessary and connected to the alleged abuse.

4. Hiring and screening: The plaintiffs alleged that the City failed to conduct adequate background checks and other screening. The court found that they pleaded only conclusory assertions that screening would have prevented Wilson’s hiring or abuse. They did not allege facts showing that a background check would have revealed that Wilson was especially likely to commit the particular misconduct alleged.

State and local claims

The plaintiffs also asserted claims under state and local law, including claims involving sexual assault and battery, negligence, negligent hiring and supervision, emotional distress, failure to intervene, and New York City’s gender-motivated-violence law. After dismissing the federal claims against the City, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these state and local claims. The court also stated that the plaintiffs had not shown that the state and local claims related to the claims against Wilson sufficiently to form part of the same constitutional case or controversy.

Disposition

The court granted the City’s motion to dismiss and dismissed the Second Amended Complaint in its entirety as against the City. The federal claims were dismissed for failure to state claims upon which relief may be granted, while the court declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state and local claims. The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a third amended complaint because the proposed amendment did not add new facts and the court was declining jurisdiction over the state and local claims without viable federal claims against the City.

The court nevertheless granted permission for the plaintiffs to file a motion seeking leave to submit another proposed amended complaint within 21 days. The court stated that failure to make a timely motion or to show that amendment would not be futile would result in dismissal of the action with prejudice. The parties were also ordered to file a status report about the claims against Wilson, which remained live. Judge Laura Taylor Swain signed the opinion and order.