LaPolice v. FAM, LLC

Background

Lauren LaPolice sued FAM, LLC, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the New York City Human Rights Law. She alleged that FAM discriminated against her because of her pregnancy when it terminated her employment as Senior Merchandising Manager on December 13, 2022. LaPolice had learned she was pregnant in October 2022 and told three coworkers, but she did not tell the people who made the termination decision before the termination call.

FAM argued that it eliminated LaPolice’s position for business and operational reasons and wanted two Los Angeles-based merchandisers. During the termination call, FAM’s Salamat told LaPolice that the arrangement would not work unless she moved to Los Angeles. LaPolice then said she could not move to California because she was pregnant. Salamat testified that she learned of the pregnancy at that point. FAM moved for summary judgment, which asks whether the evidence presents a genuine dispute that requires a trial.

Other Motions

The parties filed cross-motions to strike portions of each other’s filings. The court said it would disregard unsupported, inadmissible, or conclusory material, but it denied both motions to strike because the challenged statements were not abusive.

Court’s Analysis

For the Title VII claim, the court applied the three-step framework used in employment-discrimination cases. A plaintiff must initially show, among other things, circumstances supporting an inference that the adverse employment action was discriminatory. The court said discriminatory intent generally cannot be inferred from circumstances unknown to the employer. When pregnancy is not apparent and has not been disclosed to the employer, the plaintiff must provide evidence that the employer knew about the pregnancy.

The court did not decide whether LaPolice’s willingness to work in a particular location concerned her qualifications for the position or instead FAM’s later obligation to give a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. It ruled that this issue did not need to be resolved because LaPolice had not created a genuine dispute about discriminatory intent.

LaPolice relied on text messages exchanged by Salamat and Emamjomeh after the termination call. She argued that the messages showed Salamat knew about her pregnancy before the call. FAM argued that the messages referred to whether Salamat first announced the termination or LaPolice first disclosed her pregnancy. The court accepted FAM’s interpretation, finding that the text exchange’s language and the testimony of the people who sent and received the messages supported that reading. It found that LaPolice offered no evidence beyond conclusory assertions that the witnesses’ testimony was false.

LaPolice also argued that the timing between telling Jacobs about her pregnancy and the later termination supported an inference of discrimination. The court rejected that argument because Jacobs was not involved in the employment decision, and LaPolice did not show that Salamat or Emamjomeh learned about the pregnancy through Jacobs or anyone else before deciding to terminate her position.

The court applied the same basic requirement to the New York City Human Rights Law claim: LaPolice had to show that her termination resulted from discriminatory intent. Because the decisionmakers were unaware of her pregnancy when they made the decision, the court found that she could not establish that the termination was motivated by pregnancy or gender discrimination.

Disposition

The court concluded that LaPolice failed to establish the required initial showing for either claim. It granted FAM’s motion for summary judgment and stated that LaPolice’s Title VII and New York City Human Rights Law pregnancy-discrimination claims must be dismissed. It denied the parties’ cross-motions to strike and directed the Clerk of Court to close the case.