Lopez Benitez v. Francis

Background

Carlos Javier Lopez Benitez filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his detention by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and seeking release. He alleged that masked ICE agents detained him on July 16, 2025, as he left an immigration-court hearing in Manhattan. He also alleged that the detention was violent and that he was held for about three days at an ICE facility without a bed, bathing facilities, or a change of clothes before being transferred to Texas.

Lopez Benitez had entered the United States in 2023, was charged as a noncitizen present without being admitted or paroled, and was released that year on his own recognizance under section 236 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226. He lived in New York for more than two years, regularly attended immigration-court proceedings, filed an asylum application, worked in construction, attended church, and had no criminal history. ICE arrested him again in July 2025 under a warrant also issued under § 1226.

Which detention statute applied

The government argued during the litigation that Lopez Benitez was subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), which applies to certain noncitizens seeking admission. Lopez Benitez argued that § 1226(a) applied instead. That statute allows discretionary detention of certain noncitizens already in the United States and permits release on bond or conditional parole.

The court concluded that § 1226(a) governed for two independent reasons. First, the government’s own documents showed that it had treated Lopez Benitez’s 2023 arrest, release, and 2025 arrest as actions under § 1226. The court rejected the government’s new argument that § 1225 might have applied to his initial encounter because the record did not support that theory and the government had previously maintained that § 1226 applied.

Second, the court held that § 1225(b)(2)(A) did not apply to a person who had already been residing in the United States for more than two years. In the court’s view, the phrase “seeking admission” refers to an active effort to obtain entry, while Lopez Benitez was already living in the country. The court also relied on the statutory structure, regulations, and decisions from other courts distinguishing mandatory detention under § 1225 from discretionary detention under § 1226.

Due process

The court held that detention under § 1226(a) requires an individualized custody determination. Under the statute and implementing regulations, officials must exercise judgment about whether detention is appropriate, including consideration of whether the noncitizen poses a danger to people or property or is likely to appear at future proceedings. A detained noncitizen may then seek review of the custody decision before an immigration judge.

The court found no evidence that ICE made any individualized determination before arresting Lopez Benitez. The record did not identify who made the decision, when it was made, what facts supported it, whether circumstances had changed since his 2023 release, or whether a new policy caused the detention. The government also did not identify evidence that Lopez Benitez was a flight risk or danger to the community.

Applying the due-process balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, the court found that Lopez Benitez had a strong liberty interest, a high risk of an erroneous deprivation of that liberty, and that the government had not shown a significant interest supporting his continued detention. The court emphasized that it was not requiring an adversarial hearing before every ICE detention or limiting the government’s ability to change enforcement priorities. It held only that § 1226(a) required some valid exercise of discretion, which the record did not show.

Administrative exhaustion

Administrative exhaustion is the general practice of requiring a person to pursue available administrative remedies before seeking relief in federal court. The court held that exhaustion was not required here. A later bond hearing before an immigration judge could review custody conditions but could not remedy ICE’s failure to make the required initial individualized decision before detention. The court also found that the petition raised a substantial constitutional question that immigration authorities could not adequately resolve after the fact.

Disposition

The court granted the petition. It ordered the respondents to transport Lopez Benitez back to the Southern District of New York and release him immediately after the transfer. The government confirmed that he was released on July 31, 2025. The written opinion superseded the court’s earlier oral ruling, and the clerk was directed to terminate the case.