Dominguez Sanchez v. Bondi

Background

Belsai D.S. is a native and citizen of Mexico who has resided in the United States since approximately 1990, having arrived as a child. He entered without inspection or permission. Beginning in 2014, the government granted him Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) status, which he has renewed every two years. His most recent DACA renewal was approved on September 5, 2025.

On August 12, 2025, federal immigration authorities arrested Belsai D.S. in Bloomington and served him with a Notice to Appear (NTA) and an arrest warrant. The NTA charged that he was subject to removal because he entered without inspection and was never admitted or paroled. He has been held in Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detention in Elk River, Minnesota since his arrest. The court noted in a footnote that he had been arrested by local police on August 10, 2025, on a domestic charge, which triggered ICE investigation, but that arrest did not make him subject to mandatory detention under either § 1226(c) or the Laken Riley Act.

On July 8, 2025, the Department of Homeland Security issued an internal policy memo asserting that noncitizens present in the United States who entered without inspection are subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) — a provision historically applied to arriving aliens at the border — and are ineligible for a bond hearing before an immigration judge.

Claims

Belsai D.S. filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus (a court order challenging the lawfulness of detention) under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, asserting five counts:

- Count One: A declaration that he is detained under the discretionary framework of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1), not the mandatory detention provision of § 1225(b)(2), and an order requiring a bond hearing. - Count Two and Count Four: That denying him bond eligibility violates § 1226(a)(2)(A) and related regulations. - Count Three: That denying him a bond hearing violates his right to due process under the Fifth Amendment. - Count Five: That applying § 1225(b)(2)'s mandatory detention to him violates the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).

Jurisdiction

Respondents argued that multiple statutes stripped the court of jurisdiction, particularly 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), which bars courts from hearing claims "arising from" the government's decision to commence removal proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.

The court rejected this argument. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (1999), which held that § 1252(g) is narrow and applies only to three discrete actions, the court found that Belsai D.S.'s challenge — disputing the legal basis and framework for his detention, not challenging the commencement of removal proceedings — falls outside § 1252(g)'s scope. The court also noted disagreement with another recent decision in this district, S.Q.D.C. v. Bondi, which had found § 1252(g) stripped jurisdiction in a similar case.

Merits: Which Detention Statute Applies

The core legal issue was whether Belsai D.S.'s detention is governed by:

- 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2): Mandatory detention for "applicants for admission" — historically applied to people apprehended at the border or ports of entry who are "seeking admission" and whom an examining immigration officer determines are not clearly entitled to be admitted. No bond hearing is available under this provision. - 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a): Discretionary detention for noncitizens already in the country who are subject to removal proceedings. Under this provision, unless mandatory detention under § 1226(c) applies, the person is entitled to a bond hearing at which they may seek release by showing they are not a flight risk or danger to the community.

The government argued that because Belsai D.S. entered without inspection, he is statutorily deemed an "applicant for admission" under § 1225(a)(1), and therefore subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2).

The court rejected this in four respects:

1. Plain Language: "Seeking Admission" Section 1225(b)(2)(A) requires not only that someone be an "applicant for admission" but also that they be "seeking admission" — language the government's interpretation effectively erases. The court agreed with numerous other courts that "seeking admission" refers to someone presently and actively attempting to enter the country, not someone who entered without inspection decades ago and has been living in the United States since.

2. Structure of § 1226(a) and § 1226(c) Section 1226(a) on its face covers noncitizens subject to removal proceedings who are pending a decision on removability. The mandatory detention carve-out in § 1226(c) explicitly covers both "inadmissible" noncitizens (those never admitted) and "deportable" ones (those previously admitted). This structure shows Congress knew how to account for people like Belsai D.S. within § 1226.

3. The Laken Riley Act Would Be Superfluous Congress enacted the Laken Riley Act in January 2025, amending § 1226(c)(1)(E) to mandate detention for noncitizens who entered without inspection and who are charged with, arrested for, convicted of, or admit to committing certain crimes. If § 1225(b)(2) already required mandatory detention of all noncitizens who entered without inspection, this amendment would have been unnecessary. Courts are required to avoid interpretations that render statutory text superfluous.

4. Context, Structure, Legislative History, and Agency Practice The court found § 1225 is structurally directed at inspection and detention of people arriving at the border and ports of entry, while § 1226 governs those already in the country. This reading is consistent with the Supreme Court's summary in Jennings v. Rodriguez (2018). The court also found the government's position inconsistent with longstanding prior agency practice and relevant legislative history, and found a recent Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision (Matter of Yajure Hurtado) adopting the government's interpretation unpersuasive in light of the statutory text, citing the Supreme Court's Loper Bright decision on agency deference.

Disposition

The court granted the habeas petition on Count One. It:

The court declined to rule on the APA claim (Count Five) and found it unnecessary at this time to address Counts Two, Three, and Four, given that habeas relief was the appropriate and sufficient remedy. The court also declined to dismiss any named Respondents, finding the question of which Respondents are proper parties had not been adequately briefed.

Note on Related Cases

The court cited an extensive list of district courts across the country that have reached the same conclusion and rejected the government's § 1225(b)(2) mandatory-detention argument for long-term residents who entered without inspection.