Salcido v. City of Mountain View

Background

Felix Salcido, a tow truck driver for Ed’s Tow & Cradle, alleged that he was arrested and charged with a felony after towing three unauthorized vehicles from reserved parking spaces, including Ellen Kamei’s vehicle. Kamei, a Mountain View city council member and defendant, complained about the tow to Police Chief Max Bosel. Bosel directed Sergeant Christopher Goff to investigate Salcido and the towing company. Goff prepared a police report, which was submitted as part of an application for an arrest warrant. A district attorney charged Salcido under California law. The charge was later dismissed.

Salcido brought one claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law allowing claims against people who violate constitutional rights while acting under state authority. He alleged that Goff and Kamei maliciously prosecuted him in retaliation for towing Kamei’s vehicle, violating his Fourth Amendment rights. He sued Goff and Kamei in both their individual and official capacities and also sued the City of Mountain View.

Legal standard

The defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint contains enough facts to state a legally plausible claim. At this stage, the court accepted the complaint’s factual allegations as true but did not accept conclusory statements or unreasonable inferences as facts. The court also explained that leave to amend ordinarily should be granted when additional facts might cure the pleading problems.

Goff

The court held that Salcido failed to state a malicious-prosecution claim against Goff. Salcido alleged that Goff’s police report omitted material facts and that Goff knew the tows were legal. But the court found those allegations conclusory and unsupported by the other facts in the complaint. Salcido alleged that Goff saw signs reserving the parking spaces and knew the tows were an ongoing issue, but he did not adequately allege that Goff knew the vehicles blocked an entrance or exit and deliberately omitted that information from the report.

Salcido also alleged that Goff omitted Kamei’s involvement and Goff’s communications with owners of other towed vehicles. The court ruled that Salcido did not adequately explain how including those facts in the report would have changed the finding of probable cause, particularly if the circumstances of the charged tow independently established probable cause. The court stated that allegations of deliberate or reckless conduct or retaliation were not enough because a judicial-deception claim also requires the alleged omissions to have been material to probable cause.

Kamei

The court treated the complaint as suing Kamei in both her individual and official capacities. It also held that Salcido adequately alleged that Kamei acted under color of state law—the requirement that the conduct be connected to the authority or duties provided by the state—because he alleged that she used channels available to her as a council member and reported the tow as part of her alleged official duties.

Nevertheless, the court held that Salcido failed to state a malicious-prosecution claim against Kamei. The complaint alleged that Kamei reported false information to Chief Bosel, which led to Goff’s investigation and police report. But, as with the claim against Goff, Salcido did not plausibly allege that he was charged without probable cause or that Kamei’s alleged false statements were material to the probable-cause finding.

City of Mountain View

The court held that Salcido also failed to state a municipal-liability claim against the City under Monell v. Department of Social Services. A city may be liable under § 1983 for an unconstitutional injury caused by an official policy, widespread practice, final policymaker, or inadequate training. But such a claim depends on an underlying constitutional violation by a municipal officer. Because Salcido failed to state a malicious-prosecution claim against Goff or Kamei, he also failed to state a claim against the City.

Qualified immunity and disposition

The court did not reach the defendants’ arguments that Goff and Kamei were entitled to qualified immunity, which can protect government officials from personal liability in some circumstances.

The court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss the second amended complaint. Because it was not clear that amendment would be futile, the court dismissed the complaint with leave to amend. Salcido was ordered to file a third amended complaint, or a statement that he did not intend to amend, by October 6, 2025.