Swinton v. Department of Justice

Background

Malik Haleem Swinton filed the action without a lawyer. He sought relief based on his removal from a GEO Group halfway house in Oakland, California, in September 2020, followed by his arrest and imprisonment. He alleged that defendants were responsible for the arrest and detention and sought an unspecified amount of compensatory, statutory, and punitive damages.

The second amended complaint named James Highsman, identified as a Bureau of Prisons reentry officer, and Matthew Lang, identified as the director of GEO Group’s halfway house. Swinton alleged that he was removed from the halfway house without an explanation, arrested, and held in jail for about two and a half months. He also alleged that he was treated differently from a white man who had traveled with him to the halfway house. The complaint asserted claims under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Law Enforcement Officers’ Safety Act. It also cited 18 U.S.C. §§ 242 and 1001 in connection with the claims against GEO Group and Lang.

GEO Group and Matthew Lang

The court granted the motion to dismiss filed by GEO Group and Lang for failure to state a federal-law claim. The court concluded that GEO Group and Lang were not the people or entities that arrested or incarcerated Swinton and did not have authority to arrest or detain him.

The court also held that 18 U.S.C. §§ 242 and 1001 do not provide a private right of action, meaning that those statutes do not authorize an individual to sue for damages. The Title VI claim against Lang failed because Title VI claims cannot be brought against individual defendants. The Title VI claim against GEO Group failed because Swinton’s allegation of intentional racial discrimination was conclusory and speculative. In particular, the court found that the complaint did not allege that the white halfway-house resident was materially similar to Swinton, including whether he was a retired law-enforcement officer or had been accused of possessing a firearm.

The court dismissed the federal-law claims against GEO Group and Lang and dismissed them from the action with prejudice. It also stated that Swinton had previously amended his complaint and had been unable to state a claim against them.

Federal Defendants

The court granted the motion to dismiss filed by the Bureau of Prisons, the Department of Justice, and Highsman. It dismissed the constitutional claims under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

The court explained that a Bivens remedy is a limited damages remedy implied for certain constitutional violations by federal officials. It held that a Bivens claim cannot be brought against a federal agency, so the constitutional claims against the Bureau of Prisons and the Department of Justice failed. As to Highsman, the court found that the complaint alleged only that he refused, after the arrest, to explain the arrest or provide supporting evidence. Those allegations did not reasonably show that Highsman arrested, detained, or directed the arrest or detention. The court also held that no Bivens remedy was available for the asserted Fifth Amendment double-jeopardy claim, the asserted Sixth Amendment claims, the Eighth Amendment claim, or the asserted Fourteenth Amendment due-process claim. The Fourth Amendment claim also failed because the complaint did not allege that Highsman was involved in the arrest.

The court dismissed the constitutional claims with prejudice because amendment would be futile. It dismissed the Title VI claims with prejudice because the complaint did not plausibly allege that the federal defendants arrested Swinton or discriminated against him because of his race, and because Title VI claims cannot be brought against individual defendants such as Highsman.

The court also dismissed the Law Enforcement Officers’ Safety Act claim with prejudice. It found that the complaint did not allege facts showing that the federal defendants violated that law or that Swinton possessed the required identification. The court further held that, to the extent Swinton argued that his arrest and incarceration were invalid under that law, the claim was barred by the rule recognized in Heck v. Humphrey because success would imply that an underlying conviction or sentence was invalid.

Disposition

The court granted both motions to dismiss, dismissed the second amended complaint with prejudice, entered judgment for the defendants and against Swinton, terminated the pending motions as moot, and closed the case.